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ABSTRACT 
The main aim of this thesis was to examine whether learning processes occur in fluid 
intelligence (Gf) tasks, whether it is essential for them to occur for induction to take place 
and whether they contribute to individual differences in performance. In mainstream 
differential research, Gf is conceptualised as a factor important in induction tasks that are 
considered novel and context-free (Cattell, 1963, 1987). Thus, performance has typically 
been assumed to be uninfluenced by previous acquisitions of knowledge structures.  Sources 
of individual differences in Gf task performance have been attributed to working memory 
capacity (WMC), particularly individual differences in the ability to combat proactive 
interference. In contrast, the cognitive reasoning literature associates induction with the use 
of prior conceptual knowledge. A middle-ground position is that Gf tasks may require 
learning to occur across the task, which would draw upon WMC. That is, individual 
differences in Gf task performance may be due to knowledge learnt across the task, rather 
than knowledge brought to the task. Gf items have traditionally been presented in easy-to-
hard order but easier items may unintentionally provide learning opportunity for harder items. 
This would contradict both classic and modern test theories which make the assumption that 
items within a task are independent of each other.  
The learning hypothesis was explored in the current work along with the issue of whether it is 
possible to reliably solve complex Gf items without some relevant, prior knowledge. Also, 
the distinction between within-item induction and across-item learning was investigated, 
along with the relationship between across-item learning and proactive interference. An 
experimental-differential approach was used to manipulate learning opportunity within Gf 
tasks in four experiments.  
The first experiment examined whether learning takes place in Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1962) and if so, to what extent this learning is a source of 
individual differences. Specifically, whether rule learning within the task is necessary for 
abstraction to take place and whether those of higher Gf ability learn faster than those of 
lower Gf ability.  
The next three experiments examined the distinction between knowledge that may be brought 
to the task, learning that occurs across multiple items in the task and induction within a single 
item that may be independent of any prior knowledge including knowledge learnt across the 
xv 
 
 
 
task. The effect of proactive interference as a consequence of learning and knowledge was 
also investigated. The experiments examined which of these are relevant to general 
performance (i.e., common to everyone) and which contribute to individual differences. 
Learning-opportunity was manipulated in a task from the cognitive reasoning literature – the 
Modified Sweller and Gee (MSG) Task. Traditional Series Completion tasks were used as Gf 
markers and data analyses employed Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM).  
The advantage of the MSG Task is that it has qualities typical of Gf tasks but unlike 
conventional Gf tasks, it is able to assess within-item induction in isolation from any 
potential influences from across-item learning. This is because it involves multiple attempts 
within each item with feedback, allowing single items to be administered reliably.  When 
across-item learning opportunity is absent, the MSG Task is able to provide an estimate of 
participants’ within-item induction success through the number of attempts they need within 
a single item. The amount participants learn across items can be approximated by comparing 
performance on items preceded by learning opportunity (i.e., easier items with similar rule-
types), with items not preceded by learning opportunity. Lastly, the effects of proactive 
interference can be evaluated by comparing performance on items preceded by interference 
(i.e., items with different rule-types) with those that are not preceded by interference.  
Overall, it was found that with no learning opportunity leading up to novel items (to provide 
relevant prior knowledge), solution was nearly impossible for all participants. When learning 
opportunity was provided, all participants were able to greatly improve their performance but 
those of higher Gf improved more. It was concluded that while Gf tasks appear visually 
novel, they must contain a combination of familiar elements in earlier items (which make use 
of knowledge that participants bring to the task) and novel elements in later items (which 
require the use of knowledge that must be learnt from earlier items); and those of higher Gf 
perform better on Gf tasks, at least partly because they are able to benefit more from the 
learning opportunity provided by earlier items. It was found that proactive interference 
affects all participants when they learn from prior items. However, insufficient evidence was 
found to suggest that the ability to combat proactive interference contributes to individual 
differences in performance.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Can Cognitive Psychology Tell Us Why People Differ in Differential 
Psychology’s Gf? 
The main thesis of this dissertation can be stated quite simply: While prior experience and 
knowledge may be important to inductive reasoning, what contributes to individual 
differences in Gf is dynamic and context-free learning. 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of Gf ability. In the 
differential literature, the quintessential nature of intellectual functioning has often been 
associated with general fluid intelligence (Gf) (Cattell, 1963; Gustafsson, 1988). While the 
Gf construct has reliably been identified using correlational methods such as factor analysis, 
its exact nature is still rather poorly understood (Carlstedt, Gustafsson, & Ullstadius, 2000). 
Much research effort has been devoted to understanding Gf itself and what causes people to 
differ on Gf. Traditionally, Gf has been defined as the ability to reason and solve novel 
problems that do not rely extensively on an explicit base of knowledge such as that which 
might be developed from schooling or previous experience (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990). 
This definition is based on the observation that tasks which load on Gf are often abstract, 
inductive reasoning tasks that require participants to induce novel rules that govern the 
relationship between abstract stimuli (such as geometric shapes, numerals or letters). This 
thesis aims to gain a better understanding of Gf, through investigating why people differ on 
Gf tasks. 
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A proper explanation of why people differ on Gf tasks would require a description of the 
processes involved in performing the tasks and the ways in which these processes differ in 
different people (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003; Floyd, 2005; Schlinger, 
2003).  Many researchers have recommended that differential psychology take note of 
process theories from cognitive psychology (Cronbach, 1957; Deary, 2001; Lohman, 2000).  
However, combining the two approaches is not without some complications. Cognitive 
psychologists have been concerned with how people reason in general and have developed 
theories that account for processes that are common to all people (Mackintosh, 1998).  
Studies and theorising have been aimed at isolating reasoning processes common to all. In 
contrast, the abilities identified by differential psychology are based on individual differences 
(variation in performance). Thus, theories from cognitive psychology are not easily mapped 
onto the Gf construct.  
1.2 The Problem: Cognitive Theories Conflict with the Conceptualisation 
of Gf  
The difficulty of using theories from cognitive psychology to explain differences in 
performance on Gf tasks is illustrated by cognitive theories of induction, which seem to 
conflict with differential psychology’s conceptualisation of Gf. Cognitive theories of 
inductive reasoning that are broad enough to be applicable to all Gf tasks, emphasise the 
importance of prior conceptual knowledge in the inductive process (Holland, Holyoak, 
Nisbett, & Thagard, 1989; Sternberg, 1986). For example, according to Holland et al. (1989), 
induction cannot take place without previous knowledge. Due to the nature of inductive 
reasoning (i.e., reasoning in the absence of complete information), the solution to inductive 
problems can only be considered plausible (rather than correct) at best. Thus, whether a 
solution could be characterized as plausible can be determined only with reference to the 
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current knowledge of the person. Hence, induction is highly context dependent because it is 
guided by prior knowledge.  This conflicts with the differential literature’s conceptualisation 
of Gf as a context-free ability to solve novel problems (particularly inductive problems) that 
do not rely extensively on an explicit base of knowledge.  
1.3 A Possible Solution: The Learning Hypothesis 
It is possible to reconcile the two disparate views of induction and Gf, if cognitive processes 
involved in Gf tasks are conceptualised as three broad, non-mutually exclusive types:  
1) Processes that occur. 
2) Processes that need to occur for induction to take place. 
3) Processes that contribute to individual differences.  
With regard to “processes that occur”, it is possible that not all processes that occur in Gf 
tasks need to occur for induction to take place nor do they all contribute to individual 
differences in performance on that task. For example, during the course of solving a Gf task, 
participants may be reminded of similar tasks. This process does not need to occur for 
induction to take place nor would it contribute to performance on that task.  
Similarly, with regard to “processes that need to occur”, it is possible that not all processes 
that need to occur for induction to take place, contribute to individual differences in 
performance. For instance, the use of conceptual knowledge may be required in induction but 
it may not contribute to individual differences in Gf task performance and hence, would not 
be considered a defining feature of the Gf construct (which is defined by variation in 
performance).  
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Instead, what contributes to individual differences may be learning – a dynamic, fluid, 
context-free process. We argue that learning processes as a source of individual difference in 
Gf has been undervalued in mainstream research.  That is, we will argue that research from 
disparate fields converge on the notion that what contributes to individual differences in Gf 
may be learning – a dynamic, fluid, context-free process. We also propose that learning 
processes that occur across items within Gf tasks may act as the mediator between the 
novelty in Gf items and the knowledge needed to solve them. If correct, Gf (being an 
individual differences construct) could still legitimately be conceptualised as fluid and 
context-free.  
A major focus of this thesis will be to empirically determine whether learning occurs in Gf 
tasks, whether it needs to occur for induction to take place and whether it contributes to 
individual differences. There is certainly evidence in both the differential literature (Carlstedt 
et al., 2000; Verguts & De Boeck, 2002a, 2002b) and the cognitive literature (Anderson, 
1993; Gick & Holyoak, 1983 ; Holland et al., 1989) that learning is important in induction. 
However, there is also research that suggests that learning does not occur in Gf tasks 
(Alderton & Larson, 1990; Sternberg et al., 2002), that it does not need to occur (Sternberg, 
1986; Sternberg & Berg, 1986) and that it does not contribute to individual differences in 
performance on Gf tasks (Unsworth & Engle, 2005a). Furthermore, both classic and modern 
test theory make the assumption that conditional on person ability and item difficulty, items 
within a task are independent of each other. That is, items can in principle be presented in any 
order without changing the nature of the construct being measured. However, if learning 
occurs from one item to another, this would contradict the common test-theory assumption of 
item independence (D. P. Birney & Sternberg, 2006). Thus, the questions of whether learning 
occurs within Gf tasks and how it contributes to performance in Gf tasks are worth 
investigation.  
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1.4 Overview of the Thesis 
We will be using a combined cognitive-differential approach to manipulate learning 
opportunity within Gf tasks in four experiments. Specifically, we will be using and 
synthesising various theories of induction to gain a better understanding of how learning 
processes might operate in Gf tasks and to derive hypotheses about the outcome of learning 
manipulations in Gf tasks. Cognitive theories may give us insights into the cognitive 
processes involved in Gf task, but they are hypotheses that need to be empirically tested, 
particularly because it is not clear how or if they apply to reasoning within Gf tasks. That is, 
it is not clear if cognitive theories can explain performance on Gf tasks generally, at the mean 
group level, before individual differences are taken into account. Theories designed to 
explain performance on tasks from the cognitive literature may not be applicable to tasks 
from the differential literature. Furthermore, cognitive theories do not explicitly pinpoint 
processes that may be sources of individual differences. Thus, it may be necessary to make 
significant modifications/extensions to these theories for them to be able to explain mean 
performance on Gf tasks and individual differences in performance on Gf tasks. 
Chapter 2 of the thesis will be a review of the literature (theories, findings and issues) 
relevant to the study of Gf and its processes. This will include an outline of the differential 
approach to the study of intelligence (which gave rise to the Gf construct) and the cognitive-
differential approach (which arose out of the aim to uncover the cognitive processes involved 
in ability constructs such as Gf). The reasons for why experimental manipulations and broad, 
comprehensive cognitive theories are needed to make the link between processes (from 
cognitive psychology) and Gf comprehensible will be discussed.   
In Chapter 3, three broad, comprehensive cognitive theories of induction will be outlined, 
each with different degrees of emphasis on knowledge and learning. The implications of 
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these theories for the processes that may be involved in Gf tasks will be discussed. Our 
general hypotheses for the thesis (about how learning may be involved Gf tasks) will be 
outlined in detail.  
Chapter 4 will examine whether learning takes place in Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices (a ubiquitous Gf task) and if so, to what extent learning is a source of individual 
differences (Experiment 1). Specifically, we will examine whether rule learning within the 
task is necessary for abstraction to take place, and whether those of higher Gf ability learn 
faster than those of lower Gf ability. Implications for competing accounts of induction will be 
discussed.  That is, discussion will revolve around how well the classical conceptualisation of 
Gf, knowledge-based theories of induction, and learning-based theories of induction are able 
to explain the results at the level of group differences and at the level of individual 
differences. 
Chapter 5 will consist of one pilot study (Experiment 2) and Chapters 6 and 7 will consist of 
two larger studies (Experiments 3 and 4, respectively). These studies examine a number of 
issues including those that are raised by the results of Experiment 1, Chapter 4. These 
chapters more explicitly examine the distinction and similarities between the learning that 
may occur across items within a task, knowledge that may be brought to a task and reasoning 
within an item that may be independent of any outside knowledge or across-item learning. 
These chapters also examine the relationship between learning and item-order effects and 
proactive interference (considered a consequence of learning). The studies examine which of 
these are relevant to performance and individual differences in the Number Series and Letter 
Series tasks (ubiquitous Gf tasks) and a modified Gf-like task from Sweller and Gee (1978), 
which has characteristics ideal for exploring the questions of interest – the “Modified Sweller 
and Gee” (MSG) Task.  
7 
 
 
 
Lastly, Chapter 8 integrates the main issues addressed in each of the other chapters. Particular 
emphasis will be given to the implications of the empirical findings for how Gf should be 
conceptualised in relation to induction and the involvement of learning, use of knowledge and 
the combating of proactive interference.  
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CHAPTER 2 
INTELLIGENCE & FLUID INTELLIGENCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Gf arose out of research aimed at understanding human intelligence. Since then, much 
research effort has been devoted to understanding Gf itself and what causes people to differ 
on Gf tasks. This chapter outlines the theoretical context in which Gf and the studies of its 
processes developed.  
The differential research approach (from which the concept of Gf developed) emerged from 
early aspirations to more systematically understand the organization (structure) of abilities 
that may be associated with intelligent functioning. However, the differential approach was 
unable to identify the reasons why people differ on Gf tasks and this led to the cognitive-
differential approach. This chapter outlines these two approaches, including what they reveal 
about Gf and what we still do not know. It starts with a discussion of the shortcomings of 
conceptualizations of intelligence which are based on impressions and assumptions about the 
nature of intelligence. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the reasons as to why more 
comprehensive theorizing and theory testing is needed before processes identified in the 
cognitive literature can be meaningfully linked to abilities from the differential literature. 
2.2 The Definition of Intelligence – or Lack Thereof  
“Looked at in one way, everyone knows what intelligence is; looked at another way, no one 
does…people all have conceptions [of intelligence]…but no one knows for certain what it 
actually is.” – Sternberg (Sternberg, 2000). 
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Many debates and confusion in intelligence research arise as a result of the lack of agreement 
over how intelligence should be defined and conceptualised. Hence, a discussion of this issue 
and any implicit assumptions about what is meant when the term “intelligence” is used is 
important for any study that is about intelligence or intelligence-related concepts.  
Studies of lay conceptions of intelligence (for example see, Sternberg, 2000), where 
participants are asked what they consider to be “intelligence”, have revealed that what people 
understand intelligence to mean varies from person to person and from culture to culture, and 
even within cultures. Where commonalities exists, it is in terms of an emphasis on reasoning 
and problem solving (Sternberg, 2000).  
There is equal disagreement amongst researchers of intelligence. Various vague definitions 
have been put forward  (see Sternberg & Berg, 1986 for a collection of examples). Adaption 
to the environment, basic mental processes and higher order thinking such as the ability to 
reason, think abstractly, learn, problem solve and make decisions, are often mentioned as 
being attributes of intelligence. That is, dominant attempts at definitions of intelligence tend 
to be attempts at specifying what attributes are necessary for a person to be considered 
intelligent (Neisser et al., 1996). Intelligent people are considered to possess the attributes of 
being able to reason, think abstractly, learn etc.  
A criticism of this approach of specifying attributes is put forward by Schlinger (2003) who 
believes such attempts at defining intelligence results in erroneous, circular explanations of 
intelligent behaviour. An example of such circular reasoning is as follows. 1) A person 
displays a behaviour society regards as intelligent – such as successfully solving a reasoning 
problem. 2) The explanation for the intelligent behaviour is that the person possesses 
intelligence. However, this type of explanation simply takes the name or label given to a 
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behaviour (i.e., “intelligent” behaviour) and converts it into the explanation of that very same 
behaviour (i.e., intelligence was the reason for that intelligent behaviour – the act of 
successfully solving a reasoning problem). According to Schlinger (2003), this type of 
conceptualization of intelligence is a reification - intelligence is incorrectly assumed to be an 
attribute or essence possessed by a person that determines their behaviour; and when 
intelligence as an essence or attribute is assumed, researchers then feel that a definition of the 
essence or quality can be formulated. The end result is that the definitions formulated are just 
based on the behaviour observed in the first place. For example the definition of intelligence 
as “capacity to learn” is often formulated by teachers trying to explain why some are better at 
learning than others. This is circular. While this method of formulating definitions is 
practiced by both lay people and researchers alike (see Sternberg, 2000; Sternberg & Berg, 
1986 for examples) it does not get us very far.  
Instead, Cattell (1987) and Schlinger (2003) advocate that researchers must discover the 
definition through experimentally analysing behaviour and looking for regularities, order and 
structure. Indeed, understanding behaviour in the scientific sense means being able to specify 
the historical and contemporary conditions or variables necessary for its occurrence (i.e., 
cause and effect relations). This may be what is needed to get at the essence of intelligence, 
to formulate a real definition that goes beyond circular reasoning. If so, formulating a 
definition of intelligence would involve an iterative process of the formulation of theories and 
empirical study. This may be true because so far, a satisfactory (comprehensive) definition of 
intelligence still seems to be “a work in progress”.  
The next sections outline the two major areas of work that have been done in the field of 
intelligence research – “differential” research and “cognitive-differential” research. 
Historically, the main approach to the study of intelligence has been the differential approach.  
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It is the approach from which Gf originally emerged, but it has certain limitations. While it 
has been able to identify and categorize ways in which people differ in performance on 
various Gf tasks (i.e., to identify abilities), it has not been as successful at identifying the 
causes as to why people differ in these abilities. The cognitive-differential approach arose as 
an attempt to address this limitation. These two approaches will be discussed in more detail in 
the next sections.  
2.3 The Differential Approach – The Origins of Gf  
“We know how to measure something called intelligence, but we do not know what has been 
measured” –  Brody (2000). 
The differential approach is also known as the “individual differences” approach and the 
“psychometric” approach. It is often called the psychometric approach because it is based on 
the idea that basic mental abilities can be discovered and classified through psychological 
tests and psychometric analysis. It is often called the differential or individual differences 
approach because the (implicit) assumption is that between-individual variation in task 
performance is caused by individual variation in one or more underlying abilities (Borsboom, 
Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004) and if the selection of tasks is conducted in an 
appropriate way, abilities can be identified by factors in a factor analysis. 
The differential approach began with Charles Spearman. Spearman (1932) examined a large 
amount of data from various studies that used mental abilities tasks and found that almost all 
correlations were positive. Using factor analysis he found that a general factor (which he 
called “g”) could be extracted from these tasks. However, tasks were not perfectly correlated 
and tasks that were similar to each other (in some way) correlated more highly with each 
other. Hence, Spearman concluded that task performance was determined by a g factor and 
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factors specific to those tasks (which he called specific factors “s”). The g factor has been 
interpreted by many as being statistical evidence for the existence of a “general intelligence” 
(for examples see Gottfredson, 1997; Jensen, 1998). That is, it has been assumed by many 
researchers that it is intelligence that causes the positive correlations between mental abilities 
tasks.  
Spearman’s (1932)  g was challenged when Thurstone (1938; Thurstone, 1947) developed a 
method of factor analysis different to Spearman’s method. Thurstone argued that factors 
should be rotated to “simple structure” which resulted in a factor structure in which tasks 
loaded highly on a single factor and had near zero loadings on other factors. Thurstone’s 
analyses led him to conclude that there were several primary ability factors, including verbal 
comprehension, number facility, spatial reasoning, memory, deduction, and inductive abilities 
(Brody, 2000), rather than just a single general factor g. However, the difference in 
Spearman’s and Thurstone’s results was largely due the use of different methods of factor 
analysis; because mathematically, there is very little difference in the amount of variability 
captured by the two approaches.  
According to Brody (2000), correlation matrices of ability measures can usually be 
interpreted as containing a g factor that accounts for about 50% of the covariance in the 
matrix. Clearly, g does not cover all the covariance in the correlation matrix. Narrow ability 
measures must be postulated to better account for relationships in the matrix.  
The psychometric models currently most commonly endorsed have a hierarchical structure 
(Davidson & Downing, 2000) that can reconcile Spearman’s (1932) and Thurstone’s (1938; 
Thurstone, 1947) models. This type of structure places one or more general factors at the top 
of the hierarchy and delegates specific factors to lower levels. That is, when first order factors 
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are observed to correlate with each other, one or more second order factors are introduced to 
explain the intercorrelations. Third order factors might also be introduced to account for 
intercorrelations between second order factors. These are even more general than the second 
order factors and appear above them in a hierarchical model. The higher the factor on a 
hierarchical model, the further removed it is from people’s actual performance on 
psychometric tasks (Davidson & Downing, 2000). It is important to note that based on 
statistical criteria alone, the different models are almost indistinguishable. Thus, preference 
for the number of levels in the hierarchy is based on theoretical stance.  
Currently, the hierarchical Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory (Flanagan, McGrew, & Ortiz, 
2000; McGrew, Flanagan, Keith, & Vanderwood, 1997) is the most supported psychometric 
theory of the structure of cognitive abilities (Alfonso, Flanagan, & Radwan, 2005). It builds 
upon the integrated empirical research and theorising of Raymond Cattell, John Horn and 
John Carroll (Neisser et al., 1996; Alfonso et al., 2005) and includes evidence from 
developmental, neurocognitive, and outcome criterion studies (Alfonso et al., 2005; Horn & 
Blankson, 2005; Neisser et al., 1996).  
Cattell (1963; Cattell, 1987) put forward a theory of cognitive abilities that was based on two 
main factors, fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc).  In this Gf-Gc theory, 
Gf was conceptualised as a factor that represents what is common to reasoning tasks and 
tasks that require adaption to new situations. Gf was considered to be influenced by 
incidental learning and biological factors. Gc was conceptualised as a factor that contributes 
to performance on tasks that require acquired knowledge and is largely influenced by 
acculturation. Horn (1968; Horn & Blankson, 2005) and Carroll (1993) independently added 
to Cattell’s model other factors that they thought should be considered distinct from Gf and 
Gc. Although the factors added by each were not identical, they were very similar. The main 
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difference between Horn and Carroll’s models was that Carroll’s model contained a higher 
order g factor whereas Horn (and Cattell’s) model did not. Descriptions and comparisons of 
these factors and models can be found in (Alfonso et al., 2005).  
In an attempt to resolve the differences between the models, McGrew (2005) proposed an 
integrated Gf-Gc theory which is now known as the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory.   
CHC theory consists of seventy narrow abilities (first order factors), ten broad cognitive 
abilities (second order factors) and no general ability factor.  
The results from the differential approach are considered first approximations to the 
description and organization of human cognitive abilities (Horn & Blankson, 2005). After 
various empirical research studies and model refinement by multiple researchers, the ten 
broad factors and narrow abilities from CHC theory (listed in Table 2.1) are currently the 
most widely used description and organization of human cognitive abilities (Alfonso et al., 
2005). It is subject to further empirical research and model refinement, and is thus unlikely to 
be the final list.  An issue of contention is the omission of g in the CHC theory (Alfonso et 
al., 2005). The importance and necessity of g has been a constant source of disagreement 
amongst differential researchers. Nevertheless, researchers largely agree on the existence of 
the ten broad cognitive abilities, particularly Gf.  
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Table 2.1   
Broad Factors and their Narrow Abilities, from the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory of 
cognitive abilities. From Alfonso et al. (2005). 
Broad Factors Narrow Abilities 
·    Fluid Intelligence (Gf)  ·         Induction 
·         General Sequential (deductive) Reasoning  
·         Quantitative Reasoning  
·         Piagetian Reasoning  
·         Speed of Reasoning  
 
·   Quantitative Knowledge (Gq) ·         Mathematical Knowledge 
·         Mathematical Achievement 
 
·   Crystallized Intelligence (Gc)  ·         Language Development  
·         Lexical Knowledge  
·         Listening Ability  
·         General Information  
·         Information about Culture 
·         General Science Information 
·         Geography Achievement  
·         Communication Ability  
·         Oral Production and Fluency  
·         Grammatical Sensitivity  
·         Foreign Language Proficiency  
·         Foreign Language Aptitude  
 
·   Reading & Writing (Grw) ·         Reading Decoding 
·         Reading Comprehension 
·         Verbal Language Comprehension 
·         Cloze Ability 
·         Spelling Ability 
·         Writing Ability 
·         English Usage Knowledge 
·         Reading Speed  
 
·   Short-Term Memory (Gsm) ·         Memory Span  
·         Working Memory 
·         Learning Abilities 
 
·   Visual Processing (Gv) ·         Visualization  
·         Spatial Relations  
·         Closure Speed  
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·         Flexibility of Closure  
·         Visual Memory  
·         Spatial Scanning  
·         Serial Perceptual Integration  
·         Length Estimation  
·         Perceptual Illusions  
·         Perceptual Alternations  
·         Imagery  
 
·   Auditory Processing (Ga) ·         Phonetic Coding  
·         Speech Sound Discrimination  
·         Resistance to Auditory Stimulus Distortion  
·         Memory for Sound Patterns  
·         General Sound Discrimination  
·         Temporal Tracking  
·         Musical Discrimination and Judgment  
·         Maintaining and Judging Rhythm  
·         Sound-Intensity/Duration Discrimination  
·         Sound-Frequency Discrimination  
·         Hearing and Speech Threshold factors 
·         Absolute Pitch 
·         Sound Localization 
 
·   Long-Term Storage & Retrieval (Glr) ·         Associative Memory 
·         Meaningful Memory 
·         Free Recall Memory 
·         Ideational Fluency 
·         Associational Fluency 
·         Expressional Fluency 
·         Naming Facility 
·         Word Fluency 
·         Figural Fluency 
·         Figural Flexibility 
·         Sensitivity to Problems 
·         Originality/Creativity  
·         Learning Abilities 
 
·   Processing Speed (Gs) ·         Perceptual Speed 
·         Rate-of-Test-Taking  
·         Number Facility 
 
·   Decision Speed/Reaction Time (Gt) ·         Simple Reaction Time 
·         Choice Reaction Time  
·         Semantic Processing Speed  
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·         Mental Comparison Speed 
·         Inspection Time 
    
 
2.3.1 Criticisms of the Differential Approach 
A criticism of the differential approach is as follows: factors such as Gf are used as 
explanations for people’s performances differing in consistent ways on certain tasks, yet the 
very same task performances are used to calculate correlations that constitute evidence for the 
existence of the factor (Schlinger, 2003). This is similar to the circular-reasoning criticism of 
definitions of intelligence mentioned at the start of this chapter. 
The problem is that constructs such as Gf can be reified and become empty, circular 
explanations. Explanations for performance on Gf tasks often involve the assumption that 
people vary in the amount of Gf ability that they possess. Those who are better at Gf tasks are 
said to possess more Gf ability but typically, the only evidence that they possess more Gf 
ability is that they are better at Gf tasks. In contrast, a proper explanation would involve some 
statement that would clarify why people differed in performance, beyond referring to a 
construct whose existence is based on the very same observed differences (Borsboom, 
Mellenbergh et al., 2003). While it should be acknowledged that the differential approach is 
able to describe and categorize ways in which people differ in mental performance (it 
identifies abilities through factors), it does not identify the causes for the differences between 
people (Borsboom et al., 2003; Horn & Blankson, 2005). A proper explanation of why people 
differ on the tasks would require a description of the processes involved in performing the 
tasks (which load on the factors) and the ways in which these processes differ in different 
people (Borsboom et al., 2003; Floyd, 2005; Schlinger, 2003). 
18 
 
 
 
2.4 Going beyond Circularity and Reification  
At this point, it is worth explicating the definitions of “abilities”, “factors” and “processes”, 
and how they differ. Going beyond circularity and reification requires knowing the difference 
between abilities, factors and processes. 
Ability: Carroll (1993) defines ability in terms of a potential for performance that varies from 
person to person. The existence of an ability is inferred from a collection of behaviours (e.g., 
test item responses) on which individuals vary systematically in efficiency and accuracy. An 
individual’s ability level is then conceptualised in relative terms as a comparison between his 
or her performance with that of an appropriate “standardization” group (Floyd, 2005). The 
discovery of an ability only tells us that people differ on a group of behaviours, not why they 
differ. 
Factor: A factor is a latent trait derived via factor analysis which reflects systematic 
covariation in a group of individuals’ performances across multiple tasks of a defined class 
(e.g., Gf tasks). It is argued that factor analysis distils out the systematic variation common to 
a group of tasks from the systematic variation that is unique to each individual task, therefore 
producing a “purer assessment” of the ability. That is, factor analysis more accurately pin 
points where people differ – not why they differ (Carroll, 1993).  
Process: Processes lie at a lower, more fundamental conceptual level than abilities. Carroll 
(1993) defines a process as any action or series of actions where something is operated upon 
to produce some result. Thus, a cognitive process is one in which mental representations are 
operated upon to produce either some new representations or a response (such as behaviour). 
Cognitive processes may be viewed as hypothetical constructs since they are unseen and we 
can only infer their existence from responses on tasks (Floyd, 2005).  
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The outcome of processing is what is captured in measures of abilities. That is, cognitive 
abilities represent individual differences in the complete series of cognitive processes that 
have been instantiated to arrive at a response.  
Various researchers have commented that a large proportion of task-development research is 
characterized by an absence of theories of processes, instead focusing on convergent and 
divergent (correlational) validation strategies (D. P.  Birney & Bowman, 2009; Borsboom et 
al., 2004; Schlinger, 2003). However, if one is to avoid the potential reification criticism of 
the psychometric approach, a greater understanding of the cognitive processes that are 
reflected in ability measurements is needed (Borsboom et al., 2004; Floyd, 2005; Schlinger, 
2003; Spearman, 1932). Understanding the reasons as to why people differ on an ability level 
requires an understanding of the processes involved in that ability. It is not enough to simply 
know that the ability exists or that it is more or less similar to other abilities (which is the 
information that convergent and divergent correlational strategies provides).  
The following section outlines the cognitive-differential approach to the study of intelligence. 
This is the approach that in various ways incorporates theories about cognitive processes.  
2.5 Cognitive-Differential Approach  
The cognitive-differential approach takes an ability from the differential approach and 
describes individual differences in that ability in terms of differences in information 
processing capacities or strategies. It borrows heavily from theorizing done in the cognitive 
science literature and is based on two assumptions (Mayer, 1992). Firstly, it assumes that 
there exists a cognitive architecture composed of a system of constructs such as long term 
memory, working memory, short term memory, and processes for acting on information 
represented in these subsystems. Together, they are hypothesized to be the building blocks of 
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intelligent behaviour. Secondly, it assumes individual differences - that people may differ 
with respect to the amount of capacity or efficiency of these subsystems and that these 
differences are the basis for differences in abilities.   
The cognitive-differential approach has resulted in a varied set of studies ranging from 
research that is predominately psychometric focused on the one hand, to research which is 
mostly experimentally focused on the other (see Lohman, 2000; Mackintosh, 1998 for 
comprehensive reviews). One feature that the different studies seem to have in common is 
that they apply theories and methods from the cognitive psychology literature (particularly 
the information processing branch) to tasks which have been modelled as Gf-loaded 
psychometric tasks.  
Experimentally-focused cognitive-differential studies have largely been concerned with 
detailed study of specific tasks in much the same way that cognitive psychology has been. 
Although many different tasks have been studied, the most common studies investigate tasks 
that contain analogy problems, matrix problems, series completion, and classification 
problems, with the focus of investigation being on one task at a time (for examples see 
Arendasy & Sommer, 2005; Carpenter et al., 1990; DeShon, Chan, & Weissbein, 1995; 
Embretson, 1998; Mulholland, Pellegrino, & Glaser, 1980; Primi, 2002; Quereshi, 2001; 
Richardson, 1991; Simon & Kotovsky, 1963; Unsworth & Engle, 2005b; Verguts, De Boeck, 
& Maris, 2000; Vigneau, Caissie, & Bors, 2006). Some common methodologies include 
computer simulation of problem solving behaviours, analysis of task components, 
examination of strategies and strategy shifting, examination of response errors and task 
difficulty, and retrospection and think-aloud reports. More than one of these methods are 
often used in a single study and often to examine changes in behaviour/performance due to 
experimental manipulations of task requirements. These changes in behaviour/performance 
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are used to make inferences about the nature of the cognitive processes involved. Sometimes 
changes in the task and behaviour/performance are also compared with changes in the task’s 
correlation with the Gf factor or marker task. Increases in correlations suggest that the 
inferred processes are more likely to be determinants of Gf. In some studies, individual 
differences are explored though comparison of high and low ability groups, either statistically 
or through experimental groups.  
The advantage of cognitive-differential approach is that it examines individual differences 
and cognitive processes simultaneously. However, its shortcoming is that it is not much more 
informative than the differential approach on its own, when soley correlational/psychometric 
methods are used. Such methods merely discover the link between two constructs – albeit one 
is from the cognitive literature (such as WMC) and one is from the differential literature 
(such as Gf). The result is that our understanding of how the “process” (such as WMC) 
influences the ability remains limited (D. P.  Birney & Bowman, 2009). We shall elaborate 
upon this in the next section.   
2. 6 Empirical Findings and Unknowns about Gf:  Reasoning, WMC and 
Learning  
Studies from the differential and cognitive-differential approach have revealed many things 
about the nature of Gf. Results from several differential studies show that the relationship 
between Gf and g is very strong. Hence, they have sometimes been regarded as equivalent for 
theoretical and practical purposes (Gustafsson, 1988). That is, Gf seems to have a prominent 
place in general intellectual functioning.  
Also, there is consensus that Gf is measured in tasks that require reasoning and is related to 
the ability to indentify relationships, comprehend implications and draw inferences (Horn & 
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Blankson, 2005; Lohman, 2001; Saladin, 2007). This consensus is based on inferences about 
the nature of tasks that load on Gf. Measures that clearly statistically define Gf seem to 
require (in one way or another), reasoning. In the CHC hierarchical model (see Table 2.1), Gf 
sits above induction, general sequential (deductive) reasoning, quantitative reasoning, 
Piagetian reasoning and speed of reasoning (Flanagan et al., 2000; McGrew et al., 1997). 
Gf seems to be particularly prominent in (what at least appears to be) novel, context-free 
reasoning tasks. Gf is conventionally characterized by, “The use of deliberate and controlled 
mental operations to solve novel, “on-the-spot problems” (McGrew, 2005 p.151, italics 
added). According to Cattell (1971) Gf taps  “the level of complexity of relationships which 
an individual can perceive and act upon when he doesn’t have recourse to answers to such 
complex issues already stored in memory” (p.99). Indeed, tasks used to measure Gf are often 
abstract tasks that require participants to induce seemingly novel rules that govern the 
relationship between abstract stimuli (such as geometric shapes, numerals or letters).  
Also, Gf tasks tend to contain complex items with multiple rules, steps or numbers of stimuli 
that have to be attended to simultaneously. As the complexity of the task increases so does its 
correlation with Gf (Gustafsson, 1988). For this reason (the need to maintain multiple rules, 
steps and stimuli), many researchers from the cognitive-differential approach have linked Gf 
to Working Memory Capacity (WMC) - a construct originally investigated by cognitive 
researchers. While there is some disagreement over the definition of WMC, it has been 
defined as the simultaneous storage and processing of information, and the controlled 
sustaining of attention in the face of interference and distraction (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 
1999; Miyake & Shah, 1999).  
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Kyllonen and Christal (1990) found that Gf tasks correlated very highly with WMC tasks. 
They looked at the factor structure of a group of traditional psychometric ability tasks 
together with a varied collection of WMC measures developed from a general cognitive 
architecture theory. They found that the ability tasks tended to load on one factor and the 
WMC tasks on another, but these factors were very highly correlated with each other. Since 
this finding, more psychometric evidence has emerged to support the claim that WMC and Gf 
are highly related (Buehner, Krumm, & Pick, 2005; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005; 
Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Suss, 2005).  
Studies that show that WMC and Gf are highly related have been informative because the 
typical operationalisation of WMC and Gf are not very similar. WMC tasks do not involve 
higher level reasoning (if they involve reasoning then they should not be considered WMC 
tasks) (Lohman, 2000). In contrast, the quintessential element of Gf tasks is that they involve 
reasoning (Halford, Bain, Mayberry, & Andrews, 1998; Horn & Blankson, 2005; Sternberg, 
1986). Yet, despite this difference, WMC and Gf tasks are highly correlated.  
While these studies have been informative (that is, they reveal that there is a relationship 
between WMC and Gf), they do not answer why there is a relationship. It is however possible 
to speculate what the nature of the relationship might be. Common explanations for the 
WMC-Gf link focus on within-item processes. For example, Gf items often contain large 
numbers of steps, stimuli and sub-results that must be stored and processed simultaneously, 
and those with larger WMC may be more successful at this (Carpenter et al., 1990; 
Embretson, 1995; Mackintosh, 1998; Primi, 2002). That is, WMC constraints may limit one’s 
performance on individual items and thus contribute to individual differences in overall 
scores on Gf tasks.  
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However, some researchers (Salthouse & Pink, 2008; Unsworth & Engle, 2005a; Verguts & 
De Boeck, 2002b) have found that the relationship between WMC tasks and Gf tasks are 
fairly constant, regardless of the amount of information that exist within the Gf items. Hence, 
Salthouse and Pink (2008) concluded that the relationship between Gf and WMC could not 
be attributed to individuals performing better on Gf items being capable of processing and 
storing more within-item information than individuals who perform poorer on Gf items.  
Verguts and De Boeck (2002b) conducted a study where the amount of information was kept 
low within each item but subjects still had to remember multiple rules over the task. They 
found that despite the low working memory load within items, overall performance still 
correlated with a WMC measure. Furthermore, items with similar rules presented 
consecutively were easier than items where dissimilar rules were presented in alternating 
sequence (Verguts & De Boeck, 2002a).  Based on these findings, they argued that rules 
become “primed” and the amount of priming is a factor of individual differences related to 
WMC. They concluded that WMC contributes to individual differences in performance over 
items and that across-item learning may be the link between WMC and performance.  
In another study, Carlstedt, Gustafsson and Ullstadius (2000) presented Gf tasks in two 
different sequences: one where the same kind of items were presented together (traditional 
homogenous sequence) and one where items from different tasks were presented alternately 
(heterogeneous sequence). Carlstedt et al. (2000) had predicted that the heterogeneous 
presentation would be the better measure of Gf because they speculated that the switching 
between tasks would increase the complexity of the battery, compared to the homogenous 
presentation. To their surprise, the homogeneous sequence was the better measure of Gf. 
Carlstedt et al. suggested that the homogenous sequence may have provided an opportunity to 
learn from the earlier items, which may have then made solving later items easier and that 
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higher Gf subjects benefited more from this learning opportunity than lower Gf subjects.  
Hence, regardless of whether the link between WM and Gf may be due to learning, learning 
seems to be an important component of Gf.  
In contrast to the learning hypothesis, Unsworth and Engle (2005a) argue that what is 
important to performance in Gf tasks is the ability to control attention, especially under 
conditions of distraction and interference.  Hence, they believe Carlstedt et al.’s (2000) 
findings were due to the homogenous tasks creating a condition where there was more 
proactive interference (PI) from previous solutions. That is, in the homogenous condition, 
participants had to control their attention and try to block out or inhibit (irrelevant) solutions 
from previous items, and it is was for this reason that the homogenous items were a better 
measure of Gf. 
In summary, what we know so far about Gf is that measures which clearly define Gf seem to 
require (in one way or another), reasoning, particularly reasoning in novel situations. Also, 
Gf tasks tend to contain complex items (with multiple rules, steps or stimuli) and as the 
complexity of tasks increase, so do their correlations with Gf. Furthermore, Gf shows 
consistently strong relationships to WMC but the reason for this is unclear. Three 
explanations have been put forward for this link. The most common explanation is people 
with higher WMC can keep in memory many elements and therefore, would be better at 
storing sub-results within an item, needed for solving a single item. Another is that people 
with higher WMC can store many solution principles across items and use them to solve 
harder items; that is, they are better reasoners because they are better learners across items, 
within a single task. The third explanation is those with higher WMC are better able to 
combat proactive interference from solutions to older items and hence, are able to concentrate 
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better on current items. Whilst these explanations may not be mutually exclusive, the 
connection between WMC and Gf is still unclear and warrants further investigation.  
2.6.1 A Neglected Process: Learning  
The learning hypothesis (as mentioned in the previous section) is an interesting one. 
Intuitively, learning seems to have a strong relationship with intelligence. Originally, 
intelligence tasks (in the western world) were designed to identify children who were unable 
to profit from experience (Ferretti & Butterfield, 1992). When Raymond Cattell (1963; 1987) 
first put forward his Gf-Gc theory, Gf was conceptualised as a factor that loads on reasoning 
tasks and tasks that require adaption to new situations and influenced by incidental learning. 
That is, in past theorising, learning had strong ties with intelligence and Gf.  
However, in mainstream differential research, performance on Gf tasks is usually assumed to 
be uninfluenced by previous acquisitions of knowledge structures and learning (Gustafsson, 
1988; Richardson, 1991). The emphasis of Gf’s definition has been the ability to reason and 
solve novel problems that do not rely extensively on an explicit base of knowledge such as 
that which might be developed from schooling or previous experience (Carpenter, Just, & 
Shell, 1990). Indeed, tasks used to measure Gf are often abstract tasks that require 
participants to induce novel rules that govern the relationship between abstract stimuli (such 
as geometric shapes, numerals or letters). In CHC theory, “Learning Abilities” are not listed 
under Gf, but are listed as narrower abilities under Short-Term Memory (Gsm) and Long-
Term Storage and Retrieval (Glr) (Alfonso et al., 2005) (see Table 2.1), and are considered  
poorly defined by existing research (McGrew, 2005).  
Learning ability is rarely investigated explicitly in the individual differences literature on 
intelligence or Gf (Carlstedt et al., 2000). One reason for this may be the overly restrictive 
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and theoretically arbitrary assumption of many theories of intelligence, that cognitive abilities 
are stable and mostly immutable (Birney & Sternberg, 2006). Learning and change do not fit 
easily into such conceptualisations. Another is that it has been commonly assumed that 
conventional Gf tasks do not allow for feedback nor opportunity to learn and hence, would 
not involve any dynamic processes such as learning (Sternberg et al., 2002).  According to 
Carroll (1993), it has often been proposed that an important aspect of intelligence is the 
ability to learn but methodological issues and insufficient data has made it difficult to 
convincingly demonstrate this relation.  
The possibility that learning processes are involved in Gf will be considered in more detail in 
Chapter 3. While there might be little explicit consideration of learning (and contrary to 
common assumptions regarding the conceptualisation of Gf), solution of Gf tasks may 
actually require learning processes. Not only may learning be a required process in Gf 
measures, it may be a source of individual differences (Carlstedt et al., 2000); and if what 
researchers such as Verguts and De Boeck (2002b) are saying is correct, then learning may 
even be the link between WMC and Gf. However, before empirical investigations concerning 
how learning processes may be involved in Gf can be coherently and efficiently conducted, 
comprehensive process theories are needed to guide our investigations.  
 2.7 The Difficult Task of Linking Ability to Processes using Theory 
As mentioned previously, after the link between Gf and WMC was established a number of 
studies emerged aimed at understanding why there is connection between Gf and WMC. 
Looking at the bigger picture, such studies are more fundamentally aiming at connecting 
ability to processes. They are trying to identify the processes involved in Gf and sources of 
individual differences that contribute to differences in performance on Gf tasks. However, 
linking ability constructs (such as Gf) to cognitive processes (such as WMC) requires 
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substantial theories (Deary, 2001) which then need to be tested. Since the reason for the 
strong relationship between Gf and WMC is not clear, this suggests that there is a gap in 
theorizing and theory testing in the literature. 
 A unified cognitive-differential approach has long been advocated as a necessary path for the 
advancement of our understanding of constructs such as Gf. Many researchers have 
recommended that differential psychology take note of process theories from cognitive 
psychology (Cronbach, 1957; Deary, 2001; Lohman, 2000). Traditionally, studies of Gf in 
the differential literature have been more pre-occupied with its factor structure than with 
processes that may be involved in solving Gf items. Descriptions of Gf in the differential 
literature developed largely as a result of visual examinations of items that load on Gf and the 
introspection of researchers (for an example see Cattell, 1987). Meanwhile, in the cognitive 
literature, there have been studies that formulate theories and examine cognitive processes 
involved in reasoning tasks. Some of these works examine tasks that are similar to (and 
sometimes the same as) those found in the Gf literature. Hence, it would be sensible to 
assume that insights from the cognitive literature may be helpful in telling us more about 
processes involved in Gf. 
However, combining the two approaches is not without some complications. Cognitive 
psychologists have not been concerned with why and in what ways people differ in their 
ability to reason effectively (Mackintosh, 1998). Studies are based on theories of how people 
reason in general and they typically focused on isolating reasoning processes common to all. 
In contrast, the abilities identified by differential psychology are based on individual 
differences (variation in performance) Thus, theories from cognitive psychology are not 
easily mapped onto the Gf construct.  
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Another problem is that for practical reasons, the cognitive literature has mainly focused on 
studies of single tasks (Sternberg, 1986). The detailed investigation of processes involved in 
the study of single tasks can result in a very large amount of data related to the processes 
involved in solving that particular task. It is not clear how much of the data from single task 
studies can be generalized across tasks, persons, time and situations (Galotti, 1989; Lohman, 
2000). Also, the processes that contribute to individual differences may be a small fraction of 
the processes involved in the solving of the whole task – and the former may be hard to 
untangle from the latter (Lohman, 2000). Certainly, establishing an understanding of the 
processes entailed in a solution is an involved and complex activity. This is in part because 
there may be: 1) variability in the processes different individuals use to solve the same item, 
2) variability in the processes the same individual uses to solve different items in the same 
task, and 3) variability in the processes used by individuals of different ability (Borsboom et 
al., 2003; Floyd, 2005). Ultimately we should be most concerned with processes that are 
common to both performance on Gf tasks and everyday life tasks, since the whole point of 
studying ability tasks is that they are assumed to tell us something about performance in the 
real world (Galotti, 1989). Nevertheless, establishing a detailed understanding of processes 
which can be generalized across families of tasks, persons, situation, time and which 
represent sources of individual differences on these tasks, may be a very delicate balancing 
act (Lohman, 2000).  
A practical starting point would be to first focus on comprehensive, general, cognitive 
theories which cut across Gf tasks. General theories can help us to better focus on general 
processes – that is, processes common to everyone in all Gf tasks as well as everyday life 
tasks. The next step would be to empirically test the cognitive theories to see if they apply to 
(can explain) performance on Gf tasks at the mean group level.  The step after that would be 
to identify sources of individual differences (if any), associated with those processes. 
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Cognitive theories are usually not explicitly concerned with processes that may be sources of 
individual differences. Thus, hypotheses should be formulated about which processes 
mentioned in the cognitive theories might actually contribute to individual differences in 
performance on Gf tasks. These hypotheses should then be empirically tested (using an 
experimental-differential approach) to see if the processes in question actually differentiate 
those of high and low Gf abilities.   
Since there is consensus that Gf is measured in tasks requiring reasoning, general cognitive 
theories of reasoning would be a good starting point for investigations into Gf. Some 
potential candidate theories will be introduced in Chapter 3. Particular focus will be given to 
theories that address learning processes because learning processes have largely been 
neglected in cognitive-differential research but as argued here, has been shown to have links 
with WMC and past theorizing regarding intellectual functioning.  
2.8 Summary  
Schlinger (2003) argues that the use of “intelligence” arose out of attempts to explain certain 
behaviours such as differences in performance on certain tasks (e.g. reasoning tasks). 
However, successful performance on such tasks erroneously became the definition for 
intelligence (e.g. ability to reason). The result was that we did not know much more about 
why people differed in performance on various tasks.  
The differential approach to the study of intelligence led to the discovery and classification of 
various abilities, such as Gf. The limitation of the differential approach is that the use of 
abilities to explain differences in performance also does not tell us much about why people 
differ. Understanding why people differ on performance requires a study of cognitive 
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processes that contribute to the individual differences that define abilities. This has been the 
subject of investigation in the cognitive-differential literature.  
Understanding what Gf is exactly and why people differ on Gf tasks is largely still research in 
progress. The differential and cognitive-differential approaches have revealed that Gf is 
measured in tasks that require reasoning in seemingly novel problems and has strong links 
with WMC. However, the reason for the link is not clear.  
Three major explanations have been put forward.  The most common explanation is that 
when solving a Gf item, people with higher WMC can keep many elements in memory and 
therefore, are better at storing sub-results and information from the processing of features 
needed within an item, to solve the item. Another is that people with higher WMC can store 
many solution principles over multiple items and use them to solve harder items; that is, they 
are better reasoners because they are better learners. The third explanation is that those with 
higher WMC are better able to combat proactive interference from solutions to older items 
and hence, are able to concentrate better on current items. 
The learning hypothesis is an interesting one because despite learning having been linked 
with Gf in original conceptualisations of Gf, it has since become somewhat neglected in Gf 
and intelligence research.  The possibility that learning processes are involved in Gf will be 
considered in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Fully understanding why people differ in performance on Gf tasks requires an understanding 
of the cognitive processes involved in such tasks but making the link between processes and 
abilities requires substantial theory and theory testing. Since the reason for the link between 
Gf and WMC is not clear, there must be a gap in theorizing and theory testing in the 
literature. The differential approach has largely been devoid of process theories while 
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cognitive research has developed various processes theories. However, cognitive research has 
largely not developed theories that contain the level of detail that can be generalized across 
Gf tasks and take into account the individual differences that are inherently important to 
ability constructs. A practical starting point to address this is to first focus on comprehensive, 
general, cognitive theories which cut across reasoning tasks and then to use these theories to 
target empirical study to identify sources of individual differences which are relevant to Gf 
tasks. The next chapter focuses on three such theories.  
  
33 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
REASONING & INDUCTION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of Gf through 
investigating why people differ on Gf tasks. The cognitive reasoning literature consists of a 
large body of work on cognitive processes, including reasoning tasks which share features 
with Gf tasks. Using reasoning theories from the cognitive reasoning literature to uncover 
processes involved in Gf tasks seems like a sensible thing to do but unfortunately, this is not a 
straightforward matter. As touched upon in Chapter 2, there is a lack of unity in the cognitive 
literature due to the task-specific nature of research studies. This creates an obstacle because 
it is not clear which theories are relevant and generalizable to Gf tasks. Another obstacle is 
that cognitive reasoning theories are generally more concerned with how people reason in 
general and not with pinpointing why people differ on tasks.  We will address these obstacles 
by outlining three broad, general theories of reasoning and then using these theories to form 
the basis for our hypotheses about individual differences in Gf tasks. These hypotheses will 
be focused on learning processes. This will be preceded by a general discussion of the nature 
of reasoning which will serve to highlight some reasons why only a few comprehensive, 
unified theories of reasoning currently exist.  
3.2 What is Reasoning 
Reasoning has been defined as any process of drawing a conclusion from a set of premises 
(Blackburn, 1996). Various conceptualizations of reasoning have evolved within the field of 
formal logic (Ladriere, 2003). However, the bodies of literature on reasoning from schools of 
34 
 
 
 
philosophy and logic are quite complex and lengthy, and beyond the scope of this thesis. We 
limit ourselves to theories that come more directly from the discipline psychology.  
In psychology, two prominent, broad categories of reasoning have received the most 
attention: deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning (Bell & Staines, 2001). Deductive 
reasoning has been described as a way of reasoning that relates two or more general known 
concepts or conditions to a specific case. For example, if all birds build nests and a magpie is 
a bird, then a magpie will build a nest.  In contrast, inductive reasoning uses a specific 
observation to reach a general conclusion. For example, if a child puts her hand into a bag of 
marbles and withdraws three pieces, all of which are red, she may conclude that all the 
marbles are red. There are widely accepted standards available for evaluating the quality of 
deductive reasoning, but evaluating induction is matter of debate (Nickerson, 2004). In 
deduction, a conclusion follows directly from the premises. A valid deduction is one in which 
it is impossible to assert the premises and deny the conclusion without contradiction. Valid 
inductive reasoning only requires that based on the premises, the conclusion is highly 
probable.  
Arguably, inductive reasoning is more relevant to real life than deductive reasoning 
(Nickerson, 2004). Most of the reasoning problems from life are not solvable simply by a 
series of deductions from the information given, since they usually do not come with all the 
information that is essential for their solutions (Galotti, 1989; Nickerson, 2004). Typically 
one must make assumptions or look to known examples as a guide, which in essence is 
inductive reasoning (Nickerson, 2004). Tasks that have the highest g and Gf loadings are also 
considered to be inductive reasoning tasks (Snow, Kyllonen, & Marshalek, 1984). Hence, 
studying inductive Gf tasks may be a good place to start in identifying general processes 
common to Gf tasks as well as everyday life functioning – because ultimately, the whole 
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point of studying ability tasks is that they are assumed to tell us something about performance 
in the real world (Galotti, 1989). Later chapters in this thesis will be empirical studies of 
inductive Gf tasks.   
3.4 Reasoning Theories in Psychology  
While there is agreement on the general definition of reasoning (outlined above), it is not 
comprehensive enough for research purposes. In a review of the literature, Galotti (1989) 
argues that some of the most important issues impeding progress in reasoning research 
includes lack of agreement over definitions of terms. Boundaries for usage of the term 
“reasoning” remains unclear, which makes it very difficult for readers to know if any two 
investigators are studying a common entity and hard to meaningfully interpret patterns of 
performance across different lab reasoning tasks. Nickerson (2004) points out that in the 
psychology literature, reasoning has a variety of connotations that differ in their 
inclusiveness. Some authors do not make distinctions between reasoning and other constructs 
such as thinking, problem solving and decision making (Leighton, 2004). Even when 
theorists consider reasoning to be a particular type of thinking, its definition is rather broad. 
For example, Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) see no clear boundaries surrounding the study 
of reasoning; whether someone is drawing conclusions from premises according to traditional 
Aristotelian laws of logic,  solving a crossword puzzle, planning to buy a house or finding the 
best route of travel, they are all considered to be engaged in reasoning.   
 Galotti (1989) also argues that narrow definitions would not be desirable either. For instance, 
reasoning could be defined as “thinking according to the theorems of a logical system”, 
decision making could be defined as “weighting and combining probabilistic information in 
such a way as to rank alternatives”, and thinking could cover both of those constructs as well 
as other tasks in which information is used or combined. While consistent use of such 
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definitions would lead to clearer communication amongst researchers, Galotti argues that if 
reasoning were defined so narrowly, then the relationship between reasoning and everyday 
functioning (where rules of logic may not apply) would be obscured.  Thus, it is a fine 
balance between developing a sufficiently broad definition of reasoning that is able to extend 
to ordinary life reasoning tasks and guarding against being unclear about the phenomenon in 
an attempt to be inclusive (Galotti, 1989).  
Galotti (1989) proposes her own definition based on her summary of the literature. She 
attempts to be both precise and inclusive and the result is that her definition seems a little 
vague and tautological, as highlighted by the many instances of her use of phrases such as: 
“may, but need not”,  
“[Reasoning is defined as] mental activity that consists of transforming given 
information (called the set of premises) in order to reach conclusions. This activity 
must be focused on at least one goal (but may be focused on more than one). The 
activity must not be inconsistent with systems of logic when all of the premises are 
fully specified, although there may not always be an applicable system of logic to 
govern specific instances of reasoning. The activity may or may not be self-contained; 
that is, people may implicitly or explicitly add to, subtract from, or otherwise modify 
any or all of the premises supplied. When original premises are modified, the final 
conclusion must be consistent with the modified premises. The activity may, but need 
not, involve the breaking of mental set. The conclusions may, but need not, be 
startling or non-obvious at the outset of the activity. The conclusion may, but need 
not, be deductively valid” (p.333 italics added). 
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In order for hypotheses about Gf processes to be formulated and tested, detailed, precise and 
sufficiently general conceptualizations of reasoning are needed but such conceptualizations 
are not common in the literature. Successfully formulating such definitions is quite a 
balancing act and not an easy task (as can be seen from (Galotti, 1989). Furthermore, most 
comprehensive reasoning theories also focus solely on deduction (for examples, see (Braine, 
1990; Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Manktelow, 1999; Rips, 1994) 
which is not suitable for our purposes because our focus is on induction.  
Three attempts that focus on induction that are comprehensive and general are Spearman 
(1932) from the differential literature, Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard (1989) from 
the cognitive literature and Sternberg (1986)  from the cognitive-differential literature. In 
these theories of reasoning, attempts are made at specifying general processes that could be 
common to Gf tasks and everyday real-life functioning. The theories will be outlined in turn.  
3.4.1 Spearman’s Cognitive Theory of “g” (Eduction of Relations and Correlates) 
Spearman’s (1932) cognitive theory of g  is a prominent, cognitive theory of intelligence 
from the differential literature; prominent, because it is one of the earliest. While it was not 
meant to be a theory of reasoning per se and it is about g, rather than Gf, it is still important 
to our discussion for a number of reasons. Firstly, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Gf has strong 
links with g. The results from several studies show that the correlational relationship between 
Gf and g is so strong that theoretically and for practical purposes, the two constructs could be 
regarded as equivalent (Gustafsson, 1988). Secondly, matrices tasks (highly Gf loaded tasks) 
were originally constructed to put Spearman’s theories into testable form (Eysenck, Fulker, & 
Eysenck, 2006). Also, like Gf which loads predominantly on tasks that require reasoning, 
Spearman’s g loadings were highest in complex mathematical, abstract and verbal reasoning 
tasks and lower in motor skills and repetitive tasks. Lastly, Cattell (1963) was building upon 
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Spearman’s work when he came up with his conceptualization of Gf. Hence, Spearman’s 
theory is an important starting point in any discussion about cognitive processes and Gf.  
Spearman’s (1932) theory of g came about when he examined a large amount of data from 
various studies that used mental abilities tasks and found that almost all correlations were 
positive. Using factor analysis he found that a general factor (which he called “g”) could be 
extracted from these tasks. The g factor has been interpreted by many as being statistical 
evidence for the existence of a “general intelligence”, since intelligence may be the cause of 
the positive correlations between mental abilities tasks. Spearman was never happy with this 
explanation because it was not clear what “intelligence” actually meant.  
Spearman (1932) wanted to know exactly what g was and how universal it might be. He 
thought that in order to investigate this, one would need to study the complete system of 
fundamental processes of cognition. Such knowledge did not exist during his time (nor does 
it exist now), so he attempted to outline the processes himself (Spearman, 1932).  
He came up with what he called the three laws of neogenesis which he thought were 
fundamental processes of cognition:  
• Law 1: Knowing of our own experience – a person has more or less power to observe 
what goes on in their mind. They feel, strive and know, and know that they feel, strive 
and know.  
• Law 2: Eduction of relations – seeing first order, direct relationships between things. 
When a given person has in mind any two or more items of mental content (whether 
perceived or thought of), they have more or less power to bring to mind any relations 
that essentially exist between them. 
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• Law 3: Eduction of correlates  - given an item of mental content and a relation (such 
as one inferred from the eduction of relations), one is able to bring to mind a correlate 
to the mental content. That is, a mental content that is connected to the original mental 
content by the relation.     
Spearman (1932) concluded that the laws of neogenesis (the fundamental processes of 
cognition) were largely about spotting relations. He further concluded that the spotting of 
relations is what is common to everyday functioning and ability tasks with high g loadings, 
because g was found in all tasks where you have to look for relations (even simple ones) and 
the spotting of relations (he argued) was crucial to every day functioning. Some of the types 
of relations he identified and argued were prevalent and fundamental to everyday functioning 
were the relations of: evidence, likeness, conjunction, space, time, identity, attribution, 
causation, and constitution. Lastly, he concluded that g emerged in factor analysis because of 
individual differences. That is, people differed in their ability to implement the three laws of 
neogenesis, particularly the eduction of relations and correlates.  
3.4.2 Sternberg’s Unified Theory of Reasoning (Conceptual Knowledge)  
While acknowledging that reasoning research has been focused on narrow tasks, Sternberg  
(1986) argues that there are unities in  reasoning that transcend problem form and content 
which become apparent by looking across many tasks. According to Sternberg, these unities 
allow reasoning to be defined as, “…the controlled and mediated application of three 
processes - selective encoding, selective comparison, and selective combination - to 
inferential rules” (p. 281, italics added). 
Each of the key terms in Sternberg’s (1986) definition will be explained. Selective encoding 
refers to the activity of distinguishing relevant from irrelevant information. The selected 
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information is then stored in working memory. Selective comparison refers to the activity of 
deciding what mentally stored information is relevant for solving a problem. Solution of most 
problems requires retrieval of declarative or procedural knowledge or both, from long term 
memory. Selective combination is the activity of putting together information that has been 
selectively encoded and compared (the information to be combined is stored in working 
memory).  The nature of inferential rules in Sternberg’s theory is not very clear. Sternberg 
states that,  
“The word rules is used broadly to incorporate heuristics, mental guidelines, algorithms, and 
the like…different types of problems require different types of rules. Rules may even change 
within problem type as a function of problem content, resulting in effects of problem content 
as well as problem type in task performance. It would not be possible to specify here the 
complete set of rules required for all possible kinds of reasoning problems. Indeed, it is not 
clear that it is even possible to do this because as new reasoning tasks are invented, new rules 
may become applicable” (p.288).   
Sternberg (1986) seems to use “inferential rules” as an umbrella term for any processes 
involved in reasoning other than selective encoding, combination and comparison.  However, 
he does give two examples of types of inferential rules which he calls procedural rules and 
declarative rules, which are based on procedural and declarative knowledge. Procedural rules 
are (primarily a function of problem format/type) and include things that one needs to do to 
solve the problem (e.g. inferring relations between stimuli, mapping relations between 
concepts, applying relations etc) and solution strategies. Declarative rules (primarily a 
function of problem content) specify the possible relations allowed to form the basis of a 
given problem. This does not mean that the answer to the problem must already be known, 
because reasoning is only involved if processing is done in a controlled, effortful way (as 
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opposed to automatic). However, it does mean that the reasoner must possess general, 
conceptual procedural and declarative knowledge of relevance to the problem. For example, 
in a geometric matrix problem, two figures might be related by the addition or subtraction of 
a part of a shape or a gradual change in size of a shape. The declarative rules in this case are 
the concepts of addition or subtraction and gradual change in size. One has stored mentally 
the possible declarative rules that serve as a basis for inductive relations and calls upon these 
rules in solving problems. Selective encoding, comparison and combination processes 
determine the procedural and declarative rules to use.  
The last term in Sternberg’s (1986) definition of reasoning that needs to be clarified is 
mediators. Mediators refer to intervening variables that increase or decrease the availability 
or accessibility of the inferential rules for use in a particular problem. Examples from 
Sternberg 1986) are given in Table 3.1.  While selective encoding, comparison and 
combination processes determine the inferential rules to use, mediators effects accessibility 
and availability of rules.  
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Table 3.1  
Example “mediators” from Sternberg's (1986) Unified Theory of Reasoning.  
    
Contextual probability When the probability for application of certain kinds of 
inferential rules is influenced by the problems that 
appear in a given problem set. Affects accessibility to 
rules. 
Entrenchment Inferential rules are more easily applied if their use is 
entrenched within people’s general experience. Affects 
accessibility to rules. 
Prior knowledge Inferential rule may not be usable if it is unknown to the 
problem solver. E.g. Lexical problems are not solvable 
if one does not know the meaning of parts of the word. 
But, lack of prior knowledge does not make solving of 
the problem impossible, as you might be able to infer 
rule without knowing it in advance. Affects availability. 
WM load The difficulty of applying a set of inferential rules to a 
given reasoning problem is often affected by the 
individual's working memory capacity. Problems with 
more elements and intermediate steps than a person can 
handle will affect their ability to access relevant rules.  
In the theory, selective encoding, selective comparison, selective combination, inferential 
rules and mediators are applicable to the definition of reasoning only when executed in a 
controlled fashion.  The greater the degree of automatization, the smaller is the degree of 
reasoning considered to be involved. Anything that can be answered fast and automatically is 
not reasoning. Hence, a task is a reasoning task if and only if its solution involves the 
mediated and controlled application of inferential rules for purposes of selective encoding, 
selective comparison, or selective combination. In other words, the controlled use of 
inferential rules for any one of the three kinds of selective functions, as mediated by the 
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mediating variables described earlier, is necessary and sufficient to define a task as involving 
reasoning. The degree of involvement of reasoning is inversely related to the degree to which 
the application of the kind of process is automatized in the particular instance. Thus, the 
extent to which a task is a reasoning one is a function of an interaction between person and 
the task and depends on the extent to which selective encoding, selective comparison and 
combination are involved and done in controlled way.  
It is not clear from Sternberg’s (1986) writing whether the three processes are applied to the 
rules, or whether the rules are applied to the processes. For instance, sometimes he describes 
reasoning as being,  
“…the controlled and mediated application of three processes - selective encoding, selective 
comparison, and selective combination - to inferential rules” (p. 281).  
At other times he describes reasoning as,  
“…mediated and controlled application of inferential rules for purposes of selective 
encoding, selective comparison, or selective combination” (p.293).  
Arguably, the rules and processes may be applied to each other iteratively.    
With regard to inductive reasoning in particular (as opposed to deductive reasoning), 
Sternberg (1986) considers it to mainly involve selective encoding and comparison, rather 
than selective combination. Selective encoding is needed to distinguish relevant from 
irrelevant information. The selected information is then stored in working memory. Selective 
comparison is needed to decide what information stored in long term memory might be 
relevantly applied to what is stored in short term memory for the purposes of solving the 
problem.  The solution of most inductive problems is thought to require the retrieval of 
declarative or procedural knowledge or both, from long term memory. 
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3.4.3 Holland et al.’s Theory of Induction (Learning and Conceptual Knowledge) 
Holland et al.’s (1989) theory (or “framework”, as they describe it) is comprehensive and 
takes up several hundred pages. Only a brief description of relevant parts will be attempted 
here. While Holland et al.’s framework is relevant to other types of reasoning, its main focus 
is a description and explanation of induction. This is suitable for our purposes because Gf 
tasks are mainly induction tasks.  
Interestingly, Holland et al.’s (1989) notion of induction is inextricably linked with learning 
in that they define induction as all inferential processes that expand knowledge in the face of 
uncertainty. That is, the reasoning process is not something that is done in isolation. It is 
inextricably linked to the expansion of knowledge or learning. Although this is not a unique 
view in the cognitive reasoning literature, it is a fairly recent view (Anderson, 1993). In fact, 
Holland et al. assume what is essential to induction are goals, previous knowledge and 
learning. This is because in their theory, the plausibility of possible predictions in inductive 
reasoning can only be determined with reference to the relevant goals and the knowledge that 
the reasoner already possesses. The reasoner is characterized as possessing a cognitive 
information-processing system that forms predictions based on prior knowledge that the 
system possesses and receives feedback about its successes/failures in attaining its goals. The 
feedback then determines if the knowledge should be confirmed or modified. That is, the 
system learns, “The study of induction, is the study of how knowledge is modified through its 
use” (Holland et al., 1989, p.5).  
Specifically, the central hypotheses and assumptions they make about induction are: 
1) Induction is directed (goal driven) by problem-solving - inductions are based on the 
need to solve a problem. 
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2) Knowledge is represented by rules. 
3) Rules are used to construct mental models. Mental models are where newly acquired 
information (stored in working memory) and older information (from long term 
memory) is integrated in various ways (in working memory) to “model” (represent) 
the problem and to produce predictions about the solution. 
4) During induction, multiple rules are triggered and compete with and complement each 
other to play a part in representing the problem.  
5) The induction process is based on feedback regarding the success or failure of 
predictions generated by the system. Correct predictions strengthen rules and 
incorrect predictions trigger a weakening or revision of the rules. Stronger rules will 
tend to win the process in point 4) above.  
6) Things learnt about the problem are stored in memory in rule clusters. These clusters 
are called “schemas” and they can be accessed as large units that serve to generate 
future plausible inferences and problem solutions. 
7) When no solution can be found, the system tries to transfer other known rules 
associated with similar, better understood situations to the current problem. That is, it 
uses analogies.  
That is, induction is seen as goal driven, hypothesis testing about the environment (or 
problem). Hypotheses are based on previous knowledge. When predictions fail, this becomes 
a problem that the system solves by modifying the incorrect knowledge and creating new 
rules as hypotheses. Concepts with shared properties are activated, thus providing analogies 
for use in problem solving and rule generation. Induction difficulties arise when there is no 
previous knowledge or analogies to draw from or when new rules fail to compete effectively 
with old, well-established intuitive rules that are entrenched.  
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In Holland et al.’s (1989) theory, there is no major distinction between learning as a result of 
induction and traditional conceptualizations of learning (such as learning from education). 
The only difference is that education is seen as rules directly inserted from the outside, as 
opposed to rules that the system has to generate through induction.  These inserted rules are 
assumed to act very much like induced rules. That is, they will enter into competition for the 
right to represent the environment along with the rest of the rules in the system's possession. 
Educational learning difficulties are considered to result from the inability of the new inserted 
rules to compete effectively with old, well-established rules.  
3.5 Theoretical Similarities and Contrasts: Implications for General 
Processes and Individual Differences involved in Gf tasks  
Many researchers have recommended that differential psychology refer to process theories 
from cognitive psychology to gain a better understanding of processes involved in abilities 
(Cronbach, 1957; Deary, 2001; Lohman, 2000). Tasks that clearly define Gf seem to require 
reasoning (in one way or another), particularly inductive reasoning. Hence, theories of 
inductive reasoning such as those of Sternberg (1986) and Holland et al. (1989) may provide 
potentially plausible accounts of Gf because they are task-general theories. Spearman’s 
(1932) cognitive theory of g from the differential literature is also a task-general one. 
However, some obstacles to a merger persists. For instance, each of these theories emphasize 
different processes and with the exception of Spearman, they are not very explicit about 
processes that contribute to individual differences. 
The theories of Spearman (1932), Sternberg (1986) and Holland et al. (1989) have different 
emphasis on what induction involves. Sternberg’s theory emphasizes the use of prior 
conceptual knowledge, while Holland et al.’s conceptualization includes knowledge, but 
emphasizes learning. Spearman’s theory emphasizes the eduction of relations and correlates, 
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which seem to occur in isolation from previous knowledge and learning.  Only Spearman’s 
original conceptualization of g can be viewed as being consistent with the dominant, novelty 
view of Gf because in his theory, those of higher ability will be better able to educe relations 
and correlates, even in novel situations. In contrast, Sternberg’s theory emphasises the 
controlled application of knowledge-based inferential rules for the purposes of selective 
encoding (of new information) and comparison (with information stored in long term 
memory). That is, reasoning is guided by prior knowledge. The theory does not say that the 
reasoner must have knowledge of the answer, since this would not be considered reasoning. 
Still, this could be seen as being inconsistent with the novelty view of Gf because some prior 
knowledge must be brought to the problem1. Holland et al.’s theory is consistent with 
Sternberg’s theory and inconsistent with the novelty view of Gf, because it is also a 
knowledge-based theory of reasoning, where induction is seen as being guided by prior 
conceptual knowledge. It differs to Sternberg’s, in that it also includes learning processes as 
part of the inductive act.  Holland et al.’s theory states that induction is a process of learning 
and applying knowledge-based inferential rules.  
The emphasis on knowledge in the theories of Sternberg (1986) and Holland et al. (1989) 
may lead one to question whether their theories may be applicable to general reasoning 
processes (that is, uniform processes which are applicable to all) involved in Gf tasks. 
Furthermore, with the exception of Spearman (1932), the cognitive theories under discussion 
                                                           
1
  Sternberg does try to placate the novelty view to some extent. His theory states that it is not 
essential to know the rule to start with, since lack of prior knowledge does not make solving of the 
problem impossible. You might be able to infer the rule, without knowing it in advance. It is not clear 
what he means by “infer” in this latter sense  (when knowledge is not available) because reasoning in 
his theory relies on the use of declarative and procedural rules (that is, knowledge). He does state that 
there are other types of inferential rules, but does not state what they might be. Hence, from his 
theory, it is not clear what reasoning without knowledge would be like.  
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are not very explicit about processes that contribute to individual differences in Gf task 
performance. According to Spearman, an individual difference in performance is due to 
people differing in their ability to carry out the three laws of neogenesis, especially the 
eduction of relations and correlates. While general reasoning processes are described in some 
detail in Sternberg & Holland et al., it is not clear which processes distinguish those of high 
Gf from those of low Gf.  
Holland et al. (1989) do briefly mention a potential source of individual differences. They 
claim that individual differences in induction are due to the accumulation of goal directed 
rules (conceptual knowledge). The size and type of the store of rules will differ from 
individual to individual, depending on their experience. This focus on knowledge as a source 
of individual difference in induction is at odds with the conceptualization of Gf in differential 
literature which sees Gf as the ability to reason and solve novel problems undistorted by 
individual differences in knowledge (Roberts & Stevenson, 1996). In fact, if individual 
differences in induction are due to the accumulation of knowledge, then Gf would be a 
context-dependant construct and closer in nature to Gc.  
As for Sternberg (1986), while his focus is on outlining a unified theory of reasoning and is 
not especially concerned with individual differences in reasoning, he does refer to potential 
sources of individual differences. Like Holland et al. (1989), Sternberg hypothesizes that the 
possession of the relevant knowledge-based inferential rules would influence reasoning 
performance. An additional factor in performance is the individual’s working memory 
capacity, because according to the theory, problems with more elements and intermediate 
steps than a person can handle will affect their ability to access relevant rules. That is, 
working memory capacity is only an issue because it potentially limits access to relevant 
knowledge.  
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In summary, the cognitive theories of Sternberg (1986) and Holland et al. (1989) emphasize 
the importance of knowledge to reasoning in general, as well as refer to knowledge as a 
source of individual differences. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, Gf is conceptualised in the 
differential literature (for instance by Carroll, 1993; McGrew, 2005; Spearman, 1932) as a 
context-free ability that is relatively uninfluenced by past experience and knowledge. The 
follow sections further explore the potential synergy in these theories as they relate to Gf. 
3.6 Central Thesis and General Predictions: Knowledge, Novelty, 
Learning and Combating Proactive Interference are all involved in Gf Task 
Performance  
We propose a general hypothesis that may reconcile the need for knowledge (emphasized in 
the cognitive reasoning theories as being essential to induction) with the observation in the 
differential literature that Gf is involved in tasks that are considered novel. The hypothesis is 
based on the premise that there is a difference between processes involved in reasoning that 
contribute to individual differences in reasoning performance, and processes involved in 
reasoning that do not contribute to individual differences. Knowledge may be involved and 
important in reasoning in Gf tasks, but it may not contribute to individual differences in 
performance in Gf tasks. Instead, we propose that what contributes to individual differences 
in Gf tasks may be learning – a dynamic, fluid and context-free process. We also propose that 
learning may act as the mediator between the novelty in Gf items and the knowledge needed 
to solve them. If correct, Gf (being an individual differences construct, captured by variability 
in performance) could still legitimately be conceptualised as fluid and context-free. That is, 
we hypothesize that while prior experience and knowledge may be important to inductive 
reasoning, what contributes to individual differences in Gf task performance (and hence the 
Gf factor), may be dynamic and context-free learning.  
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Indeed, Holland et al. (1989) considers learning to be the central process in inductive 
reasoning but did not consider it a source of individual differences. We test the hypothesis 
that it is. In addition to this overarching and encompassing thesis, we test four general 
intrinsically-related hypotheses: 
Knowledge, Novelty and Learning 
 Hypothesis 1:  Complex Gf items contain novel relationships that are very difficult 
(or near impossible) to induce without guidance from some prior conceptual 
knowledge. This prior knowledge is (gradually) acquired by attempting earlier, easier, 
items which are more familiar. Thus, learning is a necessary process in Gf tasks. 
Knowledge: Inductive Gf tasks typically involve items that contain multiple elements 
(e.g., numbers, shapes, colours, etc), whose relationships are governed by specific rules that 
the reasoner must induce (“the eduction of relations” in Spearman’s (1932) terms). The 
reasoner is then required to find/choose another element that would be consistent with the 
rule (“the eduction of correlates” in Spearman’s terms).  
Gf tasks are presented in easy-to-hard format, primarily to motivate participants. Early in the 
task, Gf items conventionally consist of simple relationships to define the rules that the 
reasoner must induce. Arguably, because these are simpler relationships, they may also be 
relatively familiar relationships that one may have encountered in school or in life. It is 
possible that on these items, we get some guidance from prior knowledge brought from 
outside of the test situation (Holland et al., 1989). As one gets further into the task, the 
relationships tend to become more complicated. This has the effect of increasing the level of 
difficulty. The most popular (sometimes post-hoc) explanation for this is that more 
complicated rules have many more components and therefore place greater demands on 
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working memory capacity (Halford, Cowan, & Andrews, 2007; Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 
1998).  However, this increase in complexity may also have the effect of increasing the 
novelty of the underlying relationships and hence the novelty of the item. 
Learning & Novelty: Passmore (1935) highlights why learning may be very important 
in Gf tasks, “Things have various relations or associations, the associations we select being 
determined by the forces operating in us, and their past experience. Some relations are more 
generally observed than others, but since there are always several relations existing 
objectively between things, it is quite arbitrary to settle on one of them as being the sort of 
association an intelligent person would make” (p. 287). 
That is, the correct answer to a problem that might be used to measure Gf may not always be 
clear. The test makers’ idea of the correct response is typically based upon a novel rule he or 
she constructs to govern how elements in an item are related to each other. Consider an 
example: The Number Series Completion item – 1 3 4 7 11 18 ? – requires one to determine 
the number which comes next in the series. The rule used to develop this item is to sum 
adjacent terms. That is, the sum of 1 and 3 is 4. The sum of 3 and 4 is 7; the sum of 4 and 7 is 
11, and so on. Applying this particular rule indicates the next element should be “29”. 
However, how do we score a participant who gives the response “19” along with the 
statement: “the numbers are increasing, so any number larger than the last will be correct”? 
The reasoning is valid, it is just not the one intended. 
The point here is that the response that is considered correct is often the one that conforms to 
the rule that the test maker had in mind. However, it is possible that there are responses that 
are considered “incorrect” by the test makers, but nevertheless can still be based on consistent 
rules that the test makers had never considered. Even when a single response might be 
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considered correct, different people might give different but equally valid reasons. Indeed, 
the rules that are included in Gf tasks are often quite novel (arbitrary) (Carpenter et al., 1990). 
Thus, before a difficult Gf item can be solved, the reasoner may have to first know (or learn) 
what relations or rules are considered legitimate by the test maker – they must narrow in on 
the intended relations and reduce the initially arbitrariness. Earlier problems in Gf tasks 
which have simpler rules give participants insight into what relations are considered 
legitimate in the harder problems. That is, while the novelty of Gf tasks may serve to equate 
pre-existing declarative knowledge, learning during the task may be necessary to reason 
effectively. Without within-task-learning, reasoning may simply involve a pseudo-guessing 
trial-and-error approach. 
An often untested assumption is that people’s performance on later, more complicated items 
would be the same regardless of whether they had seen the earlier items. However, if Gf tasks 
are largely novel and inductive reasoning requires guidance from knowledge, they may be 
harder or even unsolvable without earlier, more familiar items to act as guides. That is, 
contrary to common assumptions, earlier Gf task items may act as opportunities to learn 
about the novel relationships in later, more difficult items. 
Learning and Gf 
Hypothesis 2:  Learning is a source of individual differences in Gf task performance. 
That is, those of higher Gf ability benefit more from within-task learning opportunity 
than those of lower ability.  
If Hypothesis 1 is correct, then learning would be a necessary process required for 
performance on Gf tasks.  Hypothesis 2 further predicts that those of higher Gf benefit more 
from the learning in Gf tasks.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, empirically, Gf shows consistently strong relationships to WMC 
and the reason for their link may be learning. Verguts and De Bocek (2002a; Verguts & De 
Boeck, 2002b) put forward the explanation that people with higher WMC can store many 
solution principles over items and use them to solve harder items. That is, they are better 
reasoners because they are better learners across the task. This is consistent with Holland et 
al.’s (1989) hypothesis that induction involves inferential processes that expand knowledge in 
the face of uncertainty. Furthermore, the empirical work of Carlstedt et al. (2000) suggest that 
a sequence of homogenous items is a better measure of Gf than a sequence of heterogeneous 
items; and this may be because homogenous items facilitate learning opportunity.  
Proactive Interference and Gf 
Hypothesis 3: Learning leads to a build up of proactive interference. 
Hypothesis 4: Those of higher Gf ability must be better at combating proactive 
interference (because of Hypothesis 2 and 3).  
Proactive interference is not a topic we have mentioned much in this chapter because it is not 
discussed much in Spearman (1932), Sternberg (1986) nor Holland et al, (1989). However, it 
is an issue we would like to address because it has been framed as a competing hypothesis to 
the learning hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), by Unsworth and Engle (2005a). As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, Unsworth and Engle argue that what is important to performance in Gf tasks is the 
ability to control attention, especially under conditions of distraction and interference.  
Specifically, Unsworth and Engle hypothesize that findings where homogenous sequences of 
items have been shown to be better measures of Gf and share more variance with WMC tasks 
have not been because of any learning effects. Instead, they argue that it is due to such items 
creating conditions where more proactive interference builds up from previous solutions. 
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From this perspective, Gf is responsible for inhibiting what has just been learnt (rather than 
for learning). Thus, their argument is that under conditions such as homogenous 
presentations, participants have to control their attention and try to block out or inhibit 
irrelevant aspects from previous, similar items; and it is for this reason that such items would 
be better measures of Gf and share more variance with WMC. That is, those individuals who 
are better at combating proactive interference during the task would perform better.  
While Unsworth and Engle (2005a) put forward their proactive interference hypothesis as an 
alternative to the learning hypothesis, controlled attention may also be required for learning 
because controlled attention is purportedly needed to maintain information through activation 
of relevant brain circuitry (Heitz, Unsworth, & Engle, 2005). Thus, the two hypotheses (if 
true) may not be mutually exclusive.  
Furthermore, Holland et al. (1989) predict that learning may result in an entrenchment of 
certain rules that may lead to proactive interference. Consistent with this, Sweller and Gee 
(1978) empirically found that the more one learns about a certain rule type (indicated by 
better performance on a transfer item), the more proactive interference builds up and this 
leads to poorer performance on subsequent items that rely on different rule types.  
Thus, if Hypothesis 2 is correct - that those of higher Gf learn more, then these individuals 
must also be better at combating proactive interference. Otherwise, the benefits of being 
better learners would be lost when they encounter other types of items.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 will be empirically addressed in Chapters 4 to 7. Hypotheses 3 and 4 will 
be empirically addressed in Chapters 5 to 7.  
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3.7 Summary 
Tasks that have the highest Gf loadings are typically inductive reasoning tasks. In order for 
hypotheses about Gf processes to be formulated and tested, comprehensive, sufficiently 
general conceptualizations of inductive reasoning are needed. However, such 
conceptualizations are not common. Three frameworks from different perspectives were 
identified: those of Spearman (1932), Sternberg (1986) and Holland et al. (1989). Each theory 
has a different emphasis on what is important in induction. Drawing on these different 
features has the potential to further our understanding of Gf. Sternberg emphasizes the use of 
prior conceptual knowledge, Holland et al. emphasize conceptual knowledge and learning, 
while Spearman emphasizes the eduction of relations and correlates which seems to occur in 
isolation from previous knowledge and learning. Only Spearman’s account is consistent with 
the dominant, conventional novelty view which sees Gf as largely uninfluenced by prior 
experience and knowledge. This is to be somewhat expected, of course, given the historic and 
empirical links Gf has with g. 
A middle-ground position is that Gf tasks are largely novel, but allow learning to occur across 
the task and what is learnt provides reasoners with the relevant knowledge that Sternberg 
(1986) and Holland et al. (1989) describe as necessary for induction.  Also, individual 
differences in Gf task performance may be at least partly due to the amount of knowledge 
learnt across the task, rather than knowledge brought to the task. Specifically, Gf items have 
traditionally been presented in easy-to-hard order to motivate participants but easier, simpler, 
more familiar items may (unintentionally) act as necessary learning aids for harder, complex 
and more novel items. Those of higher Gf ability may be more able to benefit from this 
learning opportunity than those of lower Gf. However, this learning is likely to create a build-
up of proactive interference. Hence, those of higher Gf also need to be better at combating 
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proactive interference. The learning hypothesis and the proactive interference hypothesis 
have been framed as competing hypotheses for the link between Gf and WMC (the source of 
individual differences in Gf tasks); but we argue that they may not be mutually exclusive and 
may actually go hand-in-hand.  
There are four general predictions. First, it is predicted that Complex Gf items contain novel 
relationships that are very difficult (or near impossible) to induce without guidance from 
some prior knowledge. This prior knowledge is (gradually) provided by earlier, easier, items 
which are more familiar. Second, it is predicted that those with higher Gf learn faster than 
those with lower Gf. Third, it is predicted that learning produces proactive interference. And 
finally, fourth, it is predicted that those with high Gf are better able to combat proactive 
interference than those with lower Gf.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENT 1:  
RULE LEARNING IN RAVEN’S ADVANCED PROGRESSIVE MATRICES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the theories of Sternberg (1986) and Holland et al. (1989) were put 
forward as cognitive theories that may be relevant to processes involved in Gf tasks. 
However, both theories emphasise the importance of conceptual knowledge in reasoning, 
while Gf is thought to be a factor related to the ability to deal with novel problems.  
Two of the four core hypotheses we have proposed (in the previous chapter) are relevant to 
resolving this apparent contradiction. The first one was that complex Gf items contain novel 
relationships and are very difficult (or near impossible) to induce without guidance from 
some prior knowledge. This prior knowledge is (gradually) provided by earlier, easier items 
within the test which are more familiar. That is, we hypothesise that items become less novel 
through learning which we predict is a necessary process in Gf tests. In the second hypothesis 
we predict that this learning is a source of individual differences in Gf test performance over 
and above reasoning per se. That is, those of higher Gf ability benefit more from within-test 
learning opportunity than those of lower ability.  
These hypotheses will be empirically tested in this chapter using Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices (“Raven”) (Raven, 1962). Specifically, we examine whether rule 
learning occurs, whether it is necessary for it to occur (for induction to take place) and 
whether it is a source of individual differences in Raven performance.  
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4.2  Learning and Raven 
Although the novelty of Gf tasks may serve to equate pre-existing background knowledge, 
learning during the task may be necessary to reason effectively. Raaheim (1988) found that 
there is an optimum level of task novelty that correlates best with independent Gf markers. 
He used problem solving tasks from the experimental literature which correlated very poorly 
with Gf measures. However, when subjects became more familiar with the tasks (either 
through more exposure to such tasks or through being given the rules), the tasks became 
highly correlated with Gf. Also, as subjects became increasingly familiar with the problem 
solving tasks, their relationship to the Gf tasks dropped. Hence, Gf tasks may require some 
amount of learning and may not be devoid of the use of knowledge.  
The Raven task is the task that loads the highest and most consistently on Gf factors 
(Marshalek, Lohman, & Snow, 1983). This suggests that this particular task might tap into 
more of the processes and abilities central to the Gf construct than any other task. Also, 
correlations between Raven scores and other measures of intellectual achievement suggests 
that the underlying processes may be general rather than specific to the task (Carpenter et al., 
1990). Hence, many studies have used Raven or Raven-like tasks to investigate the cognitive 
processes involved in Gf  (for a review see Primi, 2002 and for examples see Bors & 
Vigneau, 2003; DeShon, Chan, & Weissbein, 1995; Embretson, 1998; Meo, Roberts, & 
Marucci, 2007 ; Schiano, Cooper, Glaser, & Zhang, 1989; Unsworth & Engle, 2005a; 
Verguts, De Boeck, & Maris, 2000; Vigneau, Caissie, & Bors, 2006). Through this research, 
many Gf-related processes have been identified. Indeed, Raven’s is likely to have 
multidimensional performance determinants (DeShon et al., 1995).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, learning is argued to be a process that is essential to 
inductive reasoning (Holland et al., 1989) and contributes to individual differences in Gf test 
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performance (Carlstedt et al., 2000). The empirical focus of the current chapter is to examine 
whether learning takes place in Raven and if so, to what extent it is a source of individual 
differences in performance on this test.  
While some researchers assume that learning does not take place in Gf tasks such as Raven  
(Sternberg et al., 2002), the evidence  regarding this issue is not clear. For instance, Unsworth 
and Engle (2005b)  found that Raven’s correlated significantly with the degree of learning on 
a serial reaction time task in an intentional learning group.  Yet, in Campione, Brown, 
Ferrara, Jones and Sternberg (1985) when individuals were matched on mental age using the 
Weschler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), intellectually disabled  children  showed 
no difference in learning simple Raven’s rules when compared to children of average 
intelligence or above. Thus, the evidence regarding the contribution of learning processes to 
individual differences in Raven is not clear. In later sections we will review some of the 
research aimed at understanding Raven performance and discuss how learning processes may 
fit in with other processes that have been identified as being involved in Raven; but first, we 
describe the Raven test in more detail.  
4.3  Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices 
Raven’s items are usually considered to involve the induction of rules from an incomplete 
3x3 matrix of geometric shapes and figures. An example item is presented in Figure 4.1. The 
participant has to scan the rows and columns of the matrix and work out the rules that 
determine how these shapes and figures are laid out. They are then required to select the 
missing entry from the eight response options which are presented below the matrix, based on 
the rules that they think determine the organisation or grouping of the shapes/figures. Items 
differ with regard to the number of rules they contain, the types of rules and the combination 
of rules. Most items involve the instantiation of multiple rules, either as different rule types or 
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several instances of the same type of rule. Items are in easy-to-hard order. Generally, earlier 
items contain fewer rules. Problems also often require the participant to work out which 
figures, shapes or attributes (such as orientation of the figures/shapes) are governed by the 
same rule. Carpenter et al. (1990) named this latter requirement “correspondence finding”.  
In a series of studies that analysed performance on Raven by examining verbal protocols, 
eye-fixation patterns and computer simulation models, Carpenter et al. (1990) concluded that 
the following processes are involved and common to everyone in reaching a solution to a 
Raven item: 
1. Encoding of the figures/shapes. 
2. Finding correspondences between figures – “correspondence finding”. 
3. Working out the rule relating the figures/shapes.  
4. Storage of partial solutions and problem-solving goals in working memory. 
5. Repeating the above processes on other parts of the item (that is, discovering other 
rules because a single item often contains multiple rules). 
6. Selecting a response option.  
Thus, Carpenter et al. (1990) have identified some processes that occur in Raven that are 
relevant to all participants. Individual differences may exist for all or only some of these 
processes. The following section reviews some of the research aimed specifically at 
identifying processes that contribute to individual differences in performance in Raven.  
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2
 While Carpenter et al. (1990) did not feature any actual Raven’s items in their paper to protect the security of 
the Raven Problems, this item has already been featured in Vigneau et al. 2006. 
 
Figure 4.1. An example to illustrate the format of Raven test items. Participants look at the pattern, 
decide what the missing piece must be like to complete the pattern correctly, both across and down, and then 
find the correct piece out of the eight options shown. Only one of these options is perfectly correct. The 
organisation of the shapes and figures in the entries (in the rows and columns) of this item can be described 
by three rules: 
1) Each row/column contains three geometric figures (a circle, a diamond and a square) distributed across its 
three entries. 
2) Each row/column contains dotted lines with different orientations. The orientation of the lines (forward 
learning, backward learning and vertical) is distributed across its three entries. 
3) The number of dotted lines is constant within a row but varies down the columns (one, two, three).  
The missing entry can be generated from the above rules. Rule 1 specifies that the answer should contain a 
diamond (because the last column and row already each have a square and circle). Rule 2 specifies that it 
should contain backward leaning lines and Rule 3 specifies that the number of dotted lines should be three. 
These rules converge on the correct response option 5. Some of the incorrect response alternatives are 
designed to be in accordance with an imcomplete instantiation of the rules. For example, if a participant 
knew only of Rule 1, she might choose response option 2 or 8. More difficult problems contain more rules 
and/or more difficult rules, and/or more shapes/figures per entry. This is the first item from Raven’s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices, Set II (Raven, 1962).The analysis of the rules in this item is based on the 
work of Carpenter et al., 19902. 
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4.4  Search for Sources of Individual Differences in Raven Performance 
Research exploring processes that contribute to individual differences in Raven performance 
often manipulate various characteristics of the task (Primi, 2002). Changes in performance 
due to these manipulations imply that the characteristics manipulated tap into processes that 
contribute to individual differences on overall Raven performance. Research suggests that the 
following characteristics of Raven tap into individual differences in performance: 
1. The amount of information within an item (the number of shapes, figures, 
attributes and/or rules). 
2. The type of rules involved in an item.  
3. The perceptual organisation of the different elements (shapes/figures/attributes) 
within an item; and interestingly, 
4. The amount of learning opportunity provided within the test. 
However, it is often not clear what cognitive processes these characteristics implicate. 
Furthermore, there is often some controversy around the claims that these characteristics 
contribute to individual differences in Raven performance.  We will first review the evidence 
and then propose how learning processes may be related to the mentioned Raven test 
characteristics that seem to tap into individual differences. 
4.4.1 Amount of Information  
The amount of information refers to the number of shapes, figures, attributes or rules 
involved in an item. It is information that must be processed in working memory and should 
contribute to working memory load and hence, to the difficulty of an item (Mulholland, 
Pellegrino, & Glaser, 1980). Gf items often contain large numbers of steps, stimuli and sub-
results that must be stored and processed simultaneously (Carpenter et al., 1990); and 
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individuals with larger working memory capacity (WMC) may be more successful at this 
because WMC constraints limit one’s performance. Hence, the amount of information in 
individual Raven items may contribute to individual differences in overall Raven 
performance because people differ on WMC (Carpenter et al., 1990; Embretson, 1995; 
Pellegrino & Glaser, 1980).  
However, researchers such as Salthouse and Pink (2008), Unsworth and Engle (2005a), and 
Verguts and De Boeck (2002b) have found that the relationship between WMC tasks and Gf 
tasks are fairly constant, regardless of the amount of information contained in the Gf items. 
Thus, Salthouse and Pink (2008) concluded that the relationship between Gf tasks and WMC 
tasks could not be attributed to individuals performing better on Gf items being capable of 
processing and storing more within-item information than individuals who perform poorer on 
Gf items. Hence, the amount of information in individual Raven items may not contribute to 
individual differences in overall Raven performance after all.  
4.4.2 Learning Opportunity  
There is some evidence that learning processes contribute to individual differences in Raven. 
Using a modified version of Raven, Verguts and De Boeck (2002a) showed that participants 
were able to learn Raven  rules and then use them repeatedly in other items.  As they describe 
it, a small set of rules is repeatedly applied over items by subjects and they become more 
fluent over repeated applications. However, they did not investigate the relationship between 
their learning variable and individual difference factors such as Gf or WMC.   Hence, in a 
follow-up study Verguts and De Boeck (2002b) examined the same issue again, but this time 
with reference to WMC. WM load was kept low within each Raven item. They found that 
Raven performance still correlated with a WMC measure. Also, items with rules presented 
consecutively were easier than items where rules were presented in alternating sequence. 
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They concluded that the results together suggest that Raven rules become “primed” (or 
learnt) and the amount of priming is a factor of individual differences related to WMC. They 
argued that those with higher WMC were able to store many rules over items and hence 
perform better than those with lower WMC.  
However, Verguts and De Boeck (2002a; Verguts & De Boeck, 2002b)  really only showed 
a) that WMC matters in Raven, even when WM requirements in individual items are low, and 
b) that it is easier for everyone to solve Raven items when a rule is presented consecutively. 
Firstly, it should be noted that understanding what makes items easier for everyone is not 
necessarily the same thing as understanding sources of individual differences. For example, 
learning opportunity may benefit those of lower Gf ability just as much as those with higher 
Gf ability. Secondly, the moderate relationship between WMC and Raven (containing items 
of low WM requirements) may have been due to some other (perhaps unknown) reason not 
related to learning. For example, those with higher WMC may be better able to combat 
proactive interference from solutions to older items, and hence, perform better on current 
items (Unsworth & Engle, 2005a). 
4.4.3 Perceptual Organisation  
According to Primi (2002) perceptual organisation of shapes and figures in Raven is relevant 
to the process he calls abstraction, which seems similar to the process that Carpenter et al. 
(1990) call correspondence finding. Items often require the participant to work out which 
elements (shapes/figures/attributes) are governed by the same rule – that is, which elements 
correspond with one another. It involves working out what is relevant and what is the 
appropriate representation of the elements. This includes constructing conceptual 
representations that are only loosely tied to perceptual features (i.e., abstractions). Even when 
people have been told about all the possible rules, they do not always find it easy to see how 
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the relevant rule(s) apply to the elements, in a particular item (Carpenter et al., 1990). This 
may be because they are unable to construct the appropriate representation of the elements 
and hence, would not be able to see which elements are governed by the same rule.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. An item that illustrates a simple example of the correspondence 
finding/abstraction requirement and the distribution of two rule. The rule corresponds 
separately to the diamonds, squares, sets of four dots, circle, horizontal crosses and vertical 
crosses. Each shape/figure appears twice (and only twice) in a row and/or column – this is the 
distribution of two rule. However, due to the misleading perceptual cues caused by the 
overlap of shapes/figures, it is hard to mentally represent them  distinctly as diamonds, 
squares, circles etc. This can make it hard to identify the distribution of two rule. 
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Primi (2002) argues that the difficulty of this abstraction (or correspondence finding) depends 
on how the elements are perceptually organised or grouped. Certain ways of organising the 
elements can result in ambiguity and misleading cues that make the process of finding a 
correspondence among them difficult. That is, certain groupings of elements can increase the 
difficulty of working out which figures, shapes or attributes are governed by the same rule. 
Drawing on the gestalt principle of perceptual grouping of visual perceptions, Primi explains 
that some groupings are harder to work with than others because they violate our tendency to 
group things by certain perceptual features such as proximity, similarity, common region and 
continuity. Organisations that violate our natural grouping tendencies are called “non-
harmonic” groupings, and those that do not violate them are called “harmonic”. 
Carpenter et al. (1990) found participants struggled most with correspondence finding in 
items composed of multiple rules, probably because the involvement of several rules also 
necessitates the presence of several superimposed elements that form perceptually complex 
figures.  In perceptually complex items, the likelihood of the formation of non-harmonic 
groups of elements based on perceptual features is increased (Primi, 2002).  
There is some evidence that correspondence finding contributes to individual differences in 
Raven. Primi (2002) found that manipulations of perceptual organisation contributed 
substantially to item difficulty (moreso than the amount of information or rule types involved 
in an item). That is, non-harmonic items were substantially harder than harmonic items and 
perceptual organisation was a better predictor of item difficulty in a Raven-type item than the 
amount of information or the rule type involved. Due to this, he concluded that Gf is most 
strongly associated with the processes of abstraction/correspondence finding.  
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When considering Primi (2002), it should again be noted that understanding what makes an 
item more difficult for everyone is not the same thing as understanding individual differences. 
Increasing a task’s difficulty does not always increase its Gf loading (Elshout, 1985). 
However, understanding what makes a task difficult is a starting point, to understanding 
individual differences (Lohman, 2000).  
4.4.4 Rule Type  
Carpenter et al. (1990) discovered that Raven’s rules could be classified into five main types: 
1) Constant in a row: the same element (shape/figure/attribute) occurs throughout a 
row, but changes down a column. 
2) Pairwise progression: An increment or decrement occurs between adjacent entries in 
an attribute such as size, position or number. 
3) Figure addition or subtraction: A element from one column is added to 
(superimposed or juxtaposed) or subtracted from another figure to produce a third. 
4) Distribution of three values: Three unique elements are distributed through a row. 
5) Distribution of two values: Two elements are distributed through a row and the third 
value is null. 
Carpenter et al. (1990) found that Rules 1) and 2) were easier than rules 3) and 4. Rule 5), the 
“distribution of two values rule” was the hardest. In subsequent discussions we shall call the 
distribution of two values rule the “D2” rule.  
Carpenter et al. (1990) explored the individual differences question by developing two 
computer simulation models FAIRAVEN and BETTERAVEN. FAIRAVEN mirrored the 
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performance of a group of average performing university students tested and BETTERAVEN 
mirrored the performance of the best group of students. BETTERAVEN was programmed to 
have a larger working memory than FAIRAVEN and had access to all the rules identified in 
the Raven task. FAIRAVEN on the other hand could not identify the D2 rule (it was not 
programmed with this rule). Thus, it was unable to solve any item that required the 
application of this rule. These programming differences were implemented because Carpenter 
et al.’s (1990)  study suggested that the major source of individual differences in Raven 
performance is working memory capacity (specifically, the ability to manage a large set of 
problem-solving goals) and the knowledge and induction of the D2  rule.  
Mackintosh  (1998) questions one aspect of the computer models of Carpenter et al. (1990). 
BETTERAVEN (and to a lesser extent, FAIRAVEN) were supplied with the necessary rules 
and therefore only had to recognise which rules were relevant to a given item; thus, the 
programs did not need to induce the rules from scratch. Mackintosh questions whether this 
would be the case in human participants, “But where have the rules come from? Do not 
people differ in their ability to discover them, and are not such differences partly responsible 
for differences in task performance?” (p. 305).  
It could be argued that Carpenter et al.’s (1990) computer models of Raven performance 
assume that people bring certain declarative rules to the reasoning problem, whereas 
Mackintosh (1998) seems to suggest that there is a need to discover the rules during the 
reasoning process. 
If this is the case, Carpenter et al.’s (1990) position is consistent with Sternberg (1986) and  
Holland et al.’s (1989) theories of induction (both outlined in Chapter 3). In these theories, 
items are not seen as self contained - the participant must come to the task with some 
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familiarity with the types of relationships and concepts that define the rules in Raven. In 
Sternberg’s terms, the rules in Raven would be selectively compared with declarative, 
inferential rules that the participant possesses and brings to the problem. This position has 
some support from other theorists. For example,  Ohlsson and Lehtinen (1997) would argue 
that before a concept can be recognised, individuals must already possess the concept to be 
recognised.  That is, in order for generalisations to be made (e.g., “three of same type of 
elements are distributed through a row in this Raven item”), individuals would need to 
already possess knowledge of those generalisations (e.g., the concept of “things can occur in 
lots of threes”) before they can see their instances in concrete examples (e.g., the instantiation 
of the constant in a row rule, in a Raven item). 
In contrast,  Mackintosh’s (1998)  position is consistent with the traditional view of Gf in the 
differential literature - that Gf items involve reasoning which is not influenced by previous 
acquisitions of knowledge structures (Gustafsson, 1988; Richardson, 1991).  Indeed, Gf tasks 
have been considered to be context-free tasks that can be used to tap into fluid abilities which 
are not influenced by a person’s previous experiences (Cattell, 1971).  This line of reasoning 
entails the assumptions:   
1) Gf items are self-contained and require participants to make generalisations about 
stimuli in the item (to find commonalities that form the basis of the rules) (Ohlsson & 
Lehtinen, 1997), 
2)  The generalisations the participants make are not dependent on their prior 
experiences before they arrived at the testing session, nor their experiences on prior 
items within the task.  
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In the previous chapter, we noted that in Spearman’s (1932) cognitive theory of “g” – the 
eduction of relations and correlates reflected such a view.  
4.5  Combining the Evidence on Sources of Individual Differences  
One way to resolve the tension between the need for knowledge in induction and the 
conceptualisation of Gf tests as being novel is to consider that learning processes bridge the 
need for knowledge in induction and the novelty of Gf tests. Gf tests may be largely novel but 
if they allow learning to occur across the test, this would provide reasoners with the relevant 
knowledge that theorists such as Sternberg (1986), Holland et al. (1989), and Ohlsson and 
Lehtinen (1997) argue is required for reasoning. Furthermore, individual differences in Gf 
test performance may be partly due to the amount of knowledge learnt across the test, rather 
than knowledge brought to the test (Verguts & De Boeck, 2002b). 
It is likely that most (if not all) may come to the task with knowledge of the simpler rules 
used at the beginning of Ravens. As Verguts and De Boeck (2002a) point out, the rules of the 
first items of the task are usually very easy to work out. However, participants may need to 
learn through the task to solve more complicated (and hence, arguably, more novel) 
instantiations of the rules in later items. The assumption here is that complex items are novel 
because they contain multiple instances of various rules, which by themselves may not be 
novel, but when combined creates a novel product. 
Indeed, as one progresses through the Raven test, the items become more and more difficult, 
and the correct rule becomes more difficult to elicit (Verguts & De Boeck, 2002b). It has 
been put forward that this is because harder items in Raven contain instantiations of multiple 
rules and multiple types of rules, increasing the likelihood of perceptually complex 
arrangements (Carpenter et al., 1990). As mentioned previously in this chapter, this also 
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increases the likelihood of non-harmonic groupings and hence, increases the difficulty of 
abstraction (i.e., finding correspondence) amongst the elements in the item (Primi, 2002). 
According to Primi, correspondence finding is the most difficult aspect of Raven. 
Furthermore, non-harmonic groupings by Primi’s definition are novel and unfamiliar, 
because they violate our tendency to group things by proximity, similarity, common region 
and continuity.  
However, knowledge of Raven rules should make correspondence finding easier. 
Correspondence finding is influenced by the knowledge of the relationships between the 
various shapes/figures/attributes in an item (that is, the  rules that govern those relationships) 
(Mackintosh, 1998) because those rules define the relevant groupings (correspondence) of the 
shapes/figures/attributes. Referring back to Figure 4.2 for an illustration; the overlapping 
nature of the shapes and figures makes it hard to mentally represent them dinstinctly as 
diamonds, squares, circles etc., and hence, makes it hard to find correspondence among them 
to identify the D2 rule. However, if one already consciously knows to look for the D2 to start 
with, the correspondence finding requirement should become easier.  
Knowledge of the more complicated, novel instatiations of the rules may only be acquired 
through learning from easier items which contain simpler, more familiar instantiation of the 
rules. According to Verguts and De Boeck (2002a, 2002b) participants will try out the rules 
that they have tried before and the probability of trying out a certain rule depends on the 
activation of that rule . That is, on its occurrence in previous items and how well participants 
were able to learn it.  
However, it is unclear if learning is a source of individual differences; that is, whether 
participants differ in how well they learn the rules. For example, rule learning may be a 
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necessary part of reasoning in Raven, but it may not be a source of individual differences if 
everyone learns to the same degree and benefits from it equally.  
As mentioned previously, Carpenter et al. (1990) found that the best performers on Raven 
differed from average performers in that they were able to successfully solve items 
containing the D2 rule. In our search for processes that contribute to individual differences in 
Raven it may be helpful to empirically examine why the D2 rule has been found to be 
sensitive to individual differences; that is, whether items with the D2 require any learning 
processes. 
If learning is important to individual differences, it could be that the D2 rule distinguishes 
those of higher ability from those of lower ability because there is not much opportunity in 
the task to learn it. It occurs quite late in the task (its first appearance is at item 22 out of a 
total of 36 items) and slower learners may be less able to learn about it. For example, if it 
occurred earlier in the task, it may not be able to distinguish high and low performers as well 
as it does in the current version of Raven.  
Alternatively, the D2 rule may be more difficult than other rules because it relates objects in a 
manner that is not normal in real life (i.e., they are non-harmonic). The D2 rule specifies that 
two values from a categorical attribute are distributed through a row and the third value is 
null. This was illustrated in Figure 4.2.  It is hard to think of a situation in real life where this 
is the normal way to group things. Some may learn about this relationship in real life and 
bring it with them to the task while others may not. According to Holland et al. (1989) 
individual differences in induction is due to the accumulation of goal directed rules 
(knowledge). The size and type of the store of rules will differ from individual to individual, 
depending on their experience. From this perspective, learning within the Raven task may not 
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be a source of individual differences in Raven task performance (nor even required); 
individual differences may be more about what the participant brings to the task.  
To understand this further, we empirically investigate whether rule learning occurs in Ravens 
and if so, whether those of low and high Gf ability differ in their ability to learn rules during 
the test, particularly the D2 rule. We focus on the D2 rule in particular because it has been 
shown to be associated with individual differences in Raven performance (Carpenter et al., 
1990). 
This was done by manipulating the number of times people are exposed to the D2 rule. We 
presented three degrees of exposure: no exposure, limited exposure (the same number of D2 
rules used in the Raven’s, 1975), and most exposure, as a between-subjects manipulation. We 
will call these conditions No, Limited and Most, respectively. The critical test of the learning 
hypothesis is performance on transfer items that contain multiple instantiations of the D2 rule 
(i.e., complex, non-harmonic, novel D2 items).  
4.6  Competing Hypotheses and Specific Predictions 
Based on the various theories and arguments presented so far in this thesis, the following 
three competing sets of specific hypotheses about the outcome of the D2 (learning 
opportunity) manipulation can be derived. We shall outline them briefly here first, then 
elaborate on the details shortly. The first, the “Classical Gf Hypothesis”, is based on the 
classical view that Gf items are novel. Thus, this hypothesis assumes that reasoning in Gf 
items is self-contained, based on the eduction of relations and correlates (Spearman, 1932), 
and is done in isolation from background knowledge and learning (Cattell, 1987). According 
to this account, learning does not occur across the test and hence does not contribute to 
individual differences in Raven performance. The second, the “Knowledge Hypothesis”, is 
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based on the works of Sternberg (1986) and Holland et al. (1989) who think reasoning is 
guided by prior inferential rules (conceptual knowledge). From this view, learning occurs to 
some extent but individual differences are largely due to the prior conceptual knowledge 
brought to the test. A corollary of this view is that too much learning opportunity within 
Raven should reduce its variance (and thus, its ability to distinguish between those of high 
and low Gf). This is because the things learnt during the test would serve to equate 
everyone’s relevant conceptual knowledge and hence, wash away knowledge as a source of 
individual differences in performance. The last set of hypotheses is based on Verguts and De 
Boeck (2002a) and Verguts and De Boeck (2002b) who emphasise the importance of rule 
learning in Raven performance. We shall call this the “Learning Hypothesis”. According to 
Verguts and De Boeck, rule-learning occurs in Raven and contributes to individual 
differences in performance. The Learning Hypothesis is in line with our general hypothesis 
that learning processes act as a bridge between the knowledge required for inductive 
reasoning and the novelty of Gf tests. Specifically, it is in line with our hypothesis that one 
must learn the rules from the earlier, more familiar items to be able to solve later items that 
contain more novel instantiations of the rules, and this learning is a source of individual 
differences in task performance.  
The three sets of competing hypotheses each contain two parts. The first part contains 
predictions related to whether learning is necessary for reasoning in Raven before individual 
differences are taken into account. This would show up as differences in group means on the 
transfer items concomitant with the learning opportunity manipulation. The second part from 
each set contains predictions related to whether learning contributes to individual differences 
in Gf test (transfer item) performance. This would show up as interactions between the 
learning opportunity manipulation and Gf ability (a marker test of Gf). We expand on these 
hypotheses below: 
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1.1) Classical Gf Hypothesis – Group Means:  If induction is independent of any 
learning or knowledge, then the D2 manipulation will have no effect on the 
transfer items’ means in the different conditions (that is, the means will not differ 
significantly).  
The mean transfer item performance should not differ significantly as a function of exposure 
to the D2 rule. Also, performance in the No condition should be above chance levels (see 
Figure 4.3, graph A1) because some would be able to induce the answers (eduction of 
relations and correlates), based solely on the stimuli in the item. That is, participants discover 
the rules during the reasoning process within each of the transfer items.  
1.2) Classical Gf Hypothesis – Individual Differences: If induction is independent of 
any learning or knowledge, the D2 manipulation will have no effect on differences 
between high and low Gf ability groups on the transfer items.  
The transfer items should have the same correlations with a marker test of Gf, regardless of 
condition (Figure 4.4, graph B1). This difference could also be conceptualised in terms of 
mean performance on the transfer items for high Gf ability versus low Gf ability groups 
(Figure 4.5, Graph C1); there should be no interaction between condition and Gf ability on 
transfer item performance.  
2.1) Knowledge Hypothesis – Group Means:  If induction is guided by prior conceptual 
knowledge, more exposure to the D2 will result in more opportunity to acquire 
conceptual knowledge and result in better performance on the transfer items. 
Transfer item means should be lowest in the No Condition but above chance levels because 
according to this line of reasoning, some individuals would already possess the D2 rule while 
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others will not. Additionally, transfer item means should increase with increased exposure to 
the D2 rule (as learning is thought to constantly takes place in induction). That is, all 
participants should become more familiar with the D2 rule with more exposure to it (Figure 
4.3, Graph A2).  
 This hypothesis is based on the works of Carpenter et al. (1990), Holland et al. (1989), 
Ohlsson and Lehtinen (1997) and Sternberg (1986). In these works, it is (at the very least) 
implied that induction requires individuals to possess relevant conceptual knowledge of the 
rules before their instances can be detected in concrete examples (that is, before they come to 
the task). For example, in Sternberg’s terms, the rules in Raven would be selectively 
compared with declarative, inferential rules that the problem solver already possesses. Also, 
Holland et al. (1989) consider learning to be an integral part of induction.  
2.2) Knowledge Hypothesis– Individual Differences:  If induction is guided by prior 
conceptual knowledge and individual differences is due to possession of the relevant 
knowledge, more exposure to the D2 rule will provide everyone with the necessary 
and sufficient knowledge about it. This should decrease the difference between high 
and low Gf ability groups on transfer item performance.   
In terms of individual differences under this account, the transfer items’ correlations with a 
marker test of Gf should decrease with increased exposure to the D2 rule. This is because 
individual differences are hypothesized to be due to only some possessing the D2 rule while 
others do not (Carpenter et al., 1990). With increasing exposure, all will eventually possess 
the D2 rule by the transfer item stage. Furthermore, with increasing exposure, spotting of the 
rule may require less control and effort. The greater the degree of automatization, the smaller 
is the degree of reasoning involved (Sternberg, 1986), and thus, correlations with Gf should 
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decrease (Figure 4.4, Graph B2). In terms of differences between the means of high and low 
Gf ability groups, there should be an interaction, with those of lower ability benefitting more 
from increased exposure and those of higher ability reaching a ceiling level (see Figure 4.5, 
Graph C2). 
3.1) Learning Hypothesis – Group Means: If induction is dependent on rule-learning 
from earlier, easier items within the Raven task, more exposure to the D2 rule will 
result in more opportunity to learn about the rule and hence, better performance on 
the transfer items. No exposure to the rule will result in chance-level performance.  
Under this account a situation like Figure 4.3, Graph A3 would be predicted. If induction on 
complex, novel versions of D2 items (such as the transfer items) is dependent on learning 
from simpler, more familiar versions, then some learning opportunity will be needed before 
induction can take place. Thus, when participants are not given any prior exposure to the D2 
rule, performance on the transfer items will be at chance levels and increase with increased in 
exposure. 
This is based on the work of Verguts and De Boeck (2002a) and Verguts and De Boeck 
(2002b) who believe that rule learning is important in Ravens. They hypothesise that 
participant will try out rules they have tried before and the probability of trying out a certain 
rule depends on the activation of that rule, that is, on its occurrence in previous items and 
how well it has been learnt. In accordance with this, we hypothesise that easier rules are 
known to participants and get activated in their minds during early, easy problems. 
Progressing through the task, the instantiations of the rules in the items become more novel 
and more difficult, and the correct rule becomes more difficult to elicit. We hypothesize 
78 
 
 
 
participants then rely on what they learn from earlier, more familiar, easier items in the task 
to solve more difficult items that contain more complex, novel versions of the same rules.   
3.2) Learning Hypothesis – Individual Differences: If induction is dependent on rule-
learning from earlier, easier items within the Raven task, more exposure to the D2 
rule will result in larger differences between high and low Gf ability groups on the 
transfer items, because those of higher Gf should be better learners.  
 
Correlations between transfer item performance and a marker test of Gf should increase 
with increased exposure to the D2 rule. This is because according to Verguts and De 
Boeck (2002a), those higher in Gf benefit the most from learning opportunity (Figure 4.4, 
Graph B3). Note that this is different to Hypothesis 2.2 where those of low Gf are 
expected to benefit most from increased learning opportunity.  In terms of differences 
between means for high and low Gf ability groups, there should be an interaction, with 
those of higher ability benefitting more from increased exposure (Figure 4.5, Graph C3). 
 Figure 4.3. Predicted group means on the transfer items for the three conditions, as predicted 
by the three competing hypotheses. (A1) is based on the Classical Gf Hypothesis 1.1 , (A2) is 
based on Knowledge Hypothesis 2.1 and (A3) is based on the Learning Hypothesis 3.1.   
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 Figure 4.4. Predicted correlations between the transfer items and a Gf marker, for the three 
conditions, as predicted by the three competing hypotheses. (B1) is based on the Classical Gf 
Hypothesis 1.2, (B2) is based on Knowledge Hypothesis 2.2 and (B3) is based on the 
Learning Hypothesis 3.2.   
 Figure 4.5. Predicted differences in means on the transfer items for High Gf and Low Gf 
groups, for the three conditions, as predicted by the three competing hypotheses. (C1) is 
based on the Classical Gf Hypothesis 1.2, (C2) is based on Knowledge Hypothesis 2.2 and 
(C3) is based on the Learning Hypothesis 3.2.   
 
Thus, Figure 4.3 illustrates that Classical Gf Hypothesis 1.1 predicts means to be above 
chance but not differ as a function of condition, whereas Knowledge Hypothesis 2.1 and 
Learning Hypothesis 3.1 predict increases in mean performance as a function of learning 
opportunity. However, Hypotheses 2.1 and 3.1 differ in that 2.1 predicts that means should be 
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lowest in the No Condition but above chance, whereas 3.1 predicts that the means in the No 
Condition will be lowest and at chance levels.  
Figure 4.4 illustrates that Classical Gf Hypothesis 1.2 predicts that transfer items should have 
the same correlations with the marker test of Gf (regardless of condition), the Knowledge 
Hypothesis 2.2 predicts that the correlations should decrease with increased exposure to the 
D2 rule, while the Learning Hypothesis 3.2 predicts that the correlations should increase with 
increased exposure to the D2 rule.  
Lastly, Figure 4.5 illustrates that hypotheses 1.2, 2.2 and 3.2 could be conceptualised in terms 
of mean performance separately for those of high and low Gf. Classical Hypothesis 1.2 
predicts that there will be no interaction between condition and Gf ability. Knowledge 
Hypothesis 2.2 predicts that there will be an interaction between condition and Gf ability, 
with those of lower ability benefitting more from increased exposure and those of higher 
ability reaching a ceiling level. Learning Hypothesis 3.2 also predicts that there will be an 
interaction between condition and Gf ability, but those of higher Gf should improve more 
dramatically than those of lower Gf with more exposure to the D2 rule.  
4.7  Method  
 
4.7.1 Participants 
The participants were students, enrolled in a second year undergraduate subject at the 
University of Sydney and participated as part of their course work. In total, 284 students 
participated in the study. Due to a programming error, data was lost for 19 participants from 
the Limited condition. Due to testing time constraints, demographic information was gathered 
in class the week following the experiment. Demographic information could only be gathered 
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for 224 (163 female) out of the original 284 participants. Their mean age = 21.31 years (SD = 
4.67).  
4.7.2 Cognitive Tasks  
1) Modified Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices Items   
This task was completed on computers. Due to testing time constraints, it had a time limit of 
33 minutes (after which the task timed out). However, previous studies in our lab have shown 
that 33 minutes is usually ample time for most participants to complete a total of 16 items. 
The task consisted of a “Learning Set” component and a “Transfer Set” component. More 
information about these items can also be found in Appendix A.1, A.2 and A.3. These two 
sets will now be explicated.  
 Raven Learning Sets (13 Items): No, Limited and Most 
Items were selected from Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1962) (which 
usually has 36 items) to form three 13-item versions of the Raven task. These will be referred 
to as the “Learning Sets”.  
In the Limited condition, items for the Learning Set were selected to reflect the various types 
of items and the broad range of difficulties found in the original Raven. Although 13 items 
per task is rather short, this was necessary due to constraints on the amount of testing time 
that was available. Also, such short forms of the Raven  have been found to retain the 
psychometric properties of the original version of the task, including its predictive validity 
(Vigneau et al., 2006). This version contained four items with the D2 rule. This condition was 
included so that any findings regarding the manipulation of the D2 rule could be understood 
with reference to the original task.  
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In the No condition, items in the Learning Set were the same as the items in the Limited 
condition’s Learning Set, with the exception that the four D2 rule items were replaced with 
items the author constructed that did not contain the D2 rule. Thus, this set contained no D2 
rule items. Every attempt was made to ensure that they would be as similar as possible to the 
D2 rule items they replaced, in terms of the way the items looked, the number of rules in an 
item and the types of rules included in an item (other than the D2 rule). 
In the Most condition, items for the Learning Set were the same as the items in the Limited 
condition but six additional D2 rule items were constructed and replaced six items that did 
not contain D2 rules. Thus, this set contained ten D2 rule items. Again, every attempt was 
made to ensure that they would be as similar as possible to the items they replaced. Also, 
unlike the Limited condition version (and the original Raven), the first D2 rule item occurs 
very early in the set.  
 Raven Transfer Set (3 Items) 
Each Learning Set was followed by the same three transfer items (“Transfer Set”), containing 
multiple instantiations of the D2 rule.  The items varied in difficulty.  Items 1 and 2 were 
drawn from the end of the original Raven task and did not appear in any of the Learning Sets. 
Item 1 was considered to be easier than item 2 according to Raven, Court and Raven (1983).  
Item 3 was constructed by the author and was aimed at being less difficult than 1 and 2. It 
was included in case items 1 and 2 turned out to be too difficult and resulted in a floor effect. 
However, it was placed at the end in case it was too easy and resulted in providing training 
for items 1and 2. The aim was for the Transfer Set to be able to capture a range of difficulty 
(especially in the Limited condition – which was equivalent to no manipulation).  
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2) Number Series (Gf Marker) 
This is a well known Gf test (Marshalek et al., 1983; Quereshi, 2001). It was computer 
administered, with a time limit of 5 minutes. Items were presented in a random sequence 
(rather than the traditional easy to hard sequence)3 and consisted of a series of numbers which 
are related by various rules. Participants need to determine the next number in the series. 
Twenty-four items were drawn from an item bank from the Personality and Individual 
Differences Lab, at the University of Sydney.  
An example item is as follows: 
12  15  12  18  12   21  12 ? 
In this case, the first number is a constant repeated at an interval of two, and every second 
number has 3 added to it to gain the subsequent value. 
Thus, the correct answer is:                 24 
4.7.3 Procedure 
Testing was conducted in groups of no more than 23 students. All tasks were computer 
administrated. An experimenter provided general instructions at the beginning of each session 
and was present throughout the session to assist participants and ensure that the test protocol 
was followed. Participants were also provided with the general instructions on paper. A set of 
computerized instructions and practice phase preceded each task. Participants made their 
responses for all tasks using a standard keyboard and mouse. Participants were not allowed to 
use pen and paper for any of the other items.  
                                                           
3
 The author acknowledges that this may result in a methodological effect. This will be addressed in the General 
Discussion of this chapter and Chapter 5.  
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The experiment was a between-groups design with the three levels (No, Limited and Most 
conditions). The dependent variable was Transfer Set performance. Number Series and 
Learning Set performance were used as covariates as described below.  
4.8 Results and Discussion 
This section will be organised as follows. First, we will present descriptive statistics and 
preliminary analyses. We then move on to analyses of the Learning Sets to gain a better 
understanding of the effects that our D2 rule manipulation had on performance on the 
Learning Sets – in short, a manipulation check. After that, we present analyses of 
performance on the Transfer Set as a function of condition and Gf ability. Finally, we present 
analyses of performance on the Transfer Set as a function of condition, Gf ability and 
performance on the Learning Set. This last set of analyses was included to examine the 
possibility that there is a difference in the amount of learning opportunity available when one 
is merely exposed to the D2 rule, versus when one is able to correctly solve a D2 rule item.  
4.8.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Available demographic information is presented in Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics for the 
tasks used in the study are presented separately by condition in Table 4.2. Cronbach’s alpha 
is in the acceptable range (for research purposes) for all variables.  The Transfer Sets have 
low alphas, but with only three items that is to be expected. The Number Series alpha in the 
Limited condition is based on 18 items (instead of the full 24) because all participants got 
item 1 correct and items 20-24 either  incorrect or did not reach them in the allocated time . In 
the Most condition, it is based on 21 items because all participants either got items 22-24 
incorrect or did not reach them in time.  
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4.8.2 Preliminary Analyses 
Task correlations are presented in Table 4.3 All correlations were in the acceptable range.  
 
 
Since our aim will be to compare the three condition groups on Gf items following an 
experimental manipulation, it is important to know that the groups did not differ significantly 
on Gf at the outset. Due to unequal sample sizes in the three conditions, the Univariate 
General Linear Model (GLM) analysis of variance procedure was used with Type III sums of 
squares to see if groups differed on the Gf marker, Number Series. The univariate analysis of 
variance showed that the groups did not differ significantly on the Gf marker, F (2, 262) = 
0.554, p = .58.  
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4.8.3 Analysis of Learning Sets (Manipulation Check) 
There is an expectation that overall Learning Set performance should differ as a function of 
the D2 learning opportunity manipulation. This is because D2 rules have been shown to be 
the most difficult Raven rules (Carpenter et al., 1990) and the more difficult items you have 
in a test, the poorer performance will be. Consistent with this expectation, we test the learning 
opportunity manipulation in two ways. Firstly, we expect mean performance to differ, as just 
described, as a function of the number of D2 items in the learning set. Secondly, because item 
solution demands fluid abilities, those with higher Gf should do better overall and the 
relationship between learning set performance and Gf should not differ as a function of 
condition. 
A univariate GLM analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to see if performance 
on the Learning Sets differed, with Number Series (Gf) performance entered as a centred 
covariate but this was mainly included to examine whether those of higher Gf did better on 
this measure, as they should have. There was a significant main effect of condition F (2, 259) 
= 20.84, p >. 01, eta2 = .139 and as expected, a significant main effect of Gf ability F (1, 259) 
= 40.05, p > .01, eta2 = .134, but there was no significant interaction due to condition and Gf 
ability F (2, 259) = 1.99, p = .14, eta2 = .015. That is, the relationship between Gf and 
Learning Set performance did not differ as a function of condition. 
Figure 4.6 illustrates point estimates of mean Learning Set performance in the three 
conditions for those one standard deviation above and below the mean on Number Series 
(Gf). As would be expected, those of higher Gf consistently scored higher than those of lower 
Gf. These point estimates were derived from the regression equation in Appendix A.4.  
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Figure 4.6. Point estimates of mean Learning Set performance for those 1 standard deviation 
below and those 1 standard deviation above the mean on Number Series (Gf), in the three 
conditions. 
 
Since the effect of condition was significant, follow-up pairwise comparisons using a 
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons (see Table 4.4) were run. They showed that 
the No Condition’s Learning Set was significantly easier than the Learning Sets in the other 
conditions. Although there is a trend in the expected direction, the Most and Limited 
conditions did not differ significantly. That is, the No Condition’s set was easier than the 
other conditions’ Learning Sets. This may have been because it did not contain any D2 rule 
items - which are known to be harder than other rules (Carpenter et al., 1990; Embretson, 
1998).  
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
No Limited Most
Low Gf (-1SD)
High Gf (+1SD)
Le
a
rn
in
g 
 
Se
t  
Pe
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
90 
 
 
 
 
We suspected that the significant differences in difficulty between the No set and other sets 
would appear largest between items that did not contain the D2 rules and their corresponding 
items in the other sets that did contain the rule. Figure 4.7. shows a comparison of proportion 
correct for each Learning Set item in the three conditions and the Raven Manual (Raven et 
al., 1983) . Items 7, 8, 11 and 12 from the No condition appeared to have been much easier 
than their corresponding items from the other conditions and the means reported in the Raven 
Manual. These items were constructed by the author and unlike their corresponding items, 
did not contain the D2 rule – and thus would be expected to have been easier. Conversely, 
items 3, 4 and 5 from the Most condition appeared to have been much harder than their 
corresponding items in the other conditions and the Raven Manual. They were created by the 
author to contain the D2, whereas their corresponding items in the other conditions/Raven 
Manual did not. Again, this is as expected. Overall, these results are consistent with previous 
findings (Carpenter et al., 1990) that suggest that the D2 rule is more difficult than other 
rules. The results also suggest that the difficulty of the Learning Set in the No condition 
differed from the Learning Sets in the other conditions because of the D2 manipulation.  
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Interestingly, the last items constructed by the author in the Most condition (items 9 and 13) 
did not appear to be significantly harder than their corresponding items that did not contain 
the D2 rule. This may be an indication that participants became more familiar with the D2 
rule towards the end of the set.  
Figure 4.7. A comparison of proportion correct for each Learning Set item in the three 
conditions and the Raven Manual. Circled points indicate item containing the D2 rule.  
 
We also wanted to check that the Learning Set in the Limited condition was not too different 
to the original Raven task. The Learning Set in the Limited condition was meant to mirror the 
original Raven task so that we could relate any findings back to the original task. Item means 
from the Limited condition should have mirrored the means from the Raven Manual, since 
identical items were used. Figure 4.7 indicates that this appears to be the case up to item 7. 
However, from item 8 onwards, those in the Limited Condition outperformed the Raven 
Manual’s standardisation sample, particularly towards the end. This may have been because 
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the original Raven was a longer task. Participants from the current study may have been less 
fatigued on these later items than those whose results were reported in the Raven Manual. 
Alternatively or additionally, the calculations of item difficulties in the original time-limited 
Raven task were derived by considering unattempted items as incorrect. Thus, if the 
standardization sample had had sufficient time to complete all items (as the participants from 
our study did) perhaps they would have performed as well as our participants.  
4.8.4 Analysis of Transfer Set  
Another Manipulation Check – Was the Transfer Set Too Difficult? 
The Transfer Set was composed of items taken from the more difficult end of the original 
Raven test. Hence, there is a danger that they may have been too difficult for many 
participants, who may have resorted to guessing rather than reasoning. Means for Transfer 
Sets for each condition are around 1 item correct (out of 3) (see Table 4.2). At first glance, 
this suggests that performance was at, or close to chance levels (see Appendix A.5 for 
calculations of chance levels). To explore this in more detail, simple t-tests were carried out 
to see if individual item means differed significantly from chance levels. The probability of 
choosing the correct option from 8 alternatives by chance is 12.5%.  This is presented in 
Table 4.5.  
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Only performance on transfer item 2 (in all of the conditions) appears to have been at chance 
levels. However, this is not unusual for this item. Raven et al. (1983) indicates that it is a 
difficult item (they reported mean percentage correct of 5% - see Appendix A.3). 
Furthermore, the Transfer Set items in the Limited Condition captures a range of difficulty as 
intended (.09 - .65) and the means are similar in the other conditions. Thus, it appears that the 
Transfer Set was not too difficult and was able to capture individual differences in reasoning 
and not just random guesses.  
Main Analyses 
Transfer Set Performance - No Exposure to the D2 Rule 
As just mentioned, Table 4.5 indicates that performance on the Transfer Set items was above 
chance in the No Condition. Thus, it could be concluded that prior exposure to easier D2 rule 
items within the task is not required for participants to be able to solve D2 items with more 
complex (arguably, more novel) instantiations of the rules.  
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This is consistent with the Classical Gf Hypothesis and Knowledge Hypothesis but 
inconsistent with the Learning Hypothesis. The finding is inconsistent with the Learning 
Hypothesis because it predicts induction is dependent on rule-learning from earlier, easier 
items within the Raven task and no exposure to such items will result in chance-level 
performance on items with complex versions of the rule (such as in the Transfer Set). The 
finding is consistent with the Classical Gf Hypothesis because it predicts that the D2 
manipulation will have no effect on performance on the Transfer Set items (because 
reasoning occurs in isolation from learning). It is also consistent with the Knowledge 
Hypothesis, which predicts that even with no prior exposure to easier D2 rule items within 
the task, performance on the transfer items would still be above chance levels because some 
participants would bring the relevant, prior conceptual knowledge of the complex versions of 
the D2 rule. Thus, while it is possible to rule out the participants need to learn about the D2 
rule in the task, at this point, it is unclear if participants bring conceptual knowledge of the 
complex versions of the D2 rule to the task or if they are able to induce the answer without 
recourse to prior knowledge.  
Transfer Set Performance – Increasing Exposure to the D2 Rule 
While participants may not need learning opportunity about the D2 rule to solve the Transfer 
Set, a related question that remains is whether more exposure to easier D2 rule items makes 
participants better at solving more complex D2 rule items. An ANCOVA was conducted to 
see if performance on the Transfer Set differed across the three conditions with Gf (Number 
Series) performance entered as a centred covariate.  There was no significant main effect of 
condition F (2, 259) = 0.23, p = .79, eta2 = .002 and a significant main effect of Gf ability F 
(1, 259) = 37.16, p > .01, eta2 = .120. However, there was no significant interaction due to 
condition and Gf ability F (2, 259) = 1.01, p = .36, eta2 = .008. 
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Figure 4.8 illustrates point estimates of mean Transfer Set performance for those one standard 
deviation above and below the mean on Number Series (Gf) in the three conditions. As would 
be expected, those of higher Gf consistently scored higher than those of lower Gf. These 
point estimates were derived from the ANCOVA parameter estimates reported in Appendix 
A.6. 
 
Figure 4.8. Point estimates of mean Transfer Set performance for those 1 standard deviation 
below and those 1 standard deviation above the mean on Number Series (Gf), in the three 
conditions. 
 
The lack of main effect of condition suggests that more exposure to D2 rules does not appear 
to affect performance on harder D2 rules at the group level. This is consistent with the 
Classical Gf Hypothesis but contrary to the Knowledge Hypothesis and the Learning 
Hypothesis. The Classical Gf Hypothesis predicted that the D2 manipulation would not have 
any effect on the Transfer Set. The Knowledge and Learning Hypotheses predicted that more 
exposure to the D2 rule would result in more opportunity to learn about the rule and for 
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participants to acquire the relevant, conceptual knowledge; resulting in better mean group 
performance.  
The lack of interaction between condition and Gf ability suggests that across-item learning 
processes and knowledge do not contribute to individual differences in performance. Again, 
this is consistent with the Classical Gf Hypothesis but inconsistent with the Knowledge 
Hypothesis and the Learning Hypothesis. The two latter hypotheses predicted interactions 
between condition and Gf ability (albeit in different directions). The Knowledge Hypothesis 
predicted that individual differences are due to possession of the relevant knowledge hence, 
more exposure to the D2 rule would provide everyone with knowledge about it, decreasing 
the gap between high and low Gf ability groups. The Learning Hypothesis predicted that 
individual differences are due to learning processes (specifically rule learning) and those of 
higher Gf learn more than those of lower Gf; hence, more exposure to the D2 rule would 
increase the gap between high and low Gf ability groups. In contrast, the Classical Gf 
Hypothesis predicted that learning manipulations would have no effect on Transfer Set 
performance; hence, those of higher Gf ability would consistently and uniformly outperform 
those of lower Gf ability, regardless of condition – which is what we found.  
Summary of Analysis of Transfer Set  
Thus far, support is strongest for the Classical Gf Hypothesis. Manipulation of the D2 rule 
seems to have had no noticeable effect on Transfer Set performance. That is, providing more 
exposure to the D2 rule does not seem to change performance in any way at the mean group 
level and when individual differences are taken into account. This suggests that participants 
do not learn about the rules across the task. Consistent with the Classical Gf Hypothesis, it 
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appears that induction within an item is done in isolation from previous experience – such as 
experience from other items in the task.  
4.8.5 Analysis of Transfer Set when Actual Learning is taken into Account  
Mere exposure to the rules may not be enough for participants to learn about the rules. 
Learning may require feedback and in Raven (partial) feedback is more evident when an item 
is answered correctly. That is, as stated by Verguts and De Boeck (2002a):  
“...choosing a certain rule to solve the item and finding a response alternative that 
matches this rule provides the information that the rule chosen is the correct one. The 
idea is that, if one chooses an incorrect rule, the probability is low that one also finds a 
matching response alternative below....in [the] case the response is correct, implicit 
feedback is given about the correctness of the rule (note that the presence of feedback 
is critical in learning the rules)” (p.536). 
With reference to the current experiment, providing more exposure to rules through the 
Learning Set is providing potential learning opportunity, but that learning opportunity may 
not be exploited unless the participant can answer the Learning Set items correctly. The more 
items the participant answers correctly in the Learning Set, the more actual learning 
opportunity is available to them.  
Hence, two additional issues were explored. First, we examined the question of whether or 
not performance on the Transfer Set differs as a function of actual learning opportunity 
(performance on the Learning Set). The second issue explored was the question of whether 
those of high and low Gf ability benefit in the same way (if at all) from this actual learning 
opportunity.  
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A hierarchical moderated multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine whether 
performance on the Learning Set contributed to performance on the Transfer Set over and 
above Gf ability and whether the effects of actual learning opportunity were moderated by Gf 
ability.  This was done separately for each condition because the items used in the Learning 
Sets obviously differed from condition to condition. To test the two-way interaction (Number 
Series performance X Learning Set performance), a multiplicative term was entered into the 
regression equation after controlling for the component main effects. To prevent 
multicollinearity this multiplicative term was formed using centred Number Series scores and 
centred Learning Set scores. The models are presented in Table 4.6 for easy reference and 
illustrated in Figure 4.9.  
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Figure 4.9. Three graphs showing point estimates of mean Transfer Set performance for 
those 1 standard deviation below, above and at the mean on Number Series (Gf) at 1 standard 
deviation below and above the mean for Learning Set performance (From Model 3, Table 
4.6) for each condition, No, Limited and Most.  
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The effects are illustrated in Figure 4.9. Specifically, it illustrates separately for the three 
conditions point estimates of mean Transfer Set performance for those one standard deviation 
below, above and at the mean on Number Series (Gf), and at one standard deviation below 
and above the mean for Learning Set performance. The Learning Sets’ means and standard 
deviations referred to in the graphs are the separate ones for each condition. However, for 
ease of comparison across conditions, the Number Series mean referred to in the graphs is the 
grand mean and its standard deviation.  That is, Low, High and Middle Gf refer to the same 
numerical value of Number Series performance in each conditions’ graph (-3.95, 0 and 3.95 
respectively).  
In the No condition, Number Series was a significant predictor of Transfer Set performance, 
the Learning Set contributed to performance over and above Number Series, but there was no 
interaction between the two. That is, those of higher Gf ability did better than those of lower 
Gf ability on the Transfer Set, those who did better on the Learning Set did better on the 
Transfer Set than those who did less well on the Learning Set; and the relationship between 
Transfer Set and Learning Set performance was not moderated by Gf ability.  
In the Limited Condition, similar results were found. There was a main effect of Number 
Series (Gf), but the Learning Set’s Beta was only marginally significant (p = .08). Also, the 
graph hints that this relationship between Learning Set performance and Transfer Set 
performance is stronger for those of higher Gf than those of lower Gf, but the regression 
model indicates that this interaction is not significant.  
In the Most condition, there were main effects of Number Series, Learning Set performance, 
and their interaction was significant. Those of higher Gf ability did better than those of lower 
Gf ability on the Transfer Set, and those who did better on the Learning Set did better on the 
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Transfer Set than those who did less well on the Learning Set. Also, the relationship between 
Learning Set and Transfer Set performance was stronger for those of higher Gf ability and 
this interaction is significant.  Follow up analyses of the differences in slopes in the Most 
condition were explored using methods described in Preacher, Curran and Bauer (2006) and 
the summary is presented in Table 4.7 The results indicate that the relationship between 
Transfer Set and Learning Set performance gets stronger with higher Gf ability.  
 
Taken together, the results from the three conditions suggest the following. Firstly, Gf ability 
contributes to Raven performance (as generally expected). Secondly, the more items you are 
able to solve in the Learning Set, the better you do on the Transfer Set, independent of your 
Gf ability and regardless of condition. This may indicate that the better you do on Raven’s 
items, the better you do on other Raven’s items. However, it may also indicate the importance 
of across-item learning processes to performance on Raven. That is, the more items you are 
able to solve earlier on (such as those in the Learning Set), the more you are able to learn 
from them to help you do better on harder items that occur later (such as in the Transfer Set). 
Furthermore, across-item learning processes appear to be better exploited by those of higher 
Gf who seem to benefit the most from actual learning opportunity of the D2 rule in the Most 
Condition. Thus, learning processes may contribute to individual differences in Raven 
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performance because they do not benefit everyone equally. Those of higher Gf seem to be 
better at utilising them when there is more opportunity to utilise them (such as in the Most 
condition).  
The evidence for the importance of learning processes to individual differences in Raven 
performance comes largely from the interaction between Learning Set performance and Gf 
Ability (Number Series performance) in the Most condition, where there was the most 
opportunity to learn the D2 rule. Had there not been this significant interaction, one could 
argue that the main effect of Learning Set in all the conditions could be attributed to “the 
better you do on Raven’s items, the better you do on other Raven’s items”, and rule out any 
involvement of learning processes. However, as we increased the opportunity to learn the D2 
rule (from the No condition to the Most condition), those of higher Gf seemed to be able to 
increasingly benefit from it (when actual learning opportunity was taken into account), 
moreso than those of lower Gf. This would be consistent with the Learning Hypothesis, 
which predicts that more exposure to the D2 rule will result in larger differences in Transfer 
Set performance between those of higher Gf and those of lower Gf (since those of higher Gf 
would be better able to learn the D2 rule). These findings in the Most Condition are 
inconsistent with the Classical Gf Hypothesis. The hypothesis predicts that the performance 
(and individual differences in performance) on a given item is not dependent on prior items. 
The findings are also inconsistent with the Knowledge Hypothesis which predicts that more 
opportunity to learn would result in smaller differences between those of higher Gf and those 
of lower Gf (individual differences are thought to be due to prior knowledge rather than to 
knowledge acquired during the test).  
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4.9  General Discussion 
This study investigated processes responsible for individual differences in Raven 
performance. One potential process that has been implicated in past theorising but neglected 
in empirical research is learning. Three competing sets of hypotheses (“Classical Gf”, 
“Knowledge” and “Learning” Hpotheses) were derived from reasoning theories in the 
differential and cognitive-differential literature to predict the effects of varying the amount of 
D2 rule learning opportunity on performance on more complex and (arguably) more novel, 
D2 items. Each set of hypotheses was divided into predictions about group means and 
predictions about individual differences. We shall discuss the findings for group means and 
individual difference separately.  
4.9.1  The Effects of the D2 Manipulation on Group Means   
It was found that in the no exposure condition, performance on the Transfer Set was above 
chance levels. Hence, it is likely that rule learning is not a necessary process in solving 
Raven items. It seems that it is possible to solve items with complex instantiations of D2 
without any prior exposure to simpler versions of the rule within the task. This is not 
consistent with the Learning Hypothesis but consistent with the Classical Gf Hypothesis and 
the Knowledge Hypothesis. According to Sternberg (1986) and Holland (Holland et al., 
1989) (on which the Knowledge Hypothesis is based), induction requires individuals to 
possess conceptual knowledge, relevant to the rules  before their instances can be detected in 
concrete examples (that is, before they come to the task). Using this account, it was predicted 
that performance on the transfer items would be above chance levels (even without prior 
exposure) because some individuals would possess conceptual knowledge, relevant to 
complex instantiations of the D2 rule, while others will not.  However, the finding is also 
consistent with the Spearman (1932) and Cattell (1987) (on which the Classical Gf 
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Hypothesis is based). Using this account it was predicted that some would be able to discover 
the rules (from scratch) during the reasoning process, based on the stimuli in the item – what 
Spearman calls the eduction of relations and correlates. Thus, it could be concluded that some 
participants come to the task with prior, conceptual knowledge of the rules or are able to 
work them out during the reasoning process solely within an item, independent of any prior 
knowledge. Since we do not have access to participants’ history and their entire store of 
conceptual knowledge, it is hard to tell which of the two explanations is relevant to our 
finding.   
There is also an alternative explanation for why the Transfer Set performance was above 
chance levels for the No Condition. It could be that participants do rely on knowledge learnt 
from earlier items but do so using knowledge learnt from items containing other rules to help 
them solve the D2 Transfer Set items. In the introduction of this chapter it was put forward 
that correspondence finding may be influenced by the detection of the relationships between 
the various shapes/figures/attributes in an item (that is, detection of the rules that govern 
those relationships) (Mackintosh, 1998). That is, in Sternberg’s (1986) terms, successful 
selective comparison of declarative inferential rules that the participant possesses may assist 
the selective encoding of the relevant shapes/figures/attributes (which contributes to 
correspondence finding). However, the inverse may also be true. Selective encoding may 
assist the process of selective comparison of declarative inferential rules. That is, knowing 
that the elements can be parsed and how they can be parsed, may assist in the detection of the 
rules. Getting earlier items correct (regardless of the rules involved) may assist with this, by 
letting participants know that it is permissible to think of figures/shapes as overlapping and 
not just as whole elements. For example, easier rules (such as the “distribution of three” rule) 
may assist with correspondence finding; knowing about how things correspond may then 
assist with the detection of harder rules (such as distribution of two). It is not really possible 
106 
 
 
 
with the current data to tease this apart from the hypothesis that participants come to the test 
situation with knowledge of the rules or are able to discover them during the reasoning 
process within the item. 
The study in the next chapter tries to rectify this situation by examining what happens when 
no learning opportunity at all is provided. That is, when no earlier items are presented before 
the transfer items.  
Increasing Exposure to the  D2 Rule 
It was found that varying the amount of exposure to the D2 rule did not seem to change 
performance on the Transfer Set in any way at the mean group level. This suggests that as a 
group, participants do not learn about the rules across the task. This finding is consistent with 
the Classical Gf Hypothesis that suggests that induction within an item is done in isolation 
from previous experience, including experience from other items in the task. The finding is 
inconsistent with the Knowledge and Learning hypotheses which predict that increasing 
exposure should lead to increasing knowledge of the D2 rule and improved performance.  
4.9.2  The Effects of the D2 Manipulation (Individual Differences taken into 
Account) 
It was found that varying the amount of exposure to the D2 rule does not seem to change 
performance on the Transfer Set in any way even when individual differences are taken into 
account. Those of higher Gf ability consistently and uniformly outperformed those of lower 
Gf ability on the Transfer Set and there was no interaction with the number of times they 
were pre-exposed to the D2 rule. Again, this was consistent with the Classical Gf Hypothesis 
and inconsistent with Knowledge and Learning hypotheses. Thus, according to this finding, 
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participants do not learn from rules when they are provided with more instances of those 
rules.   
Thus far in this Discussion section, the Classical Gf Hypothesis has received the strongest 
support. However, providing more exposure to rules through the Learning Set is providing 
potential learning opportunity but that learning opportunity may not be exploited unless the 
participant can answer the Learning Set items correctly. The more items the participant 
answers correctly in the Learning Set, the more actual learning opportunity is available to 
them.  
It was found that the more items participants were able to solve in the Learning Set, the better 
they did on the Transfer Set, independent of their Gf ability (as indicated by Number Series) 
and the types of rules presented to them (that is, their condition). This may indicate support 
for the Learning Hypothesis; that is, the more items you are able to solve in the Learning Set, 
the more you are able to learn from them, to help you do better on harder items in Transfer 
Set. Furthermore, in the Most Condition (where there would have been the most opportunity 
to learn the D2 rule) there was an interaction between Learning Set performance and Gf 
ability; those of higher Gf ability were more able to benefit from their actual learning 
opportunity, to do better on the Transfer Set. This supports the Learning Hypothesis and 
contradicts the Classical Gf and Knowledge hypotheses.  
 
4.9.3  Summary and Conclusion 
The empirical aim of this study was to examine whether rule learning occurs in Raven, 
whether it is necessary for it to occur (before induction can take place) and whether it is a 
source of individual differences in Raven performan
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the D2 rule, because it has been shown to distinguish good Raven performers from average 
ones (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990).  
It was found that it is not necessary for participants to learn about the D2 from simple items 
in order for them to solve items containing complex instantiations of the rules later in the 
task. Thus, we conclude that rule learning is not necessary for induction to take place.  
However, we found evidence that rule learning occurs in Raven and contributes to individual 
differences in Raven performance, with those of higher Gf benefitting more from more 
exposure to the D2 rule. This was only evident when real learning opportunity was taken into 
account (as opposed to potential learning opportunity). When participants are exposed to D2 
rule items, they only receive potential learning opportunity. It seems they may not be able to 
learn about the rule unless they get the item correct (and thus receive real learning 
opportunity).   
4.9.4 Limitations and Further Research 
The overall findings highlight a couple of important issues. Firstly, providing more exposure 
to rules is not enough to ensure that real learning opportunity is provided. In order to be able 
to learn from an item (at least in Raven), you need to be able to get it correct - perhaps in 
order to get implicit feedback that your hypothesis about the nature of the item is correct 
(Verguts & De Boeck, 2002a). Secondly, this may mean that those of lower ability may not 
be able to learn as much from items because they are not able to get as many earlier items 
correct and not because they are less able to learn about rules across the task. That is, 
across-item learning may be confounded with within-item induction. This is something we 
address in the next chapter.  
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Another potential confound that we address in the next chapter is the issue of the presentation 
format of the marker task. The Number Series task, which was used as the marker of Gf in 
this study, was presented in random order (rather than the traditional easy to hard 
presentation format of Gf tasks). However, by presenting it in this way we may have limited 
the learning opportunity available in the Number Series task. If an important component of 
individual differences in Gf is about exploiting learning opportunity, then by presenting our 
marker test in random format may have meant that it was not as good a marker of Gf as we 
would have preferred. We address this issue in the next study (in the next chapter).  
Another shortcoming of our study is that we only examined rule learning - and only learning 
of the D2 rule. Carpenter et al. (1990) point out that their subjects were able to identify all the 
other rules and hence, these other rules would not be related to a source of individual 
differences. However, Mackintosh (1998) suspects that had Carpenter et al. (1990) studied a 
wider range of ability of subjects (rather than just university students), they would have had 
to allow for the possibility that some of the other rules may have also been related to 
individual differences. We suspect that Mackintosh is right.  
Lastly, while our study shows learning about the D2 from simpler items is not necessary for 
induction to take place in more complex versions of D2 items, we were unable to rule out that 
participants may rely on other forms of learning to be able to solve more complex Raven 
items. We will also address this in the next study.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 2: 
DIFFERENT BUT RELATED: WITHIN-ITEM RULE DISCOVERY, ACROSS-ITEM  
LEARNING, USE OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND PROACTIVE INTERFERENCE 
A PILOT STUDY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
“To make the novel seem familiar by relating it to prior knowledge, to make the familiar 
seem strange by viewing it from a new perspective - these are fundamental aspects of human 
intelligence that depend on the ability to reason by analogy. This ability is used to construct 
new scientific models, to design experiments, to solve new problems in terms of old ones, to 
make predictions, to construct arguments, and to interpret literary metaphors” -  Gick and 
Holyoak (1983 p. 2). 
This chapter has two aims which are closely related to each other. The first aim is to address 
issues raised but unresolved by the experiment in the previous chapter (Experiment 1, 
Chapter 4). Experiment 1 highlighted that inductive processes within Gf tasks have been 
characterised differently by different researchers:  
• Induction as involving learning that may occur across Gf items, within a task 
(“across-item learning”) (Carlstedt et al., 2000; Holland et al., 1989; Verguts & De 
Boeck, 2002a, 2002b), 
• Induction as involving conceptual knowledge that may be brought to the task 
(Holland et al., 1989; Sternberg, 1986) and  
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• Induction as occurring within an item and independent of any prior knowledge or 
learning that may occur across the items (Cattell, 1987; Gottfredson, 1997; Spearman, 
1932).  
This chapter further examines the distinction between these views of induction and whether 
the processes hypothesised in each view occur in Gf tasks, whether it is necessary for them to 
occur for induction to take place and whether they contribute to individual differences in 
performance. Also, while the previous chapter focussed on the different predictions that these 
different views had for changes to performance on Gf tasks when the amount of learning 
opportunity within a task is varied, this chapter focuses on the similarities between the 
different views. Particular attention will be given to how the views may be compatible and 
describe different forms of analogical thinking that occur in Gf tasks.   
This chapter’s second aim is to examine learning’s relationship with proactive interference. 
While across-item learning and combating proactive interference have been put forward as 
competing explanations for the Gf-WMC link and as competing explanations for  individual 
differences in Gf (Unsworth & Engle, 2005a), it will be put forward that the two cannot be 
mutually exclusive explanations.  
These issues with be explored in this chapter with a pilot study and continue into chapters 6 
and 7. Chapters 6 and 7 examine the same issues as those which will be discussed in the 
current chapter, but will do so using two larger studies and more sophisticated data analyses.  
5.2 Issues Raised by Experiment 1, Chapter 4 
The results from Experiment 1, Chapter 4 highlighted a number of issues that we aim to 
explore further in this and subsequent chapters. Firstly, the study highlighted that 
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examinations of across-item learning may be confounded with within-item induction. The 
study found that varying the amount of exposure to simpler Raven “distribution of two” (D2) 
rule items did not have any impact on performance on more complex D2 rule transfer items, 
at the group level and when individual differences were taken into account.  However, 
providing more exposure to rules is providing potential learning opportunity but that learning 
opportunity may not be exploited unless the participant can answer the items correctly; and 
thus, comprehend the rule. The more items the participant answers correctly, the more actual 
learning opportunity may be available to them. When actual learning opportunity was taken 
into account (as opposed to potential learning opportunity), those of higher Gf were more 
able to benefit from more exposure to D2 rules.  This may also mean that those of lower Gf 
ability have been shown to not learn as much as those of higher ability because they are not 
able to get as many earlier items correct, rather than because they are less able to learn in 
general. This potential confound is something we address empirically, later in this chapter. 
Another issue raised by the previous study that was unsatisfactorily resolved, is the issue of 
whether learning in Gf tasks is necessary for induction to take place in the more complex 
items. We had hypothesised that complex Raven items contain novel instantiations of rules, 
impossible to solve unless participants learn about these rules gradually through simpler 
items (“the General Learning Hypothesis”). While the study did not support this (specifically, 
we found that learning about the D2 rule from simpler items is not necessary for induction to 
take place in more complex versions of D2 items), we were unable to rule out that 
participants may rely on other forms of learning to be able to solve the  more complex D2 
items. Although we varied the amount of exposure to the D2 rule based on condition, each 
participant received the same number of items leading up to the transfer items. It is possible 
that participants may have been able to learn enough from these items to assist them with the 
transfer items, regardless of condition. For example, the simpler items in all of the conditions 
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contained the “distribution of three rule”. This may have helped participants learn about 
complex instantiations of the distribution of three rule, which may have been sufficiently 
similar to complex instantiations of the D2 rule. This is only a hypothetical example – we do 
not know what or even if participants were able to learn from items that did not contain the 
D2 rule to help them solve complex D2 rule items.  We are merely putting forward that it is 
possible that participants may learn something from simpler items, which they then use to 
solve more complex items and what they learn may not be restricted to specific rules.   One 
way to check this would be to include a condition where no “learning items” precede the 
transfer items at all. Only then would we be able to establish whether learning across items is 
necessary for induction in complex Gf items to take place. That is, if no learning items 
precede the transfer items and participants are unable to solve the transfer items, then we 
could conclude that learning within the task is necessary for induction to take place in 
complex Gf items. Conversely, if participants are able to successfully solve the items, then 
we could conclude that learning across items is not necessary for induction to take place. This 
will subsequently be examined further in the current chapter.  
Lastly, in Experiment 1 we noted that when the General Learning Hypothesis is not 
supported it can be hard to empirically distinguish between the alternative explanations. That 
is, if learning across the task does not occur, what processes would be involved in an item 
instead? Would they be knowledge application processes (Holland et al., 1989; Sternberg, 
1986) or rule discovery processes (induction independent of knowledge) (Cattell, 1987; 
Mackintosh, 1998; Spearman, 1932)? The next section explores these two competing 
hypotheses in more detail. The possibility that all three processes (knowledge application 
processes, learning and induction independent of knowledge) can (and are likely to) occur in 
Gf tasks will also be explored in further detail in later sections.  
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5. 3 Within-Item Reasoning 
In this section, we would like to make explicit what processes might be involved in reasoning 
in a Gf item, if no learning is involved. Our central hypothesis in this thesis is that learning is 
involved in Gf tasks and it may contribute to individual differences. Furthermore, we think 
learning processes mediate the knowledge that is hypothesised by Sternberg (1986) and 
Holland et al. (1989) to be required for induction and the novelty that is assumed to be 
characteristic of Gf tasks (Cattell, 1987; Gottfredson, 1997; Spearman, 1932) (discussed in 
the previous chapters). However, we would also like to explore the alternative possibilities in 
more detail, because often competing ideas in psychology turn out to be not mutually 
exclusive but compatible.  
In the event that no learning is involved in Gf tasks, it has been put forward that reasoning 
may involve participants coming to the test situation with conceptual knowledge of the rules 
(Holland et al., 1989; Sternberg, 1986). Alternatively,  they may discover the rules during the 
reasoning process within the item (Mackintosh, 1998; Spearman, 1932). According to 
insights from the analogical reasoning literature (a cognitive literature), both can occur in 
reasoning. 
Although much of the research in analogical thinking involves analogical problem solving 
using stories, the research may also help us to better understand processes involved in Gf 
tasks. “Analogical thinking” is used to describe thinking that involves the transfer of 
knowledge from one situation to another by a process of mapping, for the purposes of better 
understanding the less familiar situation (Gick & Holyoak, 1983 ; Holland et al., 1989). 
Mapping is finding a set of one-to-one correspondence (often incomplete) between aspects of 
one body of information and aspects of another. It involves comparison of two available 
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concepts (“analogues”), which according to Gick and Holyoak (1983 ), can vary in their 
levels of abstraction. They give the following three examples: 
• Comparison of two analogues at the same level of abstraction e.g., the heart and a 
water pump. 
• Mapping of a concrete analogue to a more general concept e.g., the heart and the 
abstract concept of “pump”.  
• Mapping between two analogues which results in the acquisition of general concepts 
from the concrete examples e.g., learning the abstract sense of “pump” by comparing 
hearts and water pumps.  
Analogical thinking may operate in Gf tasks in two ways. One way is through the mapping of 
a concrete analogue to a more general, known concept. This is similar to the process of rule 
(i.e., knowledge) application described by (Sternberg, 1986). Sternberg considers verbal 
analogies such as,   
LAWYER is to CLIENT, as DOCTOR is to _____ ? 
The solution is “patient”. According to Sternberg inferential rules are required and in this 
case are declarative in nature – knowledge about functional relations. One has to relate the 
new stimulus information (in this case, the word “lawyer”), to old information already in 
memory such as the semantic attributes or properties of the word lawyer. In this case, the 
relevant property is the function that lawyers perform. Lawyers provide professional services 
to client, in much the same way that a doctor renders a professional service to a patient. 
Knowledge about these functional relations is general, conceptual knowledge. In this 
example, one needs to map the concrete examples of “lawyer and client” to the general 
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concept of “service provider and service receiver”, and then to map this to “doctor” to arrive 
at the solution of “patient”. Thus, one arrives at the solution of “patient” by accessing the 
relevant general concept of “service provider and service receiver”, which is activated by the 
stimulus “doctor and patient”. However, if one did not possess this general, conceptual 
knowledge of the functional relation, “service provider and service receiver”, one would not 
be able to solve the induction problem.   Similarly, for Raven items, if one does not possess 
knowledge of the various rules used in Raven including complex versions of the rules (where 
multiple instantiations are involved), one may not be able to solve the items.  
Another way that analogical thinking may operate in Gf tasks is through mapping between 
two concrete analogues which results in the acquisition of general concepts from the 
concrete examples (the example we gave earlier was “learning the abstract sense of “pump” 
by comparing hearts and water pumps”).  Gick and Holyoak (1983) found that if two concrete 
analogues are presented, participants could map them together to learn about a more general 
concept. They also found that two analogues was the minimum number of analogues required 
for participants to do this. That is, one example is not enough for a person to learn about a 
general concept.  Things could operate in a very similar way in Gf tasks. For example, in 
Raven items, the first two rows of the matrix serve as two potential concrete analogues. 
Potentially, participants could map them together to learn about the general relationships 
(rules) that govern the shapes and figures in the cells and then map this onto the third row – 
the row that requires the solution. Thus, if there is an absence of any learning across items, 
analogical thinking based on the stimulus within items might be involved. This would be 
consistent with the classical conceptualisation of Gf which assumes participants discover the 
rules during the reasoning process, within the item (Mackintosh, 1998; Spearman, 1932). 
Thus, based on the analogical thinking literature, reasoning in Gf tasks could involve:  
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• The mapping of a concrete analogue to a more general, known concept or  
• Mapping between two concrete analogues which results in the acquisition of general 
concepts from the concrete examples. 
These too different methods of mapping are equivalent to the knowledge application 
processes described by Holland et al. (1989) and Sternberg (1986) and the rule discovery 
processes (induction independent of knowledge) described by Cattell (1987), Mackintosh 
(1998) and Spearman (1932).  
In the case of verbal analogies, it is hard to refute that some use of prior knowledge (known 
concepts) is involved. One needs to know about the characteristics of the words (objects) 
involved. Also, only one full analogue (e.g., “lawyer is to client”) is provided (not enough for 
a person to learn about a general concept), thus they would have to refer to general concepts 
they already know. Indeed, verbal analogies have been shown to load heavily on both Gf and 
Gc.  It is less certain whether prior knowledge is necessary for tasks such as Raven.  It does 
not load as highly on Gc and there are potentially two analogues within an item from which 
participants could map together to discover the rules. Given that the spontaneous noticing of 
an analogy between two superficially dissimilar situations has been shown to be a rare event 
in the laboratory (Gick & Holyoak, 1983 )4, it is less certain whether people would be able to 
apply general concepts they learnt in real life to tasks such as the Raven.  
Nevertheless, if across-item learning is not involved in Gf tasks, theoretically, induction 
could involve both the application of prior conceptual knowledge through the mapping of a 
concrete analogue to a more general, known concept and the discovery of conceptual 
                                                           
4
  Although, only mean performance (and not individual differences) were taken into account. 
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knowledge (e.g., rules) through mapping between two concrete analogues. This is something 
we will return to shortly.  
5.3.1 Within-Item Rule Discovery and Across-Item Learning: Similarities and 
Differences  
At this stage, one may question whether the process of mapping between two concrete 
analogues (which results in the learning of general concepts) within an item, might be the 
same as learning across items in the task? After all, they both sound like instances of 
learning. The distinction is that learning across the task would involve building upon what is 
already known (and hence, explicit and easy), to understand about something previously 
unknown and novel (something less explicit and harder). In contrast, the process of mapping 
between two concrete analogues would involve learning something previously unknown and 
less explicit, through noticing regularities/similarities between analogues available in an item. 
However, both are consistent with processes of analogical thinking described by Gick and 
Holyoak (1983 ) – both involve the transfer of knowledge from one situation to another by a 
process of mapping. 
This may lead one to entertain the idea that if one is able to learn through analogical thinking 
within an item, it would be most likely that they would also be able to learn across items 
using analogical thinking. Nevertheless, this is an empirical question. It is also an empirical 
question if both or either process is a source of individual difference.  
5.4 Application of Prior Knowledge, Across-Item Learning or Within-Item 
Rule Discovery: It’s Probably All Three? 
Returning to the earlier question of whether the application of conceptual knowledge or 
discovery of rules operates in Gf tasks, we believe that the answer is “both”. Furthermore, we 
hypothesise that across-item learning also operates in Gf tasks.  
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Early, simpler items may involve the application of conceptual knowledge. That is, 
knowledge of rules learnt from previous situations is mapped on to early items in Gf tasks. 
We shall use the Series Completion task as an example. Here is a simple example item:  
18, 27, 36, 45,  ___ ? 
Participants need to complete the series by figuring out the last number in the series. The 
correct answer in this series is “54”, because each number is larger than the preceding 
number by a value of 9.  
Sternberg (1986) hypothesizes that one draws upon declarative rules such as the set of 
possible relations that can be used to solve the items. One possible relation often used in 
Series Completion is the relation of “ascending sequences”.  Holland et al. (1989) concur and 
according to them,  
“... such categorisation derive from our background knowledge about linear orderings, 
which spans domains as diverse as rooms along a corridor, days of the week, notes in 
a musical scale etc.  The categories people will bring to bear ...will be those that have 
emerged as useful general categories for dealing with linear structures in a number of 
experiences. We understand apparently unfamiliar situations so readily because they 
fit naturally into a pre-existing default hierarchy of relevant [rules and relations]” (p. 
304). 
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However, as one progresses through the task and the task complexity and hence, novelty 
increases5, we hypothesized that one must rely on analogical thinking both within and across 
items to reduce the novelty.  
We hypothesise that those with higher Gf are able to more quickly learn novel rules, through 
analogical thinking across items.  We shall call this the “Individual Differences Learning 
Hypothesis”.  We also hypothesize that those with higher Gf are able to more quickly learn 
novel rules within an item (through analogical mappings between the concrete stimuli in the 
item - to acquire new rules). We shall call this the “Classical Gf Hypothesis”.   
Analogical thinking within an item should be substantially more difficult than analogical 
thinking across items. According to Holland et al. (1989) the acquisition of new task-specific 
knowledge can only be understood in the light of knowledge already possessed by the 
system.  Some concepts will be more quickly acquired. They believe that concepts that are 
not intrinsically similar to those the learner already possesses are those that are hardest to 
learn. This would mean that in the absence of learning opportunity across the task, when one 
comes to a novel item, one would only have recourse to mappings between stimuli in the item 
to discover unfamiliar rules which should make the item substantially more difficult.6 How 
much more difficult is an issue we would like to empirically address later in the chapter.  
The argument that in the absence of across-item learning opportunity, unfamiliar rules would 
be difficult to acquire (through mapping of within-item stimuli), provides us with a potential 
                                                           
5
 The assumption here is that complex items are also novel items and they are novel because they 
contain multiple instances of various rules, which by themselves may not be novel, but when 
combined creates a novel product. 
6
 In Experiment 1, Chapter 4 we emphasised the possibility that participants would have to rely on 
across-item learning to reduce the novelty of complex items. The possibility that participants have 
recourse to mappings between stimuli within items to learn the rules in complex items, was somewhat 
neglected (although it was an implicit assumptions made by the “Classical Gf Hypothesis”). Thus, we 
give more attention to it in the current study.  
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way to tell whether reasoning in complex Gf items involves induction that relies on prior 
conceptual knowledge or induction that uses mapping between item stimuli to discover rules. 
Induction that results from prior conceptual knowledge should be much easier than induction 
that requires rule discovery. Again, this is an empirical issue we shall address later in the 
chapter.  
5.5 The Cost of Learning: The Proactive Interference Hypothesis 
As mentioned previously, we hypothesize that those with higher Gf are able to more quickly 
learn novel rules, through analogical thinking across items. Learning may assist with 
reasoning, but learning comes at the cost of proactive interference. Items within Gf tasks 
contain similarities which may assist with later items, but since no two items should be the 
same, they also contain differences which may result in distraction and interference.  
In contrast to the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis mentioned thus far in this 
chapter, Unsworth and Engle (2005a) argue that what is important to individual differences in 
performance in Gf tasks is the control of attention, especially under conditions of distraction 
and interference, such as when similar items (for example, similar surface features) are 
presented consecutively and result in proactive interference. We shall call this “Individual 
Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis”.  
In a review of the literature Heitz, Unsworth and Engle (2005) define attentional control as 
the “...voluntary, effortful cognitive act that serves to maintain information through activation 
of relevant brain circuitry, inhibit the irrelevant and distracting information that impinges on 
us at any one time, and suppress prepotent response tendencies that are task irrelevant” 
(p.63).  
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While Unsworth and Engle (2005a) put forward their Individual Differences Proactive 
Interference Hypothesis as a competitor for the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis, 
controlled attention may also be required for learning, since controlled attention is also 
hypothesized to be needed to maintain information through activation of relevant brain 
circuitry (Heitz et al., 2005). Evidence that the two hypotheses (if true) may not be mutually 
exclusive comes from Sweller and Gee (1978) from the cognitive literature, to which we now 
turn.  
5.6 Learning and Proactive Interference: Two Sides of the Same Coin? 
Sweller and Gee (1978) empirically showed that “Einstellung” (what we have been referring 
to as proactive interference) and “the sequence effect” (what we have been referring to as 
across-item-learning) are two aspects of the same phenomenon. Einstellung was first 
demonstrated by Luchins (1942) and occurs when subjects given a series of similar problems 
to solve have trouble finding a solution to a different but simple, subsequent problem. The 
sequence effect (first demonstrated by Hull, 1920) occurs if subjects are able to solve a series 
of related problems graded according to difficulty more rapidly when the problems are 
presented in easy-to-hard sequence, rather than hard-to-easy. This phenomenon only occurs 
when problems are solved by the application of a rule (Sweller & Gee, 1978).  
Within a single task, Sweller and Gee (1978) found results consistent with both the General 
Learning Hypothesis and a general form of the proactive interference hypothesis (that is, 
when individual differences aren’t taken into account). Consistent with the General Learning 
Hypothesis, Sweller and Gee found that solving easier items helps you to solve a harder item 
that is similar to the easier items (the sequence effect). Consistent with the general form of the 
proactive interference hypothesis, Sweller and Gee found that solving more items of that 
certain rule type makes it harder to solve an item of a different rule type later on 
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(Einstellung). A summary of Sweller and Gee’s explanation is that participants solve 
problems by testing a series of hypotheses. These hypotheses are sampled from a hypothesis 
domain (a set of related hypotheses). When subjects solve a series of problems that they 
perceive as being related, they begin each problem by testing hypotheses as closely related as 
practicable to their previously correct hypotheses. Einstellung results if a new problem 
solution requires a different rule – that is, a hypothesis from a different domain.  
Sweller and Gee (1978) examined the sequence effect and Einstellung in the one experiment 
but did not examine the individual differences question.  When taken together, the Individual 
Differences Learning Hypothesis and the Individual Differences Proactive Interference 
Hypothesis (which are about individual differences) and Sweller and Gee’s (1978) theory (an 
experimental theory that does not take into account individual differences), result in 
conflicting predictions. According to the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis, those 
with higher Gf learn more solution principles. According to Sweller and Gee (1978)’s 
findings, the more items you can solve, the more you will suffer from proactive interference 
when you come to items with different solution principles. Yet, according to Unsworth and 
Engle’s (2005a) Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis, those with higher 
Gf suffer less from proactive interference. That is, these three findings cannot all be correct, 
without some further qualification. Hence, one of the aims of the current study is to address 
these issues within a combined individual differences/experimental framework. However, the 
obvious candidate qualification hypothesis would be that those with higher Gf would be both 
better at learning across the task and combating proactive interference.  
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5.7 Summary of Aims and General Hypotheses 
One aim of the current chapter is to address issues raised but unresolved by Experiment 1, 
Chapter 4. Thus, this chapter further examines the distinction and relationship between:  
• Induction involving learning that may occur across Gf items, within a task (“across-
item learning”), 
• Induction involving conceptual knowledge that may be brought to the task and  
• Induction within an item that may be independent of any prior knowledge or learning 
that may occur across the items.  
Specifically, this chapter examines whether these processes occur in Gf tasks, whether it 
is necessary for them to occur for induction to take place, whether they contribute to 
individual differences in performance and how they might be related. 
The analogical thinking literature suggests that in the absence of across-item learning, within-
item reasoning may involve conceptual knowledge that may be brought to the task through 
the mapping of a concrete analogue (i.e., stimuli in the item) to a more general, known 
concept. In the event that the concept is unknown to the participant, within-item reasoning 
could occur independent of knowledge through the mapping between the concrete stimuli in 
the item which results in the acquisition of the relevant general concepts (such as the rules in 
the item).  
The insight gained from referring to the analogical thinking literature is that within-item 
reasoning (which involves a process of mapping between two concrete analogues and results 
in the learning of general concepts) in the absence of across-item learning and prior 
knowledge, is itself, a process of learning which shares similarities with across-item learning. 
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They are both instances of analogical thinking (involve the transfer of knowledge from one 
situation to another by a process of mapping). However, concepts that are not intrinsically 
similar to those the participant already possesses are those that are hardest to learn. This 
would mean that in the absence of learning opportunity across the task and prior conceptual 
knowledge, when one comes to a novel item, the process of mapping between stimuli in the 
item to learn the rules would be substantially more difficult. 
 We suspect that early, simpler items involve the application of conceptual knowledge. 
However, as one progresses through the task and the task complexity and hence, novelty 
increases, we hypothesize that one must rely on analogical thinking both within and across 
items to reduce the novelty. In the absence of across-item learning opportunity, induction 
would still be theoretically possible, but substantially harder than when across-item learning 
opportunity is available.  Thus, we make the following general complementary hypotheses: 
1) The Classical Gf Hypothesis – In the absence of across-item learning and prior 
conceptual knowledge, induction on complex Gf items would still be possible through 
rule discovery processes (that is, through the mapping between the concrete stimuli in 
the item which results in the acquisition of general concepts such as the rules in the 
item). Also, those of higher Gf would outperform those of lower Gf (because they 
would be better at making the mentioned mappings).  However, we suspect 
performance would be quite low for all (because according to analogical thinking 
theory, acquiring unfamiliar concepts is very difficult). If performance is not low – 
this would imply that the use of prior conceptual knowledge is involved instead.  
 
2) The General Learning Hypothesis – Simpler items act as across-item learning 
opportunity for more complex items with similar rules. When this across-item 
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learning opportunity is provided, performance will improve greatly for all, compared 
to when learning opportunity is not provided.  
 
3) The Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis – When across-item learning 
opportunity is provided, those of higher Gf ability will improve more than those of 
lower Gf ability, due to those of higher Gf ability being better learners.  
Another aim of this chapter is to examine learning’s relationship with proactive interference 
in Gf tasks. Learning has been shown to produce proactive interference in cognitive tasks. 
We predict that those of higher Gf will learn more than those of lower Gf. Hence, those of 
higher Gf would also need to be better at combating proactive interference.   Thus, we make 
the following hypotheses: 
4) The General Proactive Interference Hypothesis – Learning in Gf tasks produces 
proactive interference for items that contain dissimilar rules.  
 
5) The Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis – those of higher Gf 
are better at combating proactive interference than those of lower Gf.  
5.8 Teasing Apart Prior Knowledge, Across-Item Learning and Within-
Item Rule Discovery: The “Modified Sweller & Gee Task”   
A modified version of a task used in Experiment 2 of Sweller and Gee (1978) is the focus of 
this study. It has characteristics which make it similar to conventional Gf tasks, but it also has 
special characteristics which we think allow us to assess within-item rule discovery, across-
item learning and to some extents use of prior knowledge, without one confounding the other. 
The task can also allow us to assess proactive interference.  
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 Like conventional Gf tasks, the “Modified Sweller & Gee” (MSG) task  is an inductive 
reasoning task that contains problems in an easy to hard order, involving related rules but its 
final item is solvable by a relatively simple rule, unrelated to those previously applicable to 
the earlier items.  It is similar to the Number Series task - participants must work out the next 
number in the series.  
However, unlike conventional Gf tasks, the MSG task is able to assess within-item induction 
in isolation from any potential influences from across-item learning, because a single item 
can be administered in isolation from other items. This is possible because each item allows 
multiple attempts within each item with feedback. The feedback provided is information 
about the correct answer via extension of the series (adding more analogues), which should 
have the effect of making the task increasingly easy. This is based on the idea that it gets 
progressively easier to learn about general concepts from multiple analogues  (Gick & 
Holyoak, 1983 ; Holland et al., 1989).  Normally, a single Gf item should not be used as a 
measure by itself because it would not be able to reliably estimate a person’s ability. 
However, allowing participants multiple attempts at the item should circumvent this.  
In each item, subjects are presented with a target number. They then have to respond with 
what they think might be the “answer” to that target, which should be another number. They 
are then told the correct answer for that target. Participants get to see a cumulative list (a 
series) of target-correct answer pairs. Based on this, they have to work out the rules that 
govern what is considered a correct answer. So initially, participants will have to guess the 
correct answer. But as the list builds up, enough information is provided to induce the correct 
answer. An example item is presented Figure 5.1.  
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 Figure 5.1. Screen shot of an example item from the instructions that participants get for the 
task. In this example, participants would have seen the targets:  14, 32, 54, 44, 15, 25 and 
currently 22. The correct answer to the current target would be "0" because in this example, 
the correct answer to the target is governed by the rule: answer to target equals the larger 
digit in the target minus the smaller digit in the target. Participants enter their 
guess/prediction of the answer in the “Your answer” box and then click the “Check Answer” 
button with their mouse. The target and its correct answer then appear under the “Record of 
correct Target-Answer pairs”.  
 
A participant’s ability to solve a complex item without any across-item learning (that is, their 
ability to discover a rule within an item) could be assessed by providing them with only one 
single, complex item (we shall call this the “Complex Item”). If a participant is not a 
particularly strong reasoner, the task will be able to give an indication of this – they would 
need several attempts to get the correct answer. Furthermore, if prior conceptual knowledge 
of rules is involved, instead of rule discovery, the item should be solved relatively quickly 
with few attempts – that is, with few analogues required.  
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To assess across-item learning, participants could be provided with a series of items in easy-
to-hard order. The amount of learning achieved could be assessed by comparing their 
performance on the harder transfer item (such as the “Complex Item”), with that of a control 
group with similar Gf-ability participants (defined by a separate Gf marker) that did not 
receive any easier items at all.   
Experiment 1, Chapter 4 highlighted that the examinations of across-item learning may be 
confounded with within-item induction, since it may not be possible to learn from an item 
unless you get it right. That is, there is a possibility that those of  lower Gf ability have been 
shown to not  learn as much as those of higher ability because they are not able to get as 
many earlier items correct, rather than because they are less able to learn in general. 
In the MSG task, if a participant is not a particularly strong reasoner, the task will be able to 
give an indication of this – they would need several attempts to get the correct answer. 
However, they should be able to get the correct answer eventually (because they get multiple 
attempts at an item and some feedback); and thus, glean some knowledge for future items. 
That is, even if they are weak at reasoning within items (but not a weak learner across items), 
they should be able to learn enough from previous items to require fewer attempts on a harder 
transfer item, compared to if they hadn’t received any learning opportunity at all (indicated 
by a Gf ability-matched control group who receive only the transfer item). In contrast, if a 
participant is a poor learner, they would not be able to improve much, relative to their Gf 
ability-matched control group. Put another way, they may not be able to improve much on the 
transfer item, even after being given actual learning opportunity. Hence, it is in this way that 
the MSG task may be able to assess the extent to which learning across items and within-item 
rule discovery are independent of each other. That is, the complex transfer item should be 
solved more slowly by the control group, compared to the experimental group, giving an 
130 
 
 
 
indication of the amount of learning. Thus, the MSG task should give an idea of participants’ 
amount of learning across items, while not completely confounding it with whether they are 
able to solve items in the first attempt – unlike conventional Gf tasks.  
The task can also be used to explore the effect of proactive interference (PI). The effect of PI 
can be measured by the final item in the task which has a very different rule to the other items 
experienced (we shall call it the “PI Item”). Performance on the PI Item can then be 
compared to performance on the same item from a control group that only receives the PI 
item. The PI item should be solved more rapidly by the PI control group than the 
experimental group – giving an indication of PI.  
5.9 A Methodological Issue: The Marker Task and Its Presentation Order 
The Series Completion task was used as an independent marker task of Gf. A methodological 
issue is that Gf tasks are usually presented in easy-to-hard order, which may result in learning 
opportunity, which may be important to the Gf construct.  A relevant question is: if Gf items 
are not presented in easy-to-hard order, would they still allow for learning opportunity?   That 
is, does the presentation format of Gf tasks matter to the Gf construct?  
Leary and Dorans (1985) undertook a literature review of articles that discuss item order 
effects in the educational testing literature.  The effects of individual differences were not 
touched upon. However, there were some interesting findings. There was some variation in 
the literature, but overall, the following conclusions were made about aptitude tests. Firstly, 
Leary and Dorans concluded that randomly presented items were overall, not harder than 
items presented easy-to-hard. Secondly, hard-to-easy tasks were more difficult than easy-to-
hard tasks, but this difference was only found when speeded tasks were used and not in 
power tasks. This led them to conclude that the apparent efficiency effect was due to  
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participants not reaching the end of hard-to-easy tasks because they may spend too long on 
the hard items and do not have enough time for easier items that they would have got correct 
with more time. The effect may also be due to difficult items early in the task causing anxiety 
and discouragement, leading to poorer performance on later items. Thus, Leary and Dorans  
did not make any speculations about difference in presentation format being due to learning 
effects. 
Leary and Dorans (1985) did not focus on Gf tasks. It is possible that presentation format of 
Gf items does play a role in creating learning opportunity (Carlstedt et al., 2000; Lohman, 
2001; Verguts & De Boeck, 2002b). Hence, we use multiple versions of Series Completion 
tasks as Gf markers and varied their presentation format. We suspect that random and hard-
to-easy presentations minimise learning opportunity. Hence, we predict that they will have 
weaker relationships with any learning effects that we find.  
5.10 Experiment 2: A Pilot Study 
Experiment 2 was a small pilot study that was conducted to better understand the MSG Task 
and to see if it could be used to effectively test the hypotheses of interest, before resources 
were put into using it in larger studies. The MSG Task had never been used before (in its 
modified form).  
In order to simultaneously assess the amount of learning and the PI in the one experiment, 
one experimental group and two control groups were needed. The “Experimental Group” was 
presented with a series of increasingly difficult items containing similar rules, up to the 
penultimate item. In contrast, the final item contained a relatively simple rule, very dissimilar 
to those previously applicable. One control group, the “PI Control Group” was presented with 
the final item only (the PI Item); while the other control group, the “Complex Control Group” 
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was presented with the penultimate item only (the Complex Item). The dependent variable for 
the MSG Task is the number of attempts needed on an item before multiple correct responses 
are achieved.  
5.10.1  Specific Predictions 
Based on our general hypotheses in this chapter and the nature of the MSG task, we make the 
following specific predictions: 
1) The Classical Gf Hypothesis – It is predicted that in the Complex Control Group, those 
of higher Gf will solve the Complex Item significantly faster (in terms of number of 
attempts) than those of lower Gf. That is, in the absence of across-item learning, 
induction would still be possible and those of higher Gf would outperform those of lower 
Gf.  However, we suspect performance would be quite low (solution will require many 
attempts) for all (relative to the Experimental Croup) because the item is assumed to be 
novel, containing novel concepts that are difficult to acquire. If performance is not low – 
this would imply that the use of prior conceptual knowledge is involved instead.  
2) The General Learning Hypothesis – The Experimental Group should solve the 
Complex Item more rapidly than the Complex Control Group (demonstrating a learning 
effect).  That is, simpler items earlier in the task should act as learning opportunity for 
more complex items with the same types of rules that appear later in the task. The 
availability of these simpler items for the Experimental Group (but not the Complex 
Control Group), should provide the group with the relevant conceptual knowledge that 
would make inducing the rules in the Complex Item easier (compared to those in the 
Complex Control Group).  
3) The Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis – It is predicted that the difference in 
Complex Item performance between the Experimental Group and the Complex Control 
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Group, would be larger for those of higher Gf ability, due to them being able to learn 
more from the Experimental Condition. 
4) The General Proactive Interference Hypothesis – It is predicted that the PI Item will be 
solved more rapidly by the PI Control Group than the Experimental Group and thus, 
demonstrating that learning across a task results in proactive interference for later items 
when the rules are dissimilar.  
5) The Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis – It is predicted the 
difference between the Experimental Group and the PI Control Group on the PI item 
should be larger for those of lower Gf ability, due to them suffering more from proactive 
interference.  
6) A Hypothesis Regarding the Methodological Issue of the Presentation Format of the 
Gf Marker - Gf tasks are usually presented in easy-to-hard order. It is possible that this 
presentation format plays a role in creating learning opportunity (Carlstedt et al., 2000; 
Lohman, 2001; Verguts & De Boeck, 2002b). Hence, multiple versions of Series 
Completion tasks were used as Gf markers and differed in presentation format. We 
suspect that random presentations minimise learning opportunity. Hence, we predict that 
they will have weaker relationships with any learning effects that we find.  
5.10.2  Method 
Participants 
The students were enrolled in a first year undergraduate psychology at the University of 
Sydney and participated as part of their course work. In total, 99 students participated in the 
pilot study (65% female) with mean age = 19.28 years (SD = 3.41).  
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5.10.3  Cognitive Tasks 
1) Modified Sweller & Gee (MSG) Task 
This was an untimed, computerized task. It was based on a task used in Experiment 2 of 
Sweller and Gee (1978) – which was a cognitive task that was not designed to be a Gf task. 
Thus, some modifications had to be made to it to suit our purposes. For example, in the 
original tasks, items were presented to participants verbally and one item required participants 
to memorise parts of the item.  We have changed such aspects to make it more similar to 
conventional Gf tasks. For example, we presented items visually and no memorisation of any 
of the items was required. Also, the rules in the original task were relatively simple because 
they were not intended to capture individual differences. Thus, our version of the task 
contained more complicated rules.   
In each item in the MSG task, subjects are presented with a target number. They then have to 
respond with what they think might be the “answer” to that target, which should be another 
number. They are then told the correct answer for that target. Participants get to see a 
cumulative list (a series) of target-correct answer pairs. Based on this, they have to work out 
the rules that govern what is considered a correct answer. So initially, participants will have 
to guess the correct answer. But as the list builds up, enough information is provided to 
induce the correct answer (or not - depending on their “ability” on this measure). Participants 
have to enter 12 correct answers before the program moves onto the next item. A relatively 
large number of required, correct responses were chosen (12) to guard against accidental, 
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lucky responses that could terminate the item prematurely without providing a reliable 
estimate of the participant’s ability7.  
If participants take more than 50 attempts, the item also terminates. Scores represent total 
number of attempts (out of an allowable maximum of 50) minus the number of correct 
responses. Figure 5.1 depicted an example item.  
There were 3 conditions. Participants received 1, 2 or 6 items, depending on which condition 
they were in. Table 5.1 presents the rules of all the items used based on condition. Actual 
items are presented in Appendix B.1.  
Those in the Experimental Condition received all six items. Items 1 to 5 contained similar 
rules and increased progressively in complexity (with more complex items containing rules 
with more steps). Item 6 contained a different type of rule to the others and was a relatively 
simple item. Those in the PI Control Group only received item 6 (the PI item). Those in the 
Complex Control Group only received item 5 (the most difficult item - the Complex Item) 
and item 1 (the simplest item). Item 1 was included for this group to narrow down their 
hypothesis domain. According to Sweller and Gee (1978), there is a positive relationship 
between the complexity of a hypothesis (or complexity of the rule being tested) and the 
number of hypotheses or rules that are related to it. Subjects faced with complex problems 
sample hypotheses from a large/infinite hypothesis domain, resulting in long solution times 
or no solution. Hence, item 1 was included to narrow down the domain. However, item 1 was 
developed to be sufficiently different to the Complex Item and should not take too much 
away from its novelty.  
                                                           
7
 Also, constraints in the computer programming language meant that the task could not be 
programmed to terminate after a string of correct responses in a row. Hence, a relatively large number 
was chosen to take into account the possibility of lucky guesses occurring throughout the item. 
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2) Number Series Random (NSR) 
This was basically the same task used in Experiment 1, Chapter 3. This is a well known Gf 
task (Marshalek et al., 1983; Quereshi, 2001). It was computer administered, with 25 items 
and a time limit of 5 minutes. Items were presented in a random sequence (rather than the 
traditional easy to hard sequence) and consisted of a series of numbers which were related by 
various rules. Participants need to complete the series by figuring out the last number in the 
series. Items were drawn from an item bank from the Personality and Individual Differences 
Lab, at the University of Sydney.  
An example is: 
12  15  12  18  12   21  12  __ ? 
In this case, the first number is a constant repeated at an interval of two, and every second 
number has 3 added to it to gain the subsequent value. Thus, the correct answer is in this case 
is “24”. 
3) Letter Series Easy-to-Hard (LSEH) 
This is a well known Gf task (Simon & Kotovsky, 1963), very much like Number Series, but 
involving series of letters, related by various rules. Participants needed to complete the series 
by figuring out the last letter in the series. Items were drawn from an item bank from the 
Personality and Individual Differences Lab, at the University of Sydney. It was computer 
administered with 25 items and a time limit of 10 minutes. More time was allowed for this 
task than the NSR task because items were presented in the traditional easy-to-hard sequence. 
It was thought that more time would be needed for participants to reach the harder items at 
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the end of the task. This was to avoid the possibility of having to compare a measure that 
consisted of mainly hard items (NSR) and a measure that consisted of mainly easy items 
(LSEH), because participants did not have time to reach the harder items.  
An example item is: 
B D F H __ ? 
 The rule for this item is “add 2 to every letter to gain the subsequent letter in the series”. 
Hence, the correct answer in this example is “J”.  
5.10.4  Procedure 
All tasks were computer administrated. An experimenter provided general instructions at the 
beginning of each session and was present throughout the session to assist participants and 
ensure that the task protocol was followed. A set of computerized (more specific) instructions 
preceded each task. Participants made their responses for all tasks using a standard keyboard 
and mouse. Participants were not allowed to use pen and paper for any of the items.  
5.11 Results & Discussion 
This section will be organised as follows. Firstly, descriptive statistics and some preliminary 
analyses will be presented. This will be followed by tests of differences between condition 
groups to examine the General Learning Hypothesis and the General Proactive Interference 
Hypothesis. We then move on to examinations of individual differences which start with 
some preliminary analyses of the different Gf markers (LSEH and NSR) and their 
relationship with the MSG task. This is then followed by significance tests of differences 
between groups based on condition and Gf ability groups (as defined by the Gf markers), to 
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examine the Classical Gf Hypothesis, the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis, and 
the Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis.  
5.11.1  Descriptive statistics  
Demographic information is presented in Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics for marker tasks 
used in the study are presented separately by condition in Table 5.3. Cronbach’s alpha is in 
the acceptable range (for research purposes).   
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Descriptive statistics for the MSG task are presented in Table 5.4, separately for each 
condition. The dependent variable for the MSG Task is the number of attempts needed on an 
item before multiple correct responses are achieved (the “MSG Score”). Thus, lower scores 
indicate better performance.   
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It is noted that the conditions have vastly unequal sample sizes.  This is because participants 
were randomly assigned to conditions. Tasks were pre-setup in a testing lab with ten 
computers and one condition set up on each computer. Three computers were set up with the 
Complex Control Condition, three with the PI Control Condition and four with the 
Experimental Condition. Testing was conducted in groups of no more than 10 students and 
the fewest number of participants at any one time was one.  
Distributions for many of the MSG items were not normal. This is consistent with the 
findings of Sweller and Gee (1978). This is not too surprising if one considers the nature of 
the items. Scores represent performance on a single item not a range of items with varying 
levels of difficulty. For example, very easy items (such as the PI item) had positively skewed 
distributions and very hard items (such as the Complex Item, in the Control Condition) had 
negatively skewed distributions. Some items also had bimodal distributions. Because of this 
lack of normality, Table 5.4 presents a variety of indicators of central tendency for the MSG 
task.  
5.11.2  Learning and Proactive Interference at the Group Level 
 
Preliminary Analysis 
Since our aim will be to compare the three condition groups to make inferences about the 
nature of Gf after an experimental manipulation, it is important to know that the groups did 
not differ significantly on Gf at the outset. Due to unequal sample sizes in the three 
conditions, the Univariate General Linear Model (GLM) analysis of variance procedure was 
used with Type III sums of squares to see if groups differed on the Gf markers, LSEH and 
Number Series. The univariate analysis of variance showed that the groups did not differ 
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significantly on the LSEH, F (2, 88) = 1.32, p = .27; nor Number Series, F (2, 86) = .32, p = 
.72. 
Due to the non-normality of the distribution of the MSG task, the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test was used to test for differences between groups.  At the group level (before 
individual differences are taken into account) all indicators are in the expected direction and 
consistent with Sweller and Gee (1978). We shall elaborate below.  
The General Learning Hypothesis  
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated significantly fewer attempts by the Experimental group 
(who received all the MSG items) on the Complex item, compared to the Complex Control 
Group, (U = 271.5, nControl = 27, nExperimental = 46, p > .01, two-tailed). This is consistent with 
the sequence effect found by Sweller and Gee (1978). The result also supports the General 
Learning Hypothesis. That is, it appears that the simpler items available to the Experimental 
Group act as learning opportunity for more complex items with the same types of rules that 
appear later in the task. The availability of these simpler items for the Experimental Group 
appears to have provided them with relevant conceptual knowledge that has made inducing 
the rules in the Complex Item easier for them (compared to those in Complex Control Group 
who were not provided with the simpler items).  
The General Proactive Interference Hypothesis 
The PI Control group solved the PI item significantly more rapidly than the Experimental 
group (U = 260, nControl = 18, nExperimental = 45, p = .03, two-tailed). This is consistent with the 
Einstellung effect found by Sweller and Gee (1978). The result supports the General 
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Proactive Interference Hypothesis – that learning across a task results in proactive 
interference for later items when the rules are dissimilar.  
5.11.3  Examinations of Individual Differences   
A Methodological Issue Regarding Presentation Format of the Gf Marker 
In order to examine individual differences in performance on the MSG task as a function of 
Gf ability, LSEH (Letter Series, presented easy-to-hard) and NSR (Number Series, presented 
randomly) were used as markers of Gf ability. However, it is possible that the presentation 
format of the markers affects the extent to which they tap into learning. We predict that 
random presentations will have weaker relationships with any learning effects we find in the 
MSG task. Thus, examinations of individual differences will employ the markers separately.  
Preliminary Analysis: Correlations  
While the markers correlated with each other highly, they were far from being perfectly 
correlated (r (87) = .46, p < .01). Table 5.4 presents Spearman’s rho correlations for each of 
the MSG items with LSEH and NSR, separately for each condition. Spearman’s rho is a non-
parametric rank correlation. In the Experimental condition, the increasing trend in 
correlations between LSEH (but not NSR) with MSG items as they get harder and further 
into the task, is preliminary evidence that learning occurs in markers presented in easy-to-
hard format but not necessarily in markers presented in random format.  
Interestingly, the Complex Control Item correlates more highly with LSEH than with NSR. 
In fact, the control item and NSR have no relationship. This could be viewed as surprising 
since both the Complex Control Item and NSR were expected to minimise across-item 
learning opportunity and it could be expected that they would have more in common with 
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each other. Yet, the Complex Control Item correlates quite highly with LSEH – which does 
allow for across-item learning opportunity.  
 
Creation of High and Low Gf Ability Groups Based on LSEH and NSR 
LSEH and NSR were used to divide participants into low and high Gf groups. Those who 
scored in the bottom 50% (range: 2-11) of LSEH were placed in the “Low LSEH” ability 
group and those in the top 50% (range: 12-25) were placed in the “High LSEH” ability group. 
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The same was done for NSR. Those in the bottom 50% (range: 1-7) of NSR were placed in 
the “Low NSR” ability group and those in the top 50% (range: 8-16) were placed in the 
“High NSR” ability group. Because LSEH and NSR correlated quite highly, but not perfectly, 
those in the high (low) group for one marker were not exactly the same as those in the high 
(low) group in for the other marker. That is, there would not be too much redundancy in 
looking at the marker groups separately. A cross-tabulation of participants in each ability 
group is presented in Table 5.6.  
 
 
 
We will subsequently be making numerous comparisons between the three conditions within 
the ability groups. Thus, it is important to know that the condition groups did not differ 
significantly on Gf at the outset. Due to unequal sample sizes in the three conditions, the 
Univariate General Linear Model (GLM) analysis of variance procedure was used with Type 
III sums of squares. Descriptive statistics and F-tests are presented in Table 5.7. No groups 
differed significantly on their relevant markers. 
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Further preliminary examinations: Across-Item Trends for the MSG task Based on LSEH and 
NSR Groups 
Figure 5.2 illustrates trimean scores across the MSG task for LSEH groups in the 
Experimental condition. The trimean is a robust measure of central tendency; it is a weighted 
average of the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. Specifically it is computed as follows: 
Trimean = 0.25 x 25th + 0.5 x 50th + 0.25 x 75th.  
Those in the High LSEH group display what Sweller and Gee (1978) called a “learning-to-
learn effect”. That is, despite the items increasing in complexity across the task, trimeans did 
not increase after item 3, which suggests that this group was learning consistently across the 
task. The Low LSEH group did not display this effect, suggesting that they did not learn as 
much as the High LSEH group across the task.  
 
Figure 5.2. Trimean MSG scores across the task for Experimental groups, by LSEH 
ability groups. 
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Figure 5.3 illustrates trimeans across the MSG task for NSR groups in the Experimental 
condition. In contrast to the differences displayed by the High and Low LSEH groups, the 
pattern of performance for those in the High and Low NS groups are quite similar, again 
suggesting that random presentations of Gf markers do not tap into across-item learning as 
well as easy-to-hard presentations.  
 
Figure 5.3. Trimean MSG scores across the task for Experimental groups, by NSR  
ability groups.   
 
This preliminary examination suggests that when participants are classified into high and low 
Gf ability based on LSEH, there are larger differences between them on the MSG task (in the 
Experimental condition) than when they are classified into high and low Gf ability based on 
NSR. This is despite them being exactly the same individuals. The only difference between 
LSEH and NSR is their presentation format (easy-to-hard and random, respectively) and the 
type of stimuli involved in the items (letters and numbers respectively). We believe the 
149 
 
 
 
greater difference in MSG task performance for the LSEH groups is due to the presentation 
format of LSEH. That is, the easy-to-hard presentation in the LSEH Gf marker provides 
across-item learning opportunity. Those who are better at learning across the task do better on 
the task. Thus, this is reflected in their performance on the MSG task (in the Experimental 
condition) which was developed to provide learning opportunity across the task.  In contrast, 
NSR does not appear as good at distinguishing between high and low performers on the MSG 
task, because the random presentation of its items does not seem to effectively tap into 
learning. In the next sections, we investigate this and other issues further with significance 
testing.  
5.11.4  MSG Task and Significance Testing 
In this section we explore the “Classical Gf Hypothesis”, the “Individual Differences 
Learning Hypothesis” and the “Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis” (in 
that order), separately for LSEH and NSR groups. Figure 5.4 illustrates the dependant 
variables using trimean scores for all LSEH Gf ability groups in all conditions. Figure 5.5 
does the same for all NSR Gf ability groups and conditions.  Descriptive statistics can be 
found in Table 5.8.  
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Figure 5.4. Trimean MSG score on Complex and PI items for Experimental and Control 
Conditions, by LSEH ability grouping.   
 
Figure 5.5. Trimean MSG score on Complex And PI items for Experimental and Control 
Conditions, by NSR ability groups.   
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The Classical Gf Hypothesis - LSEH 
The High LSEH group solved the Complex item significantly faster than the Low LS group, 
in the Control Condition (Mann–Whitney U = 27, nLowLS = 15, nHighLS = 11, P > .01 two-
tailed). That is, in the absence of across-item learning opportunity, the High LSEH 
outperformed the Low LSEH group on the Complex Item.  This is consistent with the 
Classical Gf Hypothesis - in the absence of across-item learning, induction in complex Gf 
items would still be possible (through the mapping between the concrete stimuli in the item 
which results in the acquisition of general concepts such as the rules in the item) and those of 
higher Gf would outperform those of lower Gf because they would be better at these within-
item mappings.  
Also, Figure 5.4 shows that there is a floor effect for the Complex Control Item for both 
groups. This suggests that without across-item learning opportunity, complex items are very 
difficult for all ability groups. According to the analogical thinking literature acquiring 
unfamiliar concepts (such as through mappings between the numbers in the item) is very 
difficult. Thus, it is likely that the Complex Control Item contained unfamiliar, novel 
concepts.  
The Classical Gf Hypothesis - NSR 
There was no significant difference between High and Low NSR groups on performance on 
the Complex Item in the Control Condition (Mann–Whitney U = 71.5, nLowNS = 
11, nHighNS = 14, p  = .77, two-tailed). That is, there appears to be no difference between the 
High and Low NSR groups when no across-item learning opportunity is provided. This 
suggests that random presentations of a Gf marker such as Number Series does not reliably 
tap individual differences in within-item induction processes.  
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There is a floor effect for the Complex Control Item, for both the High and Low NSR groups. 
Despite being able to do well on the NSR (which is a measure of Gf that minimises across-
item learning opportunity), the High NSR group were not able to perform very well on the 
Complex Control Item when no across-item learning is available.  Again, this suggests 
random presentations of Gf markers do not reliably tap within-item induction. This suggests 
that when across-item learning is minimised, task specific (rather than task general) processes 
become more important for performance.   
The Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis - LSEH 
Multiple Mann-Whitney tests were used to test for differences between the Experimental and 
Complex Control condition groups, within each ability group.  The tests and their relevant 
descriptive statistics were presented in Table 5.8. 
All LSEH ability groups demonstrated the sequence/learning effect; their respective 
Experimental groups solved the Complex Item significantly faster than their Complex 
Control groups (see Table 5.8). That is, both high and low Gf ability groups were able to 
learn within a task. This is consistent with the General Learning Hypothesis.  
While the relevant tests in Table 5.8 indicates that all LSEH ability groups were able to 
significantly learn, the trend in Figure 5.4 is consistent with the hypothesis that those from 
the High LSEH group may have been more able to benefit from their learning opportunity 
than those from the Low LSEH group. There is apparently a larger gap between the High 
LSEH Control and Experimental groups (compared to the smaller gap between the Low 
LSEH Control and Experimental groups). Indeed, in the Experimental Condition, the High 
LSEH group solved the Complex Item significantly faster than those in the Low LSEH 
group, (Mann–Whitney U = 142, nLowLS = 23, nHighLS = 21, P = .02 two-tailed). This is 
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consistent with Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis - when learning opportunity is 
provided those of higher Gf ability are more able to benefit from it, resulting in apparently 
larger differences between high and low Gf ability groups. With such small sample sizes, this 
notion could not be investigated further with statistical tests in the current pilot study, but it is 
an issue we return to in the larger studies that follow.  
The Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis - NSR 
All NSR ability groups demonstrated the sequence/learning effect; their respective 
experimental groups solved the Complex item significantly faster than their Complex control 
groups (see Table 5.8). That is, both high and low Gf ability groups were able to learn within 
a task. This is consistent with the General Learning Hypothesis.  
While the relevant tests in Table 5.8 indicates that all NSR ability groups were able to 
significantly learn, Figure 5.5 demonstrates a trend that is consistent with the possibility that 
those in the Low NSR group benefitted more from the learning opportunity than those in the 
High NSR group (due to the larger gap between their Experimental and Control Conditions).  
However, the difference between High and Low NSR on the Complex Experimental Item 
was not significant (Mann–Whitney U = 212, nLowNS = 22, nHighNS = 22, p  = .49, two-tailed). 
This suggests that random presentations of a Gf marker such as Number Series do not 
reliably tap individual differences in across-item learning processes.  
Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis – LSEH and NSR 
Multiple Mann-Whitney tests were used to test for differences between the Experimental and 
PI Control condition groups, within each ability group.  The tests and their relevant 
descriptive statistics were included in Table 5.8.  
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For the High LSEH group, the Control condition solved the PI item significantly faster than 
the Experimental condition.  For the Low LSEH group, this was not significant. That is, those 
in the High LSEH group suffered from significant proactive interference but the Low LSEH 
group did not. This is contrary to the Individual Difference Proactive Interference hypothesis 
that those of lower Gf ability would suffer more proactive interference.  
With regard to the NSR groups, those in the Low NSR grouping suffered from (marginally 
significant) proactive interference (p = .09). That is, for the Low NSR groups, the PI Control 
group solved the PI item with marginally significantly fewer attempts than the PI 
Experimental group. In contrast, there was no difference between PI Control and 
Experimental groups for those in the High NSR grouping (again, see Table 5.8).  
Thus, only the High LSEH group and the Low NSR group showed evidence of suffering from 
proactive interference. These were also the groups that demonstrated the most amount of 
across-item learning.  This is consistent with the General Proactive Interference Hypothesis – 
the more one learns, the more one suffers from proactive interference. However, since the 
High LSEH group suffered more from proactive interference than the Low LSEH group, the 
finding is inconsistent with the Individual Differences Hypothesis – that those of higher Gf 
are better at combating proactive interference.  
5.12  Preliminary Conclusions 
In summary, support was found for the Classical Gf Hypothesis, the General Learning 
Hypothesis, the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis and the General Proactive 
Interference Hypothesis. No support was found for the Individual Differences Proactive 
Interference Hypothesis. Support was also found for our supplementary hypothesis that 
random presentations of Gf markers minimise across-item learning opportunity.  
156 
 
 
 
Although this is just a pilot study, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the 
MSG task replicated the findings of Sweller and Gee (1978). That is, evidence was found to 
support the General Learning Hypothesis  (a.k.a “the sequence effect”) and the General 
Proactive Interference Hypothesis (a.k.a “Einstellung”). Consistent with the General Learning 
Hypothesis, simpler items seemed to have acted as across-item learning opportunity for a 
more complex item with similar rules. When this across-item learning opportunity was 
provided, performance on the more complex item improved greatly for all, compared to when 
learning opportunity was not provided. Consistent with the General Proactive Interference 
Hypothesis the more that participants seem to learn, the more they seemed to suffer from 
proactive interference on an item of another rule type. Thus, the evidence also suggested that 
the General Learning Hypothesis and the General Proactive Interference Hypothesis are 
different facets of a joint phenomenon – which is also consistent with Sweller and Gee 
(1978).  
Secondly, some support was also found for the Classic Gf Hypothesis. In the absence of 
across-item learning opportunity, those of higher Gf outperformed those of lower Gf on a 
complex Gf-type item. However, without learning opportunity available across the task, the 
complex item was extremely difficult (the Complex Control Item resulted in floor effects for 
all ability groups). There is evidence that in such a context, such items become extremely 
difficult not necessarily because they are complex, but because they are novel. Evidence that 
novelty contributes to extreme difficulty comes from the fact that when learning opportunity 
was provided (to reduce the novelty), the floor effect disappeared (despite the complexity of 
the item remaining the same).  
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Thirdly, the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis received some support. When 
learning opportunity across the task was provided, all ability groups were able to significantly 
learn, but there was some evidence that those of higher Gf learn more than those of lower Gf.   
A surprising finding was that the High LSEH group was the only group to suffer significant 
proactive interference. The Low NSR group suffered marginally significant proactive 
interference. Both groups seem to display the most amount of learning (see Figure 5.4 and 
Figure 5.5) and thus, is consistent with the General Proactive Interference Hypothesis.  The 
finding that those of higher Gf (i.e., those in the High LSEH group) suffered proactive 
interference while those of lower Gf (i.e., those in the Low LSEH) did not, is inconsistent 
with the Individual Differences Proactive Interference hypothesis based on the theories of 
Unsworth and Engle’s (2005a), which predicts the reverse of what was found.  
Thus, it seems that learning across the task is likely to contribute to individual differences in 
performance on Gf tasks; while combating proactive interference seems less likely to 
contribute to individual differences in performance. Learning across the task also appears 
necessary for induction to take place, since without it, the result is floor effects. That is, 
without some prior conceptual knowledge (provided through across-item learning), induction 
is unlikely to be able to take place. These preliminary conclusions only apply to Gf markers 
that have been presented in easy-to-hard format.  
While the Number Series Task (presented randomly) correlated significantly with Letter 
Series Task (presented easy-to-hard), only the easy-to-hard marker was able to distinguish 
between high and low performers on the Complex Item when across-item learning was 
presented and when it was not present. Furthermore, the Complex Control Item correlated 
more highly with LSEH than with NSR. In fact, the Complex Control Item and NSR had no 
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relationship. This  could be viewed as surprising since both the Complex Control Item and 
NSR were expected to minimise across-item learning opportunity and it could be expected 
that they would have more in common with each other. Yet, the Complex Control Item 
correlated quite highly with LSEH - which does allow for across-item learning opportunity. 
This suggests that when across-item learning is minimised, task specific (rather than task 
general) processes become more important for performance.  Additionally, this may indicate 
that the within-item induction in the Complex Control Item shares some similarities to the 
across-item learning that may occur in LSEH, which would be consistent with theorising 
from the analogical thinking literature. The literature suggests that within-item reasoning 
(which involves a process of mapping between two concrete analogues and results in the 
learning of general concepts), in the absence of across-item learning and prior knowledge, is 
itself, a process of learning which shares similarities with across-item learning. This is 
because they both involve the transfer of knowledge from one situation to another by a 
process of mapping. 
There were some limitations to this pilot study that will be addressed in the larger studies.  
Firstly, the difference in results between NSR and LSEH may be due to content effects rather 
than item presentation order, since presentation order was confounded with task content 
(numbers or letters).  Secondly, random presentations of Gf markers still contain easier items 
dispersed throughout the task, which may allow for learning opportunity. In order to more 
effectively minimise learning opportunity, hard-to-easy presentations may be more 
appropriate.  
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENT 3: 
DIFFERENT BUT RELATED: WITHIN-ITEM RULE DISCOVERY, ACROSS-ITEM  
LEARNING, USE OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND PROACTIVE INTERFERENCE 
NUMBER SERIES 
 
6.1  Experiment 3: The MSG Task and Number Series 
Experiment 3 was a larger version of pilot Experiment 2 with only a few modifications. The 
experimental design was the same as Experiment 2 and we make the same hypotheses and 
predictions. Once again, the dependant variable was performance on the Complex and PI 
Items in the MSG task and the independent variables were condition (Experimental, Complex 
Control and PI Control) and Gf ability.  Series Completion was once again used as the marker 
of Gf, but to control for content effects, only Number Series was used as the Gf marker 
(Letter Series will be used in Experiment 4).  
The Gf marker was presented in two formats to all participants:  
• Easy-to-hard (to allow for across-item learning opportunity), 
• Hard and moderately hard items only, randomly inter-mixed (to minimise across-item 
learning opportunity). 
Ideally, to minimise learning opportunity, the presentation format should be hard-to-easy. 
However, due to time constraints, only hard and moderately hard items were included.  
A two-level Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) was used to further understand the 
relationship between performance on the MSG task, condition and Gf ability. This was not 
possible in the pilot study due to the smaller sample size.  
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6.2 Method 
Participants 
In total, 208 participants were involved in the study. Participants were either enrolled in a 
second year undergraduate psychology course at the University of Sydney (72%) or from the 
general public and reimbursed for the time (28%). Out of the total, 65% were female. 
Participants’ mean age was 21.43 years (SD = 4.99).  
Cognitive Tasks  
1) Modified Sweller & Gee (MSG) Task 
This was the same task presented in pilot Experiment 2 with no modifications. Identical to 
Experiment 2 and 3, there were three versions, one for each of the three conditions: the 
Experimental Condition, the Complex Control Condition and the PI Control Condition.  
2)  Number Series (Gf markers) 
This was basically the same task as NSR presented in pilot Experiment 2. However, this time 
it was presented as two separate tasks, in two different formats:  
• Easy-to-hard (“NSEH”) – hypothesized to allow learning opportunity, 
• Only hard and moderately hard items, randomly intermixed (“NSH”) – hypothesized 
to minimise learning opportunity.  
NSH always preceded NSEH to prevent the easy items from NSEH acting as learning items 
for NSH.  
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Procedure  
Testing was conducted in groups of approximately 10 or 23 participants. All tasks were 
computer administrated. An experimenter provided general instructions at the beginning of 
each session and was present throughout the session to assist participants and ensure that the 
task protocol was followed. A set of computerized (more specific) instructions preceded each 
task. Participants made their responses for all tasks using a standard keyboard and mouse. 
Participants were not allowed to use pen and paper for any of the items. Tasks were always 
presented in the order MSG, NSH, NSEH, to prevent the Gf marker tasks from creating 
proactive interference for the MSG task.  
Those in the Experimental and Complex Control conditions received only MSG, NSH and 
NSEH. However, those in the PI Control Condition received MSG, followed by a short 
version of Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1962), followed by NSH then 
NSEH. The Raven’s task was meant to act only as a filler task. The MSG task in the PI 
Control Condition was very short, consisting of only one very easy MSG item. Hence, 
Raven’s was included to control for any fatigue that may have affected those in the 
Experimental and Complex Control conditions.  
Statistical Model 
HLM was used to model performance on MSG at each attempt on the Complex and PI items; 
to further our understanding of the relationship between performance on the MSG task, 
condition and NSEH. The equivalent model was not constructed for NSR due to restriction of 
range issues that will subsequently be discussed.  
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6.3 Results & Discussion 
This section will be organised as follows. Firstly, we will present descriptive statistics and 
correlations. We then move on to non-parametric tests that compare performance on the 
Complex and PI items for control and experimental groups, based on Gf ability groups 
(created by NSEH). For these tests, dependant variable for the MSG Task is the number of 
attempts needed on an item before multiple correct responses are achieved. This gives an 
approximation of the point at which participants start to understand the rule in MSG 
Complex/PI items and get attempts correct. This was essentially the same type of analyses 
used in pilot Experiment 2 and the main aim of these analyses here will be to see whether the 
results from the pilot can be replicated.  
We then move on to HLM analyses to gain a more complete picture of participants’ 
performance (which could not be done in the pilot study because of the small number of 
participants). The HLM allows us to model the probability that a participant will get an 
attempt in the Complex/PI items correct (for all attempts), based on the condition they are in 
and their performance on NSEH.   
Non-parametric tests and HLM were not run for NSH due to floor effect and restriction of 
range issues for this marker. Instead, we visually examine the trimeans on the MSG task for 
those who scored in the top 5% on the NSH. The rationale for this was to see whether those 
who performed very well on a task such as NSH (where learning across the task is 
hypothesized to be minimized) could do equally well on the Complex Control item where 
learning is also minimized.  
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6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Demographic information is presented in Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics for Gf marker tasks 
used in the study are presented separately by condition in Table 6.2. Cronbach’s alpha is in 
the acceptable range (for research purposes).  Means for NSH were very low (ranging from 
17% - 25% correct across the three conditions), with lower standard deviation than the NSEH 
set. Hence, any direct comparison between the two sets based on methods which examine 
variance (such as correlations) will be made with caution.  
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Descriptive statistics for the MSG task are presented in Table 6.3 separately for each 
condition. Distributions for many of the MSG items were not normal. This is consistent with 
the findings of Sweller and Gee (1978) and the findings from Experiment 2, Chapter 5. To 
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address this lack of normality, Table 6.3 presents a variety of indicators of central tendency 
for the MSG task.  
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6.3.2  Correlations 
Table 6.4 presents Spearman’s rho correlations for each of the MSG items with NSEH and 
NSH, separately for each condition. Spearman’s rho is a non-parametric rank correlation.  
The increasing trend in correlations between NSEH and MSG items as they increase in 
difficulty  and appear further into the task (seen in Experiment 2) is repeated here for NSEH 
(-.08 to -.50).  Also, as was the case in Experiment 2, the Complex Control Item correlates 
moderately with NSEH (r = -.35). This may indicate that the within-item induction in the 
Complex Control Item is similar in process to across-item learning tapped by the NSEH task. 
There is also a moderate correlation between NSH and the Complex Item in both the 
Experimental and Control conditions (-.24 and -.38, respectively), despite the floor effect in 
NSH. Also, NSH and NSEH correlate with each other (.40 to .48). That is, there appears to be 
some similarity between NSEH and NSH; or in other words, similarity between across-item 
learning and within-item induction. 
The PI Item did not have any significant relationship with NSH in any condition. This may be 
due to restriction of range issues NSH. The PI Item correlates moderately with NSEH in its 
Control condition but not in the Experimental condition. This is preliminary evidence against 
the Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis - the hypothesis that those of 
higher Gf ability suffer less from proactive interference. If individual differences in Gf tasks 
is due to those of higher Gf ability being better at combating proactive interference than those 
of lower Gf, then the PI Item in the Experimental Condition (where there is more potential 
for proactive interference) should have correlated more highly with NSEH than the PI Item in 
the Control Condition.  
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6.3.3 Non-parametric Comparisons of Gf Ability Groups (Based on NSEH) 
Construction of NSEH Ability Groups 
NSEH was used to divide participants into low and high Gf groups. Those who scored in the 
bottom 50% (score range: 1- 13) were placed in the “Low NSEH” ability group and those in 
the top 50% (score range: 14 - 20) were placed in the “High NSEH” ability group.  
Since our aim will be to compare the conditions within the ability groups, it is important to 
know that the condition groups did not differ significantly on Gf at the outset. Due to unequal 
sample sizes in the three conditions, the Univariate General Linear Model (GLM) analysis of 
variance procedure was used with Type III sums of squares. Descriptive statistics and F-tests 
are presented in Table 6.5. There were no significant differences across conditions for the 
High NSEH groups. However, the difference for Low NSEH was significant. Follow-up pair-
wise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments showed that the significant difference was 
due to those in Complex Control Condition scoring significantly higher on NSEH than those 
in the Experimental Condition. Thus differences in MSG performance for these groups 
should be interpreted with this in mind.  
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The Classical Gf Hypothesis - NSEH 
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test was used to test for differences between ability 
groups within the Complex Control condition. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 
6.6.  Consistent with Experiment 2, in the Control Condition, the High NSEH group solved 
the Complex Item significantly faster than the Low NSEH group, (Mann–
Whitney U = 325, nLowNSEH  = 24, nHighNSEH = 43, p = .01, two-tailed). This suggests that 
without across-item learning opportunity, the High NSEH group are better than the Low 
NSEH group at within-item induction. This is consistent with the Classical Gf Hypothesis - in 
the absence of across-item learning, induction in complex Gf items would still be possible 
(through the mapping between the concrete stimuli in the item which results in the acquisition 
of general concepts such as the rules in the item) and those of higher Gf would outperform 
those of lower Gf because they would be better at these within-item mappings.  
 However, there appears to be a floor effect for the Complex Control Item for both High and 
Low NSEH ability groups. This suggests that without across-item learning opportunity, 
complex, novel items are very difficult for all ability groups. This is consistent with the 
analogical thinking literature (Holland et al., 1989) which suggests that acquiring unfamiliar 
concepts through mappings between concrete analogues (in this case, the numbers in the 
item) is very difficult. This is also consistent with Experiment 2.  
The General Learning Hypothesis and the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis - 
NSEH 
Multiple Mann-Whitney tests were used to test for differences between the Experimental and 
Complex Control condition groups, within each ability group.  The tasks and their relevant 
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descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.6. Figure 6.1 illustrate these effects graphically 
for the NSEH groups using trimeans.9 
 
Figure 6.1. Trimean MSG scores on Complex and PI items, for Experimental and Control 
Conditions, by NSEH ability groups.   
 
All ability groups demonstrated the sequence/learning effect - their respective Experimental 
groups solved the Complex Item significantly faster than their Complex Control groups. That 
is, both High and Low NSEH ability groups could learn within a task. This supports the 
General Learning Hypothesis - simpler items act as across-item learning opportunity for more 
complex items with similar rules, and when this learning opportunity is provided, 
performance will improve greatly for all, compared to when learning opportunity is not 
provided. 
                                                           
9
 The trimean is a robust measure of central tendency; it is a weighted average of the 25th, 50th, and 
75th percentiles. Specifically it is computed as follows: Trimean = 0.25 x 25th + 0.5 x 50th + 0.25 x 
75th. 
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While all ability groups were able to learn, Figure 6.1 is consistent with the Individual 
Differences Learning Hypothesis that predicted that those from the High NSEH group would 
be more able to benefit from their learning opportunity than those from the Low NSEH 
group. That is, there is a larger gap between their Complex Control and Experimental groups 
(compared to the smaller gap between the Low NSEH Complex Control and Experimental 
groups).  Certainly, in the Experimental Condition, the High NSEH group solved the 
Complex Item with significantly fewer attempts than those in the Low NSEH group, (Mann–
Whitney U = 274, nLowNSEH = 33, nHighNSEH = 33 , p > .01. two-tailed).  We shall return to 
exploring this potential interaction effect with HLM, shortly.  
Figure 6.2 illustrates trimeans across the MSG task for NSEH groups in the Experimental 
Condition. Those in the High NSEH group display the “learning-to-learn effect”. That is, 
despite the items increasing in complexity across the task, trimeans did not increase after item 
3. The Low NSEH group also display this effect, but to a lesser extent.   
 
Figure 6.2. Trimean MSG scores across the task for Experimental groups, by NSEH 
ability groups. 
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Thus far, there is some support for the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis. The data 
are consistent with the idea that without across-item learning opportunity, complex, novel 
items are very difficult for all ability groups and that those of higher Gf ability are more able 
to benefit from learning opportunity when it is provided, resulting in larger differences 
between high and low Gf ability groups. 
The General Proactive Interference and the Individual Differences Proactive Interference 
Hypothesis – NSEH  
Multiple Mann-Whitney tests were used to test for differences between the Experimental and 
PI Control condition groups, within each ability group (see Table 6.6, PI Item). Surprisingly, 
there were no significant differences - no ability groups seemed to suffer from proactive 
interference. This is contrary to the Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis. 
(those of lower Gf ability would suffer more proactive interference) and contrary to the 
General Proactive Interference Hypothesis (that predicted that all ability groups would suffer 
from proactive interference to some extent). 
6.3.4 Hierarchical Linear Modelling with NSEH  
A two-level Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) was used to further understand the 
relationship between performance on the MSG task, condition and NSEH.  The probability of 
getting an attempt correct (where “Correct” = 1 if correct; 0 if incorrect)10 in the item was 
modelled with log-odds as the dependent variable, 
Prob(Correct = 1) = φij    (1) 
                                                           
10
 The MSG task was programmed to exit from an item after a total of 12 correct responses for that 
item. This would have resulted in a lot of missing data for the HLM. Hence, missing responses due to 
participants successfully exiting an item were assigned a “1” (i.e., scored as “correct”).  
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Log[φij/(1- φij)] = ηij     (2) 
Thus, η is the log of the odds (log-odds) of success (in this case, Correct = 1). That is, if the 
probability of success, φ, is .5, the odds of success φ/(1- φ) = .5/.5 = 1.0 and the log-odds 
would be log (1) = 0. That is, when the probability of success is less than .5, the odds are less 
than 1.0 and the log-odds is negative. When the probability is greater than .5, the odds are 
greater than 1.0 and the log-odds is positive. While φ must be in the interval (0,1), η can be 
any real value. 
The level-1 model is stated by equation (3). Attempt is the attempt number in the item, 
centred at the grand-trimean number of attempts for all participants on the item (attempt 
number 35 for Complex Item and attempt number 4 for the PI item), 
ηij = π0i + π1iAttemptti     (3). 
Equation (3) predicts ηij, the log-odds of success for participant i at time t; based on Attemptti. 
Thus, π0i represents the log-odds of success of participant i when Attemptti is equal to 0 
(where 0 = grand-trimean number of attempts for the item); and π1i is the growth 
(improvement) rate for participant i over the item. Since this model uses Bernoulli sampling, 
there is no error term in equation (3).  
The level-2 model predicts the coefficients in the level-1 model and is stated by equations (4) 
and (5). Condition is the dummy variable for condition (0 = Control; 1 = Experimental) and 
NSEH_Cent is centred NSEH (0 = grand-mean).  
π0i = β00 + β01Condition1i + β02NSEH_Cent2i + β03Condition X NSEH_Cent3i + r0i      (4) 
π1i = β10  + β11Condition1i + β12NSEH_Cent2i + β13Condition X NSEH_Cent3i     (5) 
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β00 is the value for π0i when all of its predictors are 0 (that is, for someone in the Control 
condition, with grand-mean NSEH score). β10 is the growth rate (that is, the value for π1i) 
when all of its predictors are 0 (that is, for someone in the Control condition, with grand-
mean NSEH score). r0i is the deviation of participant i from the trimean performance at 
attempt number 35 (for the Complex Item) or 4 (for the PI Item). Attempt 35 and 4 are the 
grand-trimean number of attempts for their respective items.  
Thus, the intercept π0i predicts the log-odds of success for participant i, at the grand-trimean 
number of attempts based on the main effects of Condition, NSEH and their interactions. The 
Attempt slope π1i predicts the growth rate for participant i, over the course of the item, based 
on the main effects of Condition, NSEH and their interactions. HLM models were run 
separately for the Complex Item and the PI Item. We first present the analyses for the 
Complex Item.  
HLM Analyses of the Complex Item (the Classical Gf Hypothesis and the Learning 
Hypotheses) 
Table 6.7 presents the estimates of the HLM parameters, which were obtained in HLM 6 
(Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, & du Toit, 2004) for the Complex Item. Intercept π0i 
represents the log-odds of success at the grand-trimean number of attempts for the Complex 
Item, that is, attempt number 35.  Slope π1i represents the growth rate for participant i over the 
item, that is, changes to the log-odds of success as a function of attempt number.  
Model 1 includes all predictors. Non-significant and weak predictors were dropped from the 
model based on two criteria. Predictors with t-ratios of smaller magnitude than +/- 1 were 
dropped (since the threshold for significance is +/- 2). Predictors with significant coefficients 
weaker  than +/- 0.01 were also dropped (since log-odds of +/- 0.009 corresponds to an odds 
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ratio of 1.009 and would not contribute much to the model). The final results are presented in 
Table 6.7, Model 2.  
 
177 
 
 
 
Performance at the Grand-Trimean Number of Attempts: The coefficients that predict 
π0 indicate that at attempt number 35 (the average number of total number of attempts for all 
participants), the log-odds of success is significantly predicted by Condition and NSEH, and 
the interaction between Condition and NSEH is marginally significant. These effects are 
more clearly illustrated in Figure 6.3.   
Thus, by attempt 35, regardless of NSEH ability, those in the Experimental Condition have a 
significantly higher probability of success than those in the Control Condition. This supports 
the General Learning Hypothesis.  
The marginally significant interaction between Condition and NSEH by Attempt number 35 
is illustrated by the larger gap between the broken lines - i.e., between the higher Gf (higher 
NSEH) Control and Experimental groups, compared to the smaller gap between the solid 
lines – i.e. the Control and Experimental groups for those of lower Gf. That is, there is some 
(marginally significant) evidence that those of higher Gf profited more from the opportunity 
to learn across items than those of lower Gf. This supports the Individual Differences 
Learning Hypothesis.  
There appears to be a floor effect for the Complex Control Item for both groups. This 
suggests that without across-item learning opportunity, complex, novel items are very 
difficult for all ability groups. However, the main effect of NSEH (regardless of condition), 
suggests that those of higher Gf outperform those of lower Gf in terms of within-item 
induction, when no across-item learning opportunity is provided. On one level, this supports 
the Classical Gf Hypothesis. However, visual examination of Figure 6.3 shows a floor effect, 
which suggests that those in the Control Condition (even of higher Gf) were rarely able to 
reach the correct answer on any attempt – the predicted probability of success for those in the 
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75th percentile of NSEH (Gf ability), in the Complex Control condition never goes above 
25%. Thus, the results do not totally support the Classical Gf Hypothesis because it appears 
that without some exposure to earlier, simpler items to provide participants with the relevant, 
related knowledge, induction is very difficult. That is, induction within a complex item does 
not occur in isolation from earlier items – it is not likely. We shall elaborate on this below in 
the “Growth of Success” result.  
Growth of Success: The coefficients for π1 indicate that Condition is the only 
significant predictor of the rate of growth of success over the course of the Complex Item. It 
can be seen in Figure 6.3 that only those in the Experimental Condition improved their 
performance with more attempts. Furthermore, the data in Figure 6.3 suggests that those in 
the Control Condition were rarely able to reach the correct answer on any attempt. The lack 
of significance of NSEH in predicting rate of growth suggests that Condition (i.e., exposure 
to earlier, simpler items) is more important than Gf ability in being able to induce the correct 
answer. That is, it appears that it is very difficult to make mappings between within-item 
analogues to induce the general concept (i.e., work out the rules by looking for 
generalisations among the item’s stimuli) in complex Gf items, unless one is provided with 
earlier, easier items to provide one with the relevant, prior knowledge. This seems to be the 
case, regardless of one’s Gf ability. This suggests that the knowledge provided by across-item 
learning is important to induction, for all levels of Gf ability.  
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Figure 6.3.  Predicted probability of success (Correct = 1) as a function of Condition, NSEH 
and Attempt, on Complex Item, based on Model 1 from Table 6.7. Black line indicates 
differences in predicted success between those in the Experimental Condition and those in the 
Control Condition, separately for those of higher and lower Gf ability at Attempt number 35 
(the grand trimean number of attempts).  
 
HLM Analyses of PI Item (the Proactive Interference Hypotheses) 
A similar two-level HLM was used to model probability of getting an attempt correct (where 
“Correct” = 1 if correct; 0 if incorrect) in the PI Item, with its log-odds as the dependent 
variable and Condition and NSEH as the independent variable. Table 6.8 presents the 
estimates of the HLM parameters which were obtained in HLM 6 (Raudenbush et al., 2004), 
for the PI Item. Like for the Complex Item, Intercept π0i represents the log-odds of success at 
the grand-trimean total number of attempts for the PI Item, which in this case is attempt 
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number 4.  Slope π1i represents the growth rate for participant i over the item, that is, changes 
to the log-odds of success as a function of attempt number. Model 1 includes all predictors. 
Non-significant and weak predictors were dropped from the model based on two criteria. 
Predictors with t-ratios of smaller magnitude than +/- 1 were dropped, as were predictors with 
significant coefficients weaker  than +/- 0.01. The final results are presented in Table 6.8., 
Model 2.  
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Performance at the Grand-Trimean Number of Attempts: The coefficients for π0  
indicate that at attempt number 4, the log-odds of success is (marginally) significantly 
predicted by Condition. Figure 6.4 indicates that at Attempt number 4, regardless of Gf 
ability, those in the PI Control Condition have a (marginally significant) higher probability of 
success than those in the Experimental Condition. This is consistent with a proactive 
interference effect. That is, those who learn about one type of rule, find it harder to solve 
items of a different rule type later on. However, this effect is general and not predicted by Gf 
ability. This supports the General Proactive Interference Hypothesis, but not the Individual 
Differences Hypothesis.  
Growth of Success: The coefficients for π1 indicate that Condition and Gf ability are 
significant predictors of the rate of growth (improvement) of success, over the course of the 
PI Item. It can be seen in Figure 6.4 that on average, the red lines representing the 
Experimental condition are steeper than the blue lines that represent the PI control condition.  
That is, the significance of Condition as a predictor of growth of success suggests that while 
the Control condition did better than the Experimental condition at Attempt 4, the 
Experimental condition would have quickly caught up. That is, proactive interference appears 
to be temporary.  
Also, the broken lines representing higher Gf ability are steeper than the solid lines 
representing lower ability. That is, the significance of Gf ability in predicting growth rate of 
success suggests that on this easy PI Item, those of higher ability improved their performance 
with more attempts, at a faster rate than those of lower Gf ability, regardless of condition. 
That is, in this case, they can induce the correct answer with more attempts, at a faster rate; 
that is, they are better at within-item induction. 
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Figure 6.4.  predicted probability of success (Correct = 1) as a function of Condition, NSEH 
and Attempt, on Complex Item, based on Model 1 from Table 6.8. Black line indicates 
differences in predicted success between those in the Experimental Condition and those in the 
Control Condition at Attempt number 4 (the grand trimean number of attempts).  
 
  
6.3.5 Examination of NSH High Performers 
NSH could not be used to split participants into high and low Gf ability groups.  The 
relatively high level of difficulty of the set resulted in a floor effect and restriction of range. 
Those in the bottom 50% scored in the range of only 0-1, while those in the top 50% scored 
in the much wider range of 2-12. This restriction of range makes it inappropriate to collapse 
them into two separate groups and renders HLM less informative.  
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However, a relevant post-hoc question that arises from this is whether those who performed 
very well on the NSH task also performed very well on the MSG Complex item, in the 
Complex Control condition. That is, are there people who are able to reason well inductively, 
without much across-item learning opportunity? And if so, can they do so on more than one 
task? Specifically, can those who perform very well on a task such as NSH, where learning 
across the task is hypothesized to be minimized, do equally well on the Complex Control 
item where no across-item learning is provided.  
The top 5% of participants on NSH were selected to be examined. Their performance on 
NSH was substantially higher than that for the rest of the sample; their mean score on NSH 
was 9 (75%, SD = 1.25, n = 18), compared to the entire sample’s mean of 2.55 (21%, SD = 
2.65, n = 208). However, their pattern of performance on the MSG task was not very 
different to that of the rest of the sample (Figure 6.5). They appear to demonstrate a learning 
effect and proactive interference effect, although, their trimean on the Complex Item (Control 
Condition) was 34, seems somewhat better than the same trimean score for the rest of the 
sample which was 45. The sample size for this extreme group was too small for statistical 
tests of these differences to be meaningful (n ≈ 6, per condition). However, their general 
pattern of performance suggests that despite their special level of performance on NSH, they 
did not display the same level of performance on MSG without across-item learning 
opportunity, and when across-item learning opportunity was provided, they seemed to benefit 
from it just as much as other participants.   
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Figure 6.5. Trimean MSG scores on Complex and PI items for Experimental and Control 
Conditions, for those in the top 5% of NSH.  
 
6.4 Summary and General Discussion  
The current study was a larger version of pilot Experiment 2 and was intended to test the 
general hypotheses and predictions outlined in Chapter 5.  The results from the current study 
largely: 
• Did not fully support the Classical Gf Hypothesis  
• Supported the General Learning Hypothesis 
• Gave some support for the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis.  
• Supported the General Proactive Interference Hypothesis 
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• Did not support the Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis.  
The Classical Gf Hypothesis: Consistent with pilot Experiment 2, it was found that 
without learning opportunity available across the task, complex, novel items are extremely 
difficult. The Complex Control Item resulted in floor effects for all Gf ability groups 
(although those of higher Gf still outperformed those of lower Gf ability). Furthermore, in the 
absence of across-item learning, participants’ performance on the Complex Item did not 
improve with more attempts and this applied to all ability groups. Thus, within-item 
analogues (e.g. the series of numbers conforming to the rule) by themselves are not good 
facilitators of induction in complex, novel items. This is not totally consistent with the 
Classical Gf Hypothesis that predicted that in the absence of across-item learning, induction 
on this complex Gf item would still be possible. However, the hypothesis also predicts that in 
the absence of across-item learning those of higher Gf would outperform those of lower Gf – 
which was what the results found. Despite the low level of performance for all ability groups, 
those of higher Gf did outperform those of lower Gf. Thus, the Classical Gf Hypothesis was 
partially supported.  
 The General Learning Hypothesis: When across-item learning opportunity was 
provided, the floor effect disappeared, despite the theoretical complexity of the item 
remaining the same. This was true for all Gf ability groups.  That is, when learning 
opportunity across the task was provided, all ability groups were able to significantly learn. 
This supports the General Learning Hypothesis that states that simpler items earlier in the 
task should act as learning opportunity for more complex (possibly, novel) items with the 
same types of rules that appear later in the task. It is likely that the availability of these 
simpler items for the Experimental Group (but not the Complex Control Group), provided the 
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group with the relevant conceptual knowledge that made inducing the rules in the Complex 
Item easier (compared to those in the Complex Control Group).  
The Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis: There was some (marginally 
significant) evidence that those of higher Gf learn more across the task than those of lower 
Gf. The difference in Complex Item performance between the Experimental Group and the 
Complex Control Group was marginally significantly larger for those of higher Gf ability in 
the HLM analysis. Although the results were only marginally significant, there was a 
consistent trend across the trimeans of all the items in the Experimental Condition that 
suggested that those of higher Gf indeed do learn more across the task when across-item 
learning opportunity is provided.  
 The General Proactive Interference Hypothesis: The significance of condition as a 
predictor of performance on the PI Item in the HLM (with those in the Control Condition 
doing better than those in the Experimental Condition), suggests that all participants 
(regardless of Gf ability) suffer from proactive interference on an item of a different rule 
type after having solved items of a particular rule-type. This was contrary to the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney tests which suggested that no groups suffered from proactive 
interference. However the HLM provides a more complete picture of what happens in the 
MSG task, as it is able to model performance at each attempt number and is a more powerful 
test than the Mann-Whitney test. Thus, we conclude from these results and from the support 
that the General Learning Hypothesis received, that there is support for the General 
Proactive Interference Hypothesis, that is, across-item learning leads to proactive 
interference for all.  
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The Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis: In the HLM, Gf ability 
did not predict performance on the PI Item, over and above condition. Thus, the Individual 
Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis was not supported. There appears to be no 
difference in the ability to combat proactive interference for those of different levels of Gf 
ability. Indeed, the PI Item correlated moderately with NSEH in its Control Condition, but 
there was no relationship between the two in the Experimental Condition. If learning leads to 
proactive interference and those of higher Gf ability are better at combating it, then the trend 
should have been the other way around – i.e., the PI Item in the Experimental Condition 
should have correlated more highly with NSEH than the PI Item in the Control Condition.  
A Hypothesis Regarding the Methodological Issue of the Presentation Format of the 
Gf Marker:  In terms of presentation format of the Gf markers, there appears to be a lot of 
similarity between Number Series presented in easy-to-hard format and when only hard and 
moderately hard items are presented. They correlate moderately with each other. A difference 
is that when only hard and moderately hard items are presented, the result is floor effect and 
restriction of range.  
Examination of the top 5% on NSH suggested that their pattern of performance on the MSG 
task was not very different to that of the rest of the sample. One might expect that if NSH 
minimised across-item learning opportunity, those who scored highly on it might also 
perform very well on the Complex Control Item (where there is no across-item learning 
opportunity); that is, there may be those who are generally very capable of within-item 
schema induction, and can do without across-item learning. However, this was not the case. 
Like the rest of the sample, they were not able to reason very well without across-item 
learning opportunity on the MSG task and benefitted from the learning opportunity when it 
was provided. Thus, their ability to reason well in the absence of much across-item learning 
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opportunity may have been task specific. It is possible that those who performed very well on 
NSH may have already been familiar with the rules used in NSH. That is, they may have 
brought relevant, prior conceptual knowledge of the rules with them to NSH.   
A limitation of the current study is that the Gf markers contained the same stimulus type as 
the MSG task – that is, despite containing different types of items, both involved reasoning 
with numbers. Thus, in the next study (Experiment 4), we aim to replicate the findings from 
the current study with the Letter Series task as the Gf marker.  
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CHAPTER 7 
EXPERIMENT 4: 
DIFFERENT BUT RELATED: WITHIN-ITEM RULE DISCOVERY, ACROSS-ITEM  
LEARNING, USE OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND PROACTIVE INTERFERENCE 
LETTER SERIES 
 
7.1 Experiment 4: The MSG Task and Letter Series  
This experiment was run at the same time as Experiment 3.  Its aim was to replicate the 
findings from Experiment 3 and to see if the relationships between the MSG task and 
Number Series (the Gf marker) would generalise to the MSG task and the Letter Series task 
(as the Gf marker). Since both Number Series and the MSG task involve numbers as stimuli 
we thought an examination of the MSG task’s relationship with a Gf task that did not involve 
numbers was warranted. 
 The experimental design was the same as Experiments 2 and 3, and we make the same 
hypotheses and predictions (refer back to Chapter 5). Once again, the dependant variable was 
performance on the Complex and PI Items in the MSG task and the independent variables 
were condition (Experimental and Complex Control or Experimental and PI Control) and Gf 
ability. The Letter Series Task was used as the marker of Gf. A two-level Hierarchical Linear 
Model (HLM) was used to understand the relationship between performance on the MSG 
task, condition and Gf ability (as indicated by the Letter Series task).  
The Gf marker was presented in two formats to all participants:  
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• Easy-to-hard (to allow for across-item learning opportunity), 
• Hard and moderately hard items only, randomly inter-mixed (to minimise across-item 
learning opportunity). 
Ideally, to minimise learning opportunity, presentation format should be hard-to-easy. 
However, due to time constraints, only hard and moderately hard items were included.  
7.2 Method 
Participants 
The students were enrolled in second year undergraduate psychology at the University of 
Sydney and participated as part of their course work. In total, 169 students participated in the 
study (70% female) with mean age = 21.41 years (SD = 5.80). Data was collected 
concurrently with data for Experiment 3.  
Cognitive Tasks 
1) Modified Sweller & Gee (MSG) Task 
This was the same task presented in pilot Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, with no 
modifications. Identical to Experiment 2 and 3, there were three versions, one for each of the 
three conditions: the Experimental Condition, the Complex Control Condition and the PI 
Control Condition.  
2)  Letter Series (Gf markers) 
This was basically the same task as LSEH presented in pilot Experiment 2. However, this 
time it was presented as two separate tasks, in two different formats:  
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• Easy-to-hard (“LSEH”) – hypothesized to allow learning opportunity, 
• Only hard and moderately hard items, randomly intermixed (“LSH”) – hypothesized 
to minimise learning opportunity.  
LSH always preceded LSEH to prevent the easy items from LSEH acting as learning items 
for LSH.  
Procedure 
Testing was conducted in groups of approximately 10 or 23 participants. All tasks were 
computer administrated. An experimenter provided general instructions at the beginning of 
each session and was present throughout the session to assist participants and ensure that the 
test protocol was followed. A set of computerized (more specific) instructions preceded each 
task. Participants made their responses for all tasks using a standard keyboard and mouse. 
Participants were not allowed to use pen and paper for any of the items. Tasks were always 
presented in the order MSG, LSH, LSEH, to prevent the Gf marker tasks from creating 
proactive interference for the MSG task.  
Those in the Experimental and Complex Control conditions received only MSG, LSH and 
LSEH. However, those in the PI Control Condition, received MSG, followed by a short 
version of Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1962), followed by LSH, then 
LSEH. The Raven’s task was meant to act only as a filler task. The MSG task in the PI 
Control Condition was very short, consisting of only one very easy MSG item. Hence, 
Raven’s was included to control for any fatigue that may have affected those in the 
Experimental and Complex Control conditions.  
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Statistical Model 
HLM was used to model performance on MSG at each attempt on the Complex and PI items, 
with condition and LSEH as predictors. The equivalent model was not constructed for LSH 
due to restriction of range issues that will subsequently be discussed. An identical model was 
used for Experiment 3.   
7.3 Results & Discussion 
This section will be organised as follows. Firstly, we will present descriptive statistics and 
correlations. We then move on to non-parametric tests that compare performance on the 
Complex and PI items for control and experimental groups, based on Gf ability groups 
(created by LSEH). For these tests, dependant variable for the MSG Task is the number of 
attempts needed on an item before multiple correct responses are achieved. This gives an 
approximation of the point at which participants start to understand the rule in MSG 
Complex/PI items and get attempts correct. This was essentially the same type of analyses 
used in pilot Experiment 2 and the main aim of these analyses here will be to see whether the 
results from the pilot can be replicated.  
We then move on to HLM analyses to gain a more complete picture of participants’ 
performance. These analyses will essentially be the same type as those which were the main 
focus of Experiment 3. The HLM will allow us to model the probability that a participant 
will get an attempt in the Complex/PI items correct (for all attempts), based on condition and 
their performance on LSEH.  The aim is to see if the findings from Experiment 3 can be 
replicated using a Gf marker involving different stimuli type to the MSG task (i.e., letters 
instead of numbers).  
194 
 
 
 
Non-parametric tests and HLM were not run for LSH due to floor effect and restriction of 
range issues for this marker. Instead, we examine the trimeans on the MSG task for those 
who scored in the top 5% on the LSH. The rationale for this was to see whether those who 
perform very well on such a task such as LSH, where learning across the task is hypothesized 
to be minimized, could do equally well on the Complex Control item where learning is also 
minimized.  
7.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Demographic information is presented in Table 7.1. Descriptive statistics for marker tasks 
used in the study are presented separately by condition in Table 7.2. Cronbach’s alpha is in 
the acceptable range (for research purposes).  Means for the LSH were very low (ranging 
from 7% - 10% correct across the three conditions), with lower standard deviation than the 
LSEH set. Hence, any direct comparison between the two sets, based on methods which 
examine variance (such as correlations) will be done with caution.  
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Descriptive statistics for the MSG task are presented in Table 7.3 separately for each 
condition. Distributions for many of the MSG items were not normal. This is consistent with 
the findings of Sweller and Gee (1978) and the findings from Experiments 2 and 3. To 
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address this lack of normality, Table 7.3 presents a variety of indicators of central tendency 
for the MSG task.  
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7.3.2 Correlations  
Table 7.4 presents Spearman’s rho correlations for each of the MSG items with LSEH and 
LSH, separately for each condition. Spearman’s rho is a non-parametric rank correlation.  
The increasing trend in correlations between LSEH and MSG items as they increase in 
difficulty and appear later in the task (-.06 to -.27), seen in Experiments 2 and 3 is repeated 
here for LSEH.  The process causing these increases in correlations may be learning. That is, 
learning across the task may be important in NSEH and may become increasingly important 
in MSG items as they get harder. That is, as the items get harder, participants may have to 
rely more on what they learn from previous items. Alternatively, the correlations between 
MSG and LSEH may increase with increases in the complexity of the MSG items.  
Also, as was the case in the Experiments 2 and 3, the Complex Control Item correlates 
moderately with easy-to-hard Gf marker (-.34). This may indicate that the within-item 
induction in the Complex Control Item is similar in process to across-item learning. 
Alternatively, the correlations may be due to the complexity of the Complex Control Item 
and similarities in within-item induction processes, and not related to across-item learning 
processes.  
The PI Item correlates moderately with LSEH in its Control Condition (-.30), but not in the 
Experimental Condition (-.04). This was also the case for NSEH in experiment 3. This is 
evidence against the Individual Differences Proactive Interference hypothesis (that those of 
higher Gf ability suffer less from proactive interference) because if learning leads to 
proactive interference and those of higher Gf ability are better at combating it, then the PI 
Item in the Experimental Condition should have correlated more highly with LSEH than the 
PI Item in the Control Condition.  
198 
 
 
 
LSH did not have any significant relationships with any of the MSG items. This may be due 
to the restriction of range issues with LSH. However, LSH correlated moderately with LSEH 
(.33 to .65) in each condition.  
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7.3.3 Non-parametric Comparisons of Gf Ability Groups (Based on LSEH) 
Construction of LSEH Ability Groups 
LSEH was used to divide participants into low and high Gf groups. Those who scored in the 
bottom 50% (score range: 0 - 9) were placed in the “Low LSEH” ability group and those in 
the top 50% (score range: 10 - 20) were placed in the “High LSEH” ability group.  
Since our aim will be to compare the conditions within the ability groups, it is important to 
know that the condition groups did not differ significantly on Gf at the outset. Due to unequal 
sample sizes in the three conditions, the Univariate General Linear Model (GLM) analysis of 
variance procedure was used with Type III sums of squares. Descriptive statistics and F-tests 
are presented in Table 7.5. There was no significant difference on Gf across conditions for 
any group.  
The Classical Gf Hypothesis – LSEH  
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test was used to test for differences between ability 
groups within the Complex Control Condition. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 
7.6.  Consistent with Experiments 2 and 3, the High LSEH group solved the Complex item 
significantly faster than the Low LSEH group, in the Control Condition (Mann–
Whitney U = 177, nLowLSEH  = 25, nHighLSEH = 22, p = .03, two-tailed). This is consistent with 
the Classical Gf Hypothesis. Also consistent with Experiments 2 and 3, there appears to be a 
floor effect for the Complex Control Item for both groups. This suggests that without across-
item learning opportunity, complex, novel items are very difficult for all ability groups. 
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The General Learning Hypothesis and the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis - 
LSEH 
Multiple Mann-Whitney tests were used to test for differences between the Experimental and 
Complex Control condition groups, within each ability group.  The tests and their relevant 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 7.6. All ability groups demonstrated the 
sequence/learning effect; their respective Experimental groups solved the Complex item 
significantly faster than their Complex Control groups. That is, both high and low LSEH 
ability groups could learn within a task. This is consistent with Experiments 2 and 3 and 
Figure 7.1 illustrates these effects graphically for the LSEH groups using trimeans.  
While all ability groups were able to learn, Figure 7.1 suggests that those from the High 
LSEH group were more able to benefit from their learning opportunity than those from the 
Low LSEH group, as there is a larger gap between their Complex Control and Experimental 
groups (compared to the smaller gap between the Low LSEH Complex Control and 
Experimental groups). This is consistent with Experiment 2 and 3. However, in the 
Experimental Condition, the High LSEH group did not solve the Complex Item significantly 
faster than those in the Low LSEH group, (Mann–Whitney U = 325, nLowLSEH = 
24, nHighLSEH = 36 , p = .10 two-tailed), although the difference was marginally significant. 
We shall return to exploring this potential interaction effect with HLM, shortly.  
Figure 7.2 illustrates trimeans across the MSG task for LSEH groups in the Experimental 
Condition. Those in the High LSEH group display the “learning-to-learn effect”. That is, 
despite the items increasing in complexity across the task, trimeans did not increase after item 
3. The Low LSEH group also display this effect, but to a lesser extent, consistent with 
Experiment 2 and 3.  
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Figure 7.1. Trimean MSG scores on Complex and PI items for Experimental and Control 
Conditions, by LSEH ability groups.   
 
 
Figure 7.2. Trimean MSG scores across the task for Experimental groups, by LSEH  
ability groups.   
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The General Proactive Interference and the Individual Differences Proactive Interference 
Hypothesis – LSEH  
Multiple Mann-Whitney tests were used to test for differences between the Experimental and 
Complex Control condition groups, within each ability group.  The tests and their relevant 
descriptive statistics were presented in Table 7.6. No groups seemed to suffer from proactive 
interference; however those in the High LSEH group suffered marginally significant 
proactive interference. This is similar to the findings from pilot Experiment 2, where the 
Mann-Whitney test suggested that those in the High LSEH group was the only group to 
suffer from significant proactive interference. It is also similar in finding to Experiment 3, 
where according to the Mann-Whitney test, no groups suffered from proactive interference, 
including the High NSEH group. Overall, this is weak support for the General Proactive 
Interference Hypothesis (that learning across a task results in proactive interference for later 
items when the rules are dissimilar and the more you learn, the more you will suffer from 
proactive interference) and contrary to the Individual Differences Proactive Interference 
Hypothesis (that those of lower Gf suffer more from proactive interference than those of 
higher Gf ability).  
7.3.4 Hierarchical Linear Modelling with LSEH 
A two-level Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) was used to further understand the 
relationship between performance on the MSG task, condition and LSEH.  The probability of 
getting an attempt correct (where “Correct” = 1 if correct; 0 if incorrect)11 in the item was 
                                                           
11
 The MSG task was programmed to exit from an item after a total of 12 correct responses for that 
item. This would have resulted in a lot of missing data for the HLM. Hence, missing responses due to 
participants successfully exiting an item were assigned a “1” (i.e., scored as “correct”).  
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modelled with log-odds as the dependent variable. The two-level model is identical to the one 
used and described in detail for Experiment 3, Chapter 6.  
The level-1 model is stated by equation (1). Attempt is the attempt number in the item, 
centred at the grand-trimean number of attempts for all participants on the item (attempt 
number 34 for Complex Item and attempt number 3 for the PI item), 
Equation (1) predicts ηij, the log-odds of success for participant i at time t; based on Attemptti. 
Thus, π0i represents the log-odds of success of participant i when Attemptti is equal to 0 
(where 0 = grand-trimean number of attempts for the item). π1i is the growth (improvement) 
rate for participant i over the item. Since this model uses Bernoulli sampling, there is no error 
term in equation (1): 
ηij = π0i + π1iAttemptti     (1)  
The level-2 model predicts the coefficients in the level-1 model and is stated by equations (2) 
and (3). Condition is the dummy variable for condition (0 = Control; 1 = Experimental) and 
LSEH_Cent is centred LSEH (0 = grand-mean): 
π0i = β00 + β01Condition1i + β02LSEH_Cent2i + β03Condition X LSEH_Cent3i + r0i       (2) 
π1i = β10  + β11Condition1i + β12LSEH_Cent2i + β13Condition X LSEH_Cent3i     (3) 
β00 is the value for π0i when all of its predictors are 0 (that is, for someone in the Control 
Condition, with grand-mean LSEH score). β10 is the growth rate (that is, the value for π1i) 
when all of its predictors are 0 (that is, for someone in the Control Condition, with grand-
mean LSEH score). r0i is the deviation of participant i from the trimean performance at 
attempt number 34 (for Complex Item) or 3 (PI Item).  
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Thus, the intercept π0i predicts the log-odds of success for participant i, at the grand-trimean 
number of attempts based on the main effects of Condition, LSEH and their interactions. The 
Attempt slope π1i predicts the growth rate for participant i, over the course of the item, based 
on the main effects of Condition, LSEH and their interactions. HLM models were run 
separately for the Complex Item and the PI Item. We first present the analyses for the 
Complex Item.  
HLM Analyses of the Complex Item (the Classical Gf Hypothesis and the Learning 
Hypotheses) 
Table 7.7 presents the estimates of the HLM parameters, which were obtained in HLM 6 
(Raudenbush et al., 2004) for the Complex Item. All results for the Complex Item are 
consistent with Experiment 3.  
Intercept π0i represents the log-odds of success at the grand-trimean number of attempts for 
the Complex Item, that is, attempt number 34.  Slope π1i represents the growth (improvement) 
rate for participant i over the item, that is, changes to the log-odds of success as a function of 
attempt number.  
Model 1 includes all predictors. Non-significant and weak predictors were dropped from the 
model based on two criteria. Predictors with t-ratios of smaller magnitude than +/- 1 were 
dropped (since the threshold for significance is +/- 2) as were predictors with significant 
coefficients weaker  than +/- 0.01 (since log-odds of +/- 0.009 corresponds to an odds ratio of 
1.009 and would not contribute much to the model).  The final results are presented in Table 
7.7, Model 2.  
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Performance at the Grand-Trimean Number of Attempts: The coefficients that predict 
π0  indicate that at attempt number 34, the log-odds of success is significantly predicted by 
Condition and LSEH and the interaction between Condition and LSEH is marginally 
significant. These effects are more clearly illustrated in Figure 7.3.  At attempt 34, regardless 
of LSEH, those in the Experimental Condition have a higher probability of success and this 
supports the General Learning Hypothesis. Regardless of Condition, those with higher scores 
on LSEH have a higher probability of success. Also, the marginally significant interaction 
between Condition and LSEH is indicated by the larger gap between the broken lines - i.e. 
between the higher Gf, Control and Experimental groups (compared to the smaller gap 
between the solid lines – i.e. the Control and Experimental groups for those of lower Gf). 
That is, there is some (marginally significant) evidence that those of higher Gf profited more 
from the opportunity to learn across items than those of lower Gf. Thus, there is some support 
for the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis. This result is consistent with the 
equivalent result from Experiment 3.  
Again, there appears to be a floor effect for the Complex Control Item for both groups. This 
suggests that without across-item learning opportunity, complex, novel items are very 
difficult for all ability groups. Visual examination of Figure 7.3 suggests that those in the 
Control Condition (even of higher Gf) were rarely able to reach the correct answer on any 
attempt – the predicted probability of success for those in the 75th percentile of NSEH (Gf 
ability) in the Complex Control Condition rarely goes above 10%. Thus, the results are 
somewhat inconsistent with the Classical Gf Hypothesis because it appears that without some 
exposure to earlier, simpler items to provide participants with the relevant, related 
knowledge, induction is practically impossible. This result is consistent with the equivalent 
result from Experiment 3.  
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Growth of Success: The coefficients for π1 in Table 7.7 indicate that Condition is the 
only significant predictor of the rate of growth of success, over the course of the Complex 
Item. It can be seen in Figure 7.3 that only those in the Experimental Condition improved 
their performance with more attempts. Furthermore, Figure 7.3 suggests that those in the 
Control Condition were rarely able to reach the correct answer on any attempt. The lack of 
significance of LSEH in predicting rate of growth suggests that Condition (i.e., exposure to 
earlier, simpler items) is more important than Gf ability in being able to induce the correct 
answer. That is, it appears that it is very difficult to make mappings between within-item 
analogues to induce the general concept (i.e., work out the rules by looking for 
generalisations among the item’s stimuli) in complex Gf items, unless one is provided with 
earlier, easier items to provide one with the relevant, prior knowledge. This seems to be the 
case, regardless of one’s Gf ability. This suggests that the knowledge provided by across-item 
learning is essential to induction, for all levels of Gf ability and is contrary to the Classical Gf 
Hypothesis but supports the General Learning Hypothesis. This result is consistent with the 
equivalent result from Experiment 3.  
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Figure 7.3. Predicted probability of success (Correct = 1) as a function of Condition, LSEH 
and Attempt, on Complex Item, based on Model 1 from Table 7.7. Black line indicates 
differences in predicted success between those in the Experimental Condition and those in the 
Control Condition, separately for those of higher and lower Gf ability at Attempt number 34 
(the grand trimean number of attempts).  
 
HLM analyses of PI item (the Proactive Interference Hypotheses) 
A similar two-level HLM was used to model probability of getting an attempt correct (where 
“Correct” = 1 if correct; 0 if incorrect) in the PI Item, with its log-odds as the dependent 
variable and Condition and LSEH as the independent variable. Table 7.8 presents the 
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estimates of the HLM parameters, which were obtained in HLM 6 (Raudenbush et al., 2004), 
for the PI Item. Intercept π0i represents the log-odds of success at the grand-trimean number 
of attempts for the PI Item, that is, attempt number 3.  Slope π1i  represents the growth 
(improvement) rate for participant i over the item, that is, changes to the log-odds of success 
as a function of attempt number. Model 1 includes all predictors. Non-significant and weak 
predictors were dropped from the model based on two criteria. Predictors with t-ratios of 
smaller magnitude than +/- 1 were dropped as were predictors with significant coefficients 
weaker  than +/- 0.01. The final results are presented in Table 7.8., Model 2.  
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Performance at the Grand-Trimean Number of Attempts:  The coefficients for π0 
indicate that at attempt number 3, the log-odds of success is (marginally) significantly 
predicted by Condition. Figure 7.4 indicates that at Attempt number 3, regardless of Gf 
ability, those in the PI Control Condition have a (marginally significant) higher probability of 
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success than those in the Experimental Condition, which is consistent with the General 
Proactive Interference Hypothesis. That is, those who learn about one type of rule, find it 
harder to solve items of a different rule type later on. However, this effect is general and not 
predicted by Gf ability. This supports the General Proactive Interference Hypothesis but not 
the Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis.  
This is not consistent with the Mann-Whitney test in section 7.2.3 and Experiment 3 where 
those of higher Gf ability (as indicated by LSEH) suffered from proactive interference. 
However, these effects were small; the difference between the PI Control Condition and the 
Experimental Condition for the High LSEH was only marginally significant in section 7.2.3. 
Growth of Success: The coefficients for π1 indicate that only Condition was a 
significant predictor of the rate of growth (improvement) of success, over the course of the PI 
Item. It can be seen in Figure 7.4 that on average, the red lines representing the Experimental 
Condition are steeper than the blue lines that represent the PI Control Condition. That is, 
while the Control Condition did better than the Experimental Condition at Attempt 3, the 
Experimental Condition would have quickly caught up. That is, while the result supports the 
General Proactive Interference Hypothesis, proactive interference is temporary. This is 
consistent with Experiment 3.  
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Figure 7.4.  Predicted probability of success (Correct = 1) as a function of Condition, LSEH 
and Attempt, on Complex Item, based on Model 1 from Table 7.8. Black line indicates 
differences in predicted success between those in the Experimental Condition and those in the 
Control Condition at Attempt number 3 (the grand trimean number of attempts).  
  
7.3.5 Examination of LSH Higher Performers 
LSH could not be used to split participants into high and low Gf ability groups.  The 
relatively high level of difficulty of the set resulted in a floor effect and restriction of range. 
Those in the bottom 50% scored in the range of only 0-1, while those in the top 50% scored 
in the much wider range of 2-12. This restriction of range makes it inappropriate to collapse 
them into two separate groups and renders HLM less informative.  
However, a relevant post-hoc question that arises from this is whether those who performed 
very well on LSH task also performed very well on the MSG Complex Item in the Complex 
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Control Condition. That is, are there those who are able to reason well inductively, without 
much across-item learning opportunity? And can they do so on more than one task? 
Specifically, can those who perform very well on a task such as LSH, where learning across 
the task is hypothesized to be minimized, do equally well on the Complex Control item where 
no across-item learning is provided?  
 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Trimean MSG scores on Complex and PI items for Experimental and Control 
Conditions, for those in the top 5% of LSH.  
 
The top 5% of participants on LSH were selected to be examined. Their performance on LSH 
was higher than that for the rest of the sample; their mean score on LSH was 5.27 (44%, SD 
= 1.49, n = 11), compared to the entire samples mean of 1.02 (8%, SD = 1.45, n = 169). 
However, their pattern of performance on the MSG task was not very different to that of the 
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rest of the sample (Figure 7.5). They appear to demonstrate a proactive interference effect 
and their trimean on the Complex Item (Control Condition) was 46, which is somewhat 
similar to the rest of the sample’s performance which was 45. The sample size for this 
extreme group was too small for statistical tests of these differences to be meaningful (n ≈ 4, 
per condition). However, their general pattern of performance suggests that despite their 
special level of performance on LSH, they did not display the same level of performance on 
MSG without across-item learning opportunity, and when across-item learning opportunity 
was provided, they seemed to benefit from it just as much as other participants.  It also 
appears that they suffered from proactive interference on the PI item.  
7.4 General Discussion and Summary of Results for Experiments 2, 3 and 
4 
Experiments 2, 3 and 4 focused on the distinction between knowledge that may be brought to 
the task, learning that occurs across multiple items in the task and induction within a single 
item that may be independent of any prior knowledge. The effect of proactive interference as 
a consequence of learning and knowledge was also investigated. The experiments examined 
which of these are relevant to general performance (i.e., common to everyone) and which 
contribute to individual differences. Finally, an additional question of interest was the effect 
of item ordering in Gf tasks on the learning opportunity provided in such tasks. Each of these 
issues will be discussed in detail, in light of the results from these studies.  
Results from the current experiment (Experiment 4) were largely consistent with the results 
from Experiments 2 and 3. Rather than summarising the results for Experiment 4 separately 
(which would be verging on repeating the summary of results for Experiment 2 and 3), we 
shall present broad summary of all the important results from all three experiments together 
and their implications for the relevant hypotheses and predictions.  
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The Classical Gf Hypothesis 
Overall, the Classical Gf Hypothesis, which was based on theorising in the differential 
literature - such as the works of Cattell (1987), Gottfredson (1997) and Spearman (1932), was 
partially supported. It predicted that in the absence of across-item learning and prior 
conceptual knowledge, induction on complex Gf items would still be possible (through the 
participant’s mappings between the concrete stimuli in the item, which can result in the 
acquisition of general concepts such as the rules in the item). Also those of higher Gf would 
outperform those of lower Gf (because they would be better at making the mentioned 
mappings).  However, we suspected performance would be quite low, for all (because 
according to analogical thinking theory, acquiring unfamiliar concepts is very difficult). If 
performance is not low – this would imply that the use of prior conceptual knowledge is 
involved instead. 
For the Complex Control Item, when no across-item learning opportunity was provided, 
performance was indeed generally very low for all Gf ability groups, in all experiments. That 
is on average, participants required a very large number of attempts (and analogues) before a 
series of correct responses was achieved. When viewed in isolation, one might conclude that 
this was due to the item’s difficulty level.  However, in the Experimental Condition, when 
easier items led up to the Complex Item, performance improved dramatically for all groups, 
despite the complexity of the item staying the same. This suggested that the Complex Item is 
quite novel and that without easier, possibly more familiar items leading up to it (to allow for 
across-item learning opportunity), it was difficult for all Gf ability groups. The Classical Gf 
Hypothesis predicts that in the absence of across-item learning and prior conceptual 
knowledge, induction on complex Gf items would still be possible. In this case, it was 
possible – but success rate was very low. Furthermore, participants were allowed many 
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attempts at the item. Gf items do not conventionally allow as many attempts and analogues as 
the MSG task. Thus, it is questionable whether induction in complex, novel Gf items would 
be possible without across-item learning.  
However, Gf ability was a significant predictor of performance on the Complex Control Item. 
That is, even when across-item learning opportunity was not available (and despite the floor 
effects), those of higher Gf outperformed those of lower Gf on the Complex Item. This is 
consistent with the component of the Classical Gf Hypothesis which states that regardless of 
whether there is across-item learning opportunity leading up to an item, those of higher Gf 
will outperform those of lower Gf.  
Also, the Complex Control Item consistently correlated moderately with Gf markers 
presented easy-to-hard. This may indicate that the within-item induction in the Complex 
Control Item share processes in common with across-item learning. Indeed, in the 
introduction, we proposed that within-item induction and across-item learning may be similar 
in processes because they both seem to be examples of analogical thinking (Gick & Holyoak, 
1983 ) – both involve the transfer of knowledge from one situation to another by a process of 
mapping. Across item learning may involve building upon what is already known (and hence, 
explicit and easy), learnt from previous items, to understand something previously unknown 
and novel (something less explicit and harder) in latter, more complex items. Within-item 
induction may involve the process of mapping between two concrete analogues, to learn 
something previously unknown and less explicit, through noticing regularities/similarities 
between analogues available in an item. The former involves the application of knowledge 
gained from previous items to a current item and the latter involves the application of 
knowledge learnt from mappings between analogues, to other analogues within a single item. 
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The similarity of these processes would explain the Complex Control Item’s correlation with 
Gf markers presented easy-to-hard.  
The General Learning Hypothesis 
The General Learning Hypothesis, which was based on the work of Sweller and Gee (1978) 
and Holland et al. (1989) from the cognitive literature, was supported. It predicted that 
Simpler items act as across-item learning opportunity for more complex items with similar 
rules. When this across-item learning opportunity is provided, performance on the complex 
item will improve greatly for all, compared to when learning opportunity is not provided. 
Mann-Whitney tests showed that in all experiments, all Gf groups benefited from across-item 
learning opportunity. This was supported by HLM analyses which were conducted in 
Experiments 3 and 4.  
The Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis 
The Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis, which was based on the works of Carlstedt 
et al. (2000) and Verguts and De Boeck (2002b) from the cognitive-differential literature, 
was largely supported. It predicted that when across-item learning opportunity is provided, 
those of higher Gf ability will improve more than those of lower Gf ability, due to those of 
higher Gf ability being better learners. The HLM models in Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that 
when across-item learning opportunity was provided those of higher Gf ability benefitted 
marginally significantly more from this learning opportunity (compared to their performances 
when no across-item learning was provided). While the effect was only marginally significant 
in both experiments, the fact that the effect was found in both experiments (and backed up by 
trimean trends in Experiment 2), suggests that it is a real effect rather than a type I error; and 
the marginal significance may be due to lack of power.  
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 The General Proactive Interference Hypothesis and the Individual Differences Proactive 
Interference Hypothesis 
The General Proactive Interference Hypothesis, based on the work of Sweller and Gee 
(1978), predicted that learning in Gf tasks produces proactive interference for items that 
contain dissimilar rules. The Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis, based 
on Unsworth and Engle (2005a) predicted that those of higher Gf are better at combating 
proactive interference than those of lower Gf. There was support for the former but not for 
the latter.  
With regard to proactive interference, there was evidence from the HLM in Experiments 3 
and 4 that those in the PI Control Condition had a better chance of success on the PI item 
than those in the Experimental Condition – demonstrating the proactive interference effect. 
However, there was no evidence that those of lower Gf ability suffer more from proactive 
interference.  Overall, easy-to-hard markers correlated moderately with PI item in the PI 
Control Condition, but not in the Experimental Condition. One explanation for this is that 
those of higher Gf suffer more from proactive interference – which would reduce the 
experimental PI Item’s correlations with Gf.  
Certainly, non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests from Experiments 3 and 4 suggest those of 
higher Gf  (but not lower Gf) seem to suffer  from proactive interference (at least when the 
marker was Letter Series presented easy-to-hard). That is, those of higher Gf may suffer more 
from proactive interference when faced with items of a different rule type because they learn 
more from items of the same rule type. However, the effect of proactive interference, when 
present, was always either weak or marginally significant. Nevertheless, there is certainly no 
evidence that those of lower Gf suffer more from proactive interference than those of higher 
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Gf. This was a surprising finding, because many studies have shown WMC accounts for 
much of the variance in Gf tasks and what seems to be important about WMC tasks is that 
they require the combat of proactive interference (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003; Engle et 
al., 1999).  
A possible starting point for an explanation is given by Sternberg (1986). Some rules 
(concepts) are more entrenched (familiar) in one’s experience than other rules. Indeed, we 
believe that simpler rules also tend to be more familiar than complex rules. The PI Item was a 
simple item. It could be that its rule is equally entrenched in the minds of all participants and 
thus, the item was not very sensitive to differences in proactive interference.  
Another potential explanation is that since those of higher Gf learn more across the task, they 
should display more of the effects of proactive interference than those of lower Gf ability. 
The fact that there was no significant difference in the amount of proactive interference 
shown, may suggest that those of higher Gf are indeed better at combating proactive 
interference.  
A Hypothesis Regarding the Methodological Issue of the Presentation Format of the Gf 
Marker:   
Gf tasks are usually presented in easy-to-hard order. It is possible that this presentation 
format plays a role in creating learning opportunity. Gf markers with only hard and 
moderately hard items were intended to capture performance on these Gf items when learning 
across the task is minimised. We predicted that they would have weaker relationships with 
any learning effects that we find. Unfortunately, the manipulation resulted in very low 
performance for the majority of participants and restriction of range and variance issues for 
these measures, which limited the type of analyses that could be run with them. It is possible 
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that this very low level of performance mirrors the very low performance for the Complex 
Control Item. That is, without much or any across-item learning opportunity, novel items are 
very difficult for all Gf ability groups.  
We examined the top 5% of performers on these types of markers (where only moderately 
hard and hard items are presented). The rationale behind this was:  if these types of markers 
minimise across-item learning opportunity and the performance on the Complex Control Item 
is free of any influence from across-item learning opportunity, then those who perform very 
well on these particular Gf markers may also be able to perform very well on the Complex 
Control Item. This hypothesis was not supported.   
The top 5% on these types of Gf markers’ general pattern of performance suggested that 
despite their special level of performance on the Gf markers, they did not display the same 
level of performance on the Complex Control Item without across-item learning opportunity. 
Furthermore, when across-item learning opportunity was provided, they seemed to benefit 
from it just as much as other participants.  This finding suggests that the ability to reason well 
with-out across-item learning opportunity, in traditional Gf items is task specific. That is, it 
may be due to knowledge of certain concepts that are brought to the task.  
7.4.1 Implications for Processes Involved in Gf and Individual Differences 
Thus, overall, the results from the three experiments:  
• Partially supported the Classical Gf Hypothesis  
• Supported the General Learning Hypothesis 
• Largely supported the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis.  
• Largely supported the General Proactive Interference Hypothesis 
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• Did not support the Individual Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis.  
The partial support of the Classical Gf Hypothesis suggests that induction in a complex Gf 
item, in isolation from knowledge learnt from previous items in the task or knowledge 
brought to the task is very difficult but possible. While it may be possible to solve a Gf item 
in the absence of across-item learning opportunity, the support found for the General 
Learning Hypothesis suggests that learning does occur in Gf tasks. Furthermore, the support 
for the Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis suggests that those of higher Gf learn 
more than those of lower Gf. That is, learning across the task is a source of individual 
differences in performance. The floor effects that appeared for the Complex Item in the 
absence of across-item learning opportunity and the restriction of range issues in markers that 
theoretically limited across-item learning opportunity, suggest that tasks are better able to 
measure Gf if they allow across-item learning opportunity.  There was also some evidence to 
suggest that when across-item learning opportunity is not provided, performance may then 
depend on knowledge that participants bring to the task, which may make the task a less 
“fluid” measure.  
While there is a difference between across-item learning and within-item induction that 
occurs in isolation from previous knowledge, the application of analogical thinking theory 
(Gick & Holyoak, 1983 ) suggests that they may be similar processes because both seem to 
be instances of analogical thinking. Indeed, the positive correlations between conditions/tasks 
that allowed for across-item learning opportunity and those that did not, suggests that they 
may indeed be similar processes.  
The support for the General Proactive Interference Hypothesis but not the Individual 
Differences Proactive Interference Hypothesis suggests that proactive interference occurs in 
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Gf tasks (as a result of across-item learning), but does not contribute to individual differences 
in performance. That is, those of lower Gf ability do not suffer more from proactive 
interference.  
7.4.2 Significance and Limitations of Experiments 2, 3 and 4 
Experiments 2, 3, and 4 were significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, unlike Experiment 
1, they were able to assess the amount learnt across-items without confounding this learning 
with whether participants were able to successfully solve items that were intended to provide 
learning opportunity. Providing more exposure to rules is providing potential learning 
opportunity but that learning opportunity may not be exploited unless the participant can 
answer the items correctly (Verguts & De Boeck, 2002b) – and thus fully comprehend the 
rule. The more items the participant answers correctly, the more actual learning opportunity 
may be available to them. It was found in the MSG task when actual learning opportunity 
was provided to all participants (through allowing participants multiple attempts and allowing 
the item to get theoretically easier with more attempts, until they are able to successfully 
solve it) all participants were able to learn but those of higher Gf were able to learn more. 
What this suggests is that the finding from Experiment 1 – that those of higher Gf benefitted 
more from across-item learning opportunity – was unlikely due to them simply being better at 
within-item induction and creating more actual learning opportunity for themselves. Even 
when the same amount of actual learning opportunity is available to all, as was the case in 
Experiments 2 through 4, those of higher Gf still benefitted more from this learning 
opportunity.  
In addition to being able to assess across-item learning without confounding it with success 
of within-item induction, Experiments 2 through 4 were also able to assess within-item 
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induction isolated from any potential influences from across-item learning. This is because 
the MSG task allows single items to be administered in isolation from other items.   
Furthermore, the use of HLM in experiments 3 and 4 allowed us to model the probability of 
success at each attempt, thereby providing us with an indication of the variability of 
performance for those of different levels of Gf within a single item. Hence, the MSG task was 
also able to allow us to ascertain (to a certain degree) whether induction on complex Gf items 
(in the absence of across-item learning) involves the use of prior knowledge brought to the 
test or rule discovery processes that occur in isolation from the use of prior knowledge. The 
very low levels of success on each attempt on the Complex Item, in the absence of across-
item learning opportunity, suggested that complex Gf type items contain rules that are indeed 
novel to (at least the majority) of participants. Had the rules been more familiar to 
participants, one would expect a more similar pattern of performance to the Complex Item in 
the Experimental Condition. In this condition, participants were provided with learning 
opportunity across the test to familiarise them with the rule and this led to better levels of 
performance that incrementally improved with each attempt.  
A limitation of the current experiments is that although the MSG task has Gf-like 
characteristics, it is not a conventional Gf task. However, we argued that it is sufficiently 
similar to conventional Gf tasks and this is supported by the fact that it consistently showed 
moderate, positive correlations with the Gf markers. Another limitation is that we only used 
single Gf tests (instead of a Gf factor) and these, being series completion tasks, were rather 
similar in nature to the MSG task. Future studies could employ multiple tests to more derive a 
more traditional Gf factor.  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, within-item induction processes can occur in complex items in isolation from 
prior knowledge and these processes contribute to individual differences in performance. 
Learning across items also occurs and it appears to contribute to individual differences in 
performance. This learning creates proactive interference for items that appear similar but 
contain different rule types. However, there was not strong enough evidence to suggest that 
the ability to combat this proactive interference contributes to individual differences in 
performance.  
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Summary of Aims and Hypotheses 
The aim of this thesis was to gain a better understanding of Gf through investigating why 
people differ on Gf tasks. Specifically, this thesis examined whether learning processes occur 
in fluid intelligence (Gf) tests, whether it is essential for them to occur for induction to take 
place, and whether they contribute to individual differences in performance. Gf has been 
reliably identified by factor analysis as important in novel induction tasks but its exact nature 
is still rather poorly understood. Cognitive theories of inductive reasoning that are broad 
enough to be applicable to all Gf tasks emphasise the importance of prior conceptual 
knowledge in the inductive process (Holland et al., 1989; Sternberg, 1986). This tension 
between the view in the differential literature that Gf is a fluid ability to reason when faced 
with novel problems (Cattell, 1987) and the view in the cognitive literature that possession of 
relevant prior conceptual knowledge is important to success in induction acts as a potential 
barrier to understanding Gf.  
We proposed that one way to reconcile the seemingly incompatible views is to consider that 
learning processes may occur across items within Gf tasks, and act as the mediator between 
the novelty in Gf items and the knowledge needed to solve them. We hypothesised that: 
1) Complex Gf items contain novel relationships that are very difficult (or near 
impossible) to induce without guidance from some prior conceptual knowledge. This 
prior knowledge is (gradually) provided by earlier, easier, items which are more 
227 
 
 
 
familiar. Thus, learning is a necessary process in Gf tests (the “General Learning 
Hypothesis”). 
2) Furthermore, learning is a source of individual differences in Gf test performance. 
That is, those of higher Gf ability benefit more from across-item learning opportunity 
than those of lower ability (the “Individual Differences Learning Hypothesis”).  
We further hypothesised that  
3) Learning leads to a build up of proactive interference. 
4) Those of higher Gf ability must be better at combating proactive interference (because 
of Hypothesis 2 and 3).  
The learning hypotheses and the proactive interference hypotheses have been framed as 
competing hypotheses for the link between Gf and WMC (Unsworth & Engle, 2005a), but we 
have argued that they may not be mutually exclusive and may actually go hand-in-hand.  
8.2 Summary of Findings 
In Experiment 1 (Chapter 4) we tested the learning hypotheses by varying the occurrence of 
the “distribution of two rule” in three versions of the Raven test. Experiment 1 revealed that it 
is not necessary for participants to learn about the distribution of two rule from simple items, 
in order for them to solve items containing complex instantiations of the rule later in the test. 
That is, the results suggested that rule learning is not necessary for induction to take place. 
However, the results also suggested that rule learning occurs in Raven and contributes to 
individual differences in Raven performance, with those of higher Gf benefitting more from 
more exposure to the distribution of two rule. 
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Experiment 1 also highlighted an unexpected issue that we pursued further in Experiments 2, 
3 and 4. The results suggested that in order for participants to be able to learn from an item, 
they need to be able to get it correct - perhaps in order to get feedback that their hypothesis 
about the nature of the item is correct (Verguts & De Boeck, 2002a). Secondly, this may 
mean that those of lower Gf ability may not be able to learn as much from items simply 
because they are not able to get as many earlier items correct and not because they are less 
able to learn about rules across the test. That is, across-item learning may be confounded 
with within-item induction.  
Experiments 2, 3 and 4 (Chapters 5 – 7) investigated the learning hypotheses but addressed 
the potential confound between across-item learning and within-item induction through the 
MSG task. The proactive interference hypotheses were also examined. It was found that 
within-item induction processes can occur in complex items in isolation from prior 
knowledge. However, without across-item learning opportunity, complex items are very 
difficult for all Gf ability groups. Across-item learning also occurs and appears to contribute 
to individual differences in performance. This learning creates proactive interference for 
items that appear similar but contain different rule types. However, there was not strong 
enough evidence to suggest that the ability to combat this proactive interference contributes 
to individual differences in performance. There was also some evidence to suggest that the 
ability to reason well without across-item learning opportunity in traditional Gf items is task 
specific. That is, it may be due to knowledge of certain concepts that are brought to the task. 
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8.3 Implications for Processes Involved in Gf tasks 
8.3.1 Complex Items: Rule Discovery and Learning Processes 
The findings from Experiments 1 to 4 suggest that learning processes are important to 
induction in Gf tasks as well as to individual differences in Gf tasks. Gf items need to be 
novel to tap into “fluid” abilities as opposed to “crystallised” abilities. There was evidence in 
our experiments that suggested that performance on complex, novel items requires some 
guidance from knowledge provided by the successful solution of earlier, simpler items 
(which are arguably, more familiar – we shall examine this assumption further, later on). This 
may be because without some prior relevant knowledge, induction involves a lot of “trial and 
error” guessing. Thus, for Gf tasks to be both novel and meaningful measures that reliably tap 
into fluid ability (rather than random guessing), they must involve learning processes that 
build upon existing knowledge.  
According to Holland, Holyoak et al. (1989), induction cannot take place without previous 
knowledge. Due to the nature of inductive reasoning (reasoning in the absence of complete 
information), the solution to inductive problems can only be considered plausible (rather than 
correct) at best. And whether a solution could be characterized as plausible can be determined 
only with reference to the participant’s current knowledge. Indeed, the stimuli in a Gf item 
exist with various objective relations and associations between them, with the one considered 
the “correct relation” by the test-maker often only one of many other potentially correct 
relations (Passmore, 1935). Sweller and Gee (1978) highlight that prior knowledge may be 
more important in complex items than in simple ones.  They argue that the more complex the 
rule (relationship) in an item, the larger the number of other potentially correct rules may also 
be observed in an item. Thus, when items are complex, the correct rule could be hard to 
detect amongst all the other potentially correct rules unless they are more familiar. Across-
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item learning may be necessary to make the correct rule more familiar through a scaffolding 
process. Indeed, it was found that learning does appear to occur in Gf tests and those of 
higher Gf learn more than those of lower Gf.  
However, it was also found that in the absence of across-item learning opportunity, induction 
was still possible for some although, a) their success rate was very low, and b) those of higher 
Gf outperformed those of lower Gf. The low success rates may have been due to the reasons 
outlined by Passmore (1935) and Sweller and Gee (1978) mentioned previously. However, 
induction may have still been possible because of the mapping process typical in Gf items. 
According to (Gick & Holyoak, 1983 ) a general concept (such as a Gf item rule) can be 
learnt through the mapping between two analogues (such as the stimuli in a Gf item) -- that  
is through noticing regularities and similarities between analogues available in an item. 
While it is possible to induce the solution to a complex, novel, Gf item in the absence of 
across-item learning opportunity, conventional Gf tests do provide across test learning 
opportunity through the easy-to-hard presentation format. Thus, it is likely that the solution 
process in a Gf item involves a combination of within-item mapping of analogues and the 
application of knowledge learnt across items.  
Also, the processes of across-item learning and within-item induction (in the absence of any 
prior knowledge brought to the item) may be highly related. There was empirical evidence to 
suggest that those who are good at one are also good at the other. That is, there were positive 
relationships between measures that involved across-item learning opportunity and those that 
did not or minimised such opportunities. However, these correlations were not perfect, 
suggesting that these processes are not identical. Thus, Gf measures that are presented in 
easy-to-hard order may tap into something slightly different to Gf measures that are presented 
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in random order. It would be interesting to see in future studies whether tasks with different 
item orders form different factors.  
The findings from this thesis have implications for both classic and modern test theory, which 
make the assumption that conditional on person ability and item difficulty, items within a test 
are independent of each other – that is, items can in principle be presented in any order 
without changing the nature of the construct being measured. However, since learning occurs 
from one item to another, and if this learning is an ability different and not perfectly 
correlated with traditional Gf reasoning, the assumption of item independence is contradicted 
(D. P. Birney & Sternberg, 2006).  
8.3.2 What About Early Simple Items?  
This thesis has mainly focussed on complex Gf items that occur later in the task. This is 
because they are more likely to contribute to overall individual differences in performance on 
the overall test. A neglected topic of discussion is what processes may occur in early, simpler 
items; most importantly, the very first item that is not preceded by any items.  It was put 
forward in earlier chapters in this thesis that in the absence of across-item-learning, within-
item induction may involve the application of inferential rules that the participant brings to 
the test situation. The alternative was also put forward:  within-item induction may involve 
the discovering of the rules, which may have been totally novel to the participant, through a 
process of analogical mapping of the analogues provided within an item. We have worked 
with the assumption that early items contain familiar relationships that we all come across in 
some form in our lives. This is because some theorists believe that a concept cannot be 
recognised unless we already possess some prior knowledge of those concepts (Ohlsson & 
Lehtinen, 1997). For example, insight problems are not difficult to solve once we have been 
told about how to properly represent the problem (Sternberg & Davidson, 1995). However, 
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this is only a supposition based on our own induction. It is possible that the earliest Gf items 
involve induction independent of prior knowledge brought to the test. This is not a question 
we empirically examined.    
However, the earliest items tend to have high success rates - performance on them do not 
contribute to individual differences. It is possible that knowledge application processes are 
involved for some participants and rule discovery processes for others. As long as 
performance on these early items are sufficiently high enough for all participants to learn 
from them to have a chance at solving subsequent items, which processes are actually 
involved probably does not really matter.  
However, Gf tests may contain biases if early items can only be solved with the application 
of knowledge brought from outside of the test situation which is possessed by some 
participants, but not by others. This may be a question worth examining in future studies.  
8.3.3 What about Proactive Interference? 
Experiments 2 – 4 revealed that proactive interference occurs as a consequence of across-
item learning but it did not appear to affect those of lower Gf more than those of higher Gf.  
In fact, there was some evidence to suggest that those of higher Gf may suffer more from 
proactive interference. Sweller and Gee (1978) explain why this might be so. Proactive 
interference occurs when the participant encounters a rule that is very dissimilar to all the 
previous rules that they had previously encountered. According to Sweller and Gee (1978), 
this is because participants continue testing rules similar to the ones they previously 
encountered. The more they learn from previous rules, the more entrenched those types of 
rules become and the more they suffer from proactive interference.  
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However, our studies did not investigate the proactive interference question very thoroughly. 
It is possible that the MSG task was not able to replicate the conditions that actually occur in 
Gf tests that require the combating of proactive interference – in such conditions those of 
higher Gf may be better at combating proactive interference than those of lower Gf. For 
example, we investigated proactive interference using a very simple (arguably, familiar) item, 
whose rule may be well entrenched in the knowledge of all participants. Those of higher Gf 
may be better at combating proactive interference in more complex, novel items, whose rules 
are not as well entrenched. This may be a question worthy of future investigation.  
8.4 Implications for Cognitive Theories  
In Chapter 3 we outlined three broad theories of induction which we thought would be 
helpful to our quest to better understand the cognitive processes involved in Gf tasks. These 
were the theories of Sternberg (1986), Holland et al. (1989) and Spearman (1932). These 
theories have different emphases on what is important in induction. Sternberg emphasizes the 
use of prior conceptual knowledge, Holland emphasizes conceptual knowledge and learning 
and Spearman emphasizes the eduction of relations and correlates, which seem to occur in 
isolation from previous knowledge and learning. Only Spearman is consistent with the 
dominant, conventional novelty view of Gf, which sees it as largely uninfluenced by prior 
experience and knowledge. 
While at first glance they seem to conflict to varying degrees, our conclusion is that these 
three theories describe different aspects of the Gf induction process. Complex Gf items are 
indeed novel. However, the possession of relevant prior conceptual knowledge is important to 
induction success. Learning occurs in Gf tests and provides participants with the relevant, 
prior knowledge to successfully solve complex Gf items. The amount learnt contributes to 
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individual differences in performance (with those of higher Gf are able to learn more than 
those of lower Gf).  
We do not believe that these are the only processes involved in Gf tasks. Other theories of 
reasoning emphasise the importance of other processes such as working memory capacity 
(Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). It is likely that the processes emphasised in different theories 
are all important to Gf performance at different levels. For example, learning processes may 
require working memory capacity. That is, learning processes may be the link between the 
high correlations between working memory capacity and Gf tasks (Verguts & De Boeck, 
2002b). 
Many researchers have recommended that differential psychology take note of process 
theories from cognitive psychology (Cronbach, 1957; Deary, 2001; Lohman, 2000). 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis, mapping process theories onto ability 
constructs is difficult because it is not always obvious how cognitive theories (developed to 
explain general, average performance) might be applicable to explanations of individual 
differences in Gf tasks. We hope that we have shown that it is possible to use insights from 
cognitive psychology to increase our understanding of Gf. However, we would like to 
emphasise that it required theory synthesis and modification. That is, theories from cognitive 
psychology may require adjustments when they are used for the purposes of explaining 
processes involved in differential psychology’s ability constructs.  
8.5 Implications for Gf  
The research from this thesis has two major implications for understanding the Gf construct. 
Firstly, it has implications for how Gf is conceptualised. In the CHC theory of abilities 
(McGrew 2005), the most widely accepted organisation of human abilities (Alfonso et al., 
2005), “Learning Abilities” are not listed under Gf, but are listed as narrower abilities under 
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Short-Term Memory (Gsm) and Long-Term Storage and Retrieval (Glr), and are considered  
poorly defined by existing research (McGrew, 2005). According to Carroll (1993) it has often 
been proposed that an important aspect of intelligence is the ability to learn, but 
methodological issues and insufficient data has made it difficult to convincingly demonstrate 
this relation. Evidence from this thesis suggests that (pending further investigation and 
evidence) Gf should be reconceptualised to include learning processes.  
Secondly, the evidence from our research (potentially) sheds some light on why Gf is 
predictive of real world performance. Learning processes may be one of the links between Gf 
test performance and real world performance. That is, Gf measures may be predictive of real 
world success partly because it taps into learning which is important to performance in real 
world learning, such as in formal education, vocational training or learning practical 
knowledge about the world. 
8.6 Conclusion  
In conclusion, learning processes are important to induction in Gf tasks. Learning across the 
test occurs, learning needs to occur for induction to take place properly (as opposed to 
induction which involves some element of random guessing), and learning contributes to 
individual differences in performance on Gf tasks. It has been commonly assumed that 
conventional Gf tests do not allow for feedback nor opportunity to learn (Sternberg, 
Grigorenko et al. 2002), however, we have shown evidence to the contrary. Learning appears 
to be an important aspect of induction in Gf tasks and hence, fluid intelligence.  Thus far, it 
has been a neglected focus of research in investigations of Gf, but we conclude that it is 
worthy of further investigation.  
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APPENDIX A 
  
 
A.1 Items Generated for the Raven Learning Sets  
Every attempt was made to ensure that they would be as similar as possible to the original 
APM items they replaced. Things taken into account when generating items included: 
• The way the items looked (that is, the type of shapes/figures used) 
• Number of  rules in each item 
• Types of rules included in the item 
• Note: Instantiations of d2 rules require a minimum of 3 tokens. Any fewer and one of 
the entries will appear blank. Hence, some generated d2 rule items contained more rule 
tokens than the items they replaced.  
 
 
 
Item 7, No Exposure condition. 
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Item 8, No Exposure condition.  
 
Item 11, No Exposure condition. 
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Item 12, No Exposure condition.  
 
 
 
Item 3, Most Exposure condition. 
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Item 4, Most Exposure condition. 
 
 
 
Item 5, Most Exposure condition. 
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Item 6, Most Exposure condition. 
 
 
Item 9, Most Exposure condition. 
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Item 13, Most Exposure condition. 
 
 
 
 
Item 3, Transfer Set. 
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A.2  Characteristics of Learning Set items used in each condition and 
their equivalents in the original Raven (Advanced Progressive Matrices) 
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A.3  Transfer Set item characteristics 
 
 
 
A.4  Regression model for variables predicting performance on Learning 
Set 
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A.5 Working out for probabilities of chance level performance for 
Raven’s APM Transfer Set  
 
For each item there are 7 wrong options and 1 correct option. So there is 1/8  (or 12.5%) 
chance of getting an item correct by chance/guessing alone. Conversely, there is a 7/8 chance 
of getting an item wrong if one is guessing alone. Therefore, by guessing alone, the chance of 
getting all three Transfer Set items incorrect is: 
 
 7/8 x 7/8 x 7/8 = 343/512.  
 
Therefore, the chance of not getting all three items wrong  is: 
1 – (343/512) = 169/512 = 0.33 or 33%  
This 0.33 indicates that by chance and guessing alone, one is bound to get 1 item correct out 
of 3.  
 
 
 
A.6  Regression model for variables predicting performance on Transfer 
Set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
B.1 MSG Items with all of their correct target
 
 
 
Item 1: 
•  1st digit of correct response identical to 1st digit of target number.
•  2nd digit of correct response always 
• 1 pair = 1 analogue 
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-answer pairs and rules. 
 
“8”. 
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Item 2: 
•  1st digit of correct response identical to 1st digit of target number. 
•  2nd digit of correct response alternates between “7” and “8”: 
• 2 pairs = 1 analogue 
 
 
 
 
Item 3:   
• 1st digit of correct response identical to 1st digit of target number, but increases by 1 when 
2nd digit of correct answer is “0”. 
•  2nd digit of correct response alternates between “5”, “2” and “0”: 
• 3 pairs = 1 analogue. 
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Item 4: 
•  1st digit of correct response alternates between “6”,  and “1”. 
• 2nd digit of correct response identical to 2nd digit of target, but decreases by 1 when 1st digit 
of correct response is “1” 
• 2 pairs = 1 analogue 
 
 
 
 
Transfer item: 
•  1st digit of correct response alternates between “9”, “1” and “5”. 
• 2nd digit of correct response identical to 2nd digit of target, but doubled when 1st digit of 
correct response is “5” 
• 3 pairs = 1 analogue 
 
 
 
253 
 
 
 
 
PI item: 
•  Add 2nd digit of target onto the total 2 digit number. 
• 1pair = 1 analogue 
 
 
 
